1972_美国_AAR7227.pdf

8 N A T I O N A L T R A N S P O R T A T I O N S A F E T Y B O A R D

FB 212 988

AIRGRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,

BOEING 747-151, NGOSUS

OVER THE NORTK PACIFIC OCEAN

105 NAUTICAL MILS WEST OF 150 EAST

LONGITUDE AT 16 NORTH LATITUDE

AFRIL. 12, 1972

NATIONAL TECHNICAL INORIAATION SERVICE

NMITIGMAI IRA HSPORITATON SATITY BOARD

Washington, D. C. 20591

40104 N/Me/V N/SE AAR-12-21

FILE 100.1.83QY

Aircraft ACCIDENT REPORT

NORTHWEST AULIES, H.C.,

B01.906 747-151.9066US

OVER THE NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN

165 NAUVICAL MLES WEST OF 180° EAST

LONG SITUDE AT 38° NORTH LATITUOKE

APRIL 12, 1072

ASOPIED: PCTUER 4, 1972

NATIÓNAL TRAKSPORTATION SAFETV BOARD

Washington, 3. C. 20361

REPORT NUMBER; NTSC.AAR-12-27

TECHNICAL REPORT STANDARD TITLE PAGE

198 Report No.

ST答案·表法题·13-21

V. Title and Sublittle Aircraft Accident Report Bortver: Airlines, Inc., Poering 747-151, MORUS, over the North Facifis Ocean, 195.�asical Rlies Weo of 150th East longitude at 50th North Institute

1. Author (s)

1. Factorising Jigenzelton Type and Address

Theal Transportation Safety Board cerees of Aviation Safety Washington, D. C. 20591

1. Sponsoring Agency and Address

NATIONAL TRSPORATION SAFET BOAND Washington, D. C. 20591

TS.SuppTemporary Notes

So new Aircraft Safety Specifications are included in this report.

16. Astreet

1. For a event, airlineo Flight 22 of April 12, 1972, a Beering 167-151, WOCUK, encountered infereact light-to-seven, clear air curve for a period of 55 access while ending at High et al. 19, 300 foot on face to Bi�-L�u, Smith, from Tajk, Japan. There were 160 passengers and a crew of 16 alward. Seven of the passengers received more conjuriet, cell two received serial defarles. Five cells at students required almor Inflarlet. The misrift was unchanged. The secclest occurred at approximately 116/600.

The personal transpective safety board determines that the practile cause of its accident on the party of the olberft into an area of different, and respected sererear clear all but valence value, continuous occupants did not have been� intentible f�.

This model: support's peris is use amand�alica mode to the Federal Aviation. Allatistication and the pilots' our classines.

T.ley.w.di

Aircraft, second-end, unfore-�ed, clear air turt�ce; lA1015-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1-L1

IT.STISTHETOK'SISTHETOK

Publication of Public

1. Security Classifications

(of this report)

1. Security�Assiliations

(of this page) (CLASSIFIED)

1. No. cTFages

ITPUBTECH 43.00

WISI Fora 1945.2 (11/10)

FORTYER APLUTES, IX.,

2017 7-151, WOUS

YER THE SOP'S MICIMO OCIX

105 NAFICIAL KILLE VRIST OF 150° DATT LONOTIVDS

AT 26° BOTHIR LATTURE

APRIL 12, 1972

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Lurestligasico $\ldots$ 2

Analysis 4

Probable Data $\dots$ 5

Recommendations $\ldots$ 5

Atta taan4

tachost 1 - Crv Information

Attachment 3 · Injury Location Chart

Attachment ) · Safety Concerndations and Responses

SPECIAL NOTICE

This report contains the essential items of information relevant to the probable cause and safety message to be derived from this accident/incident. However, for those having a need for more detailed information, the original factual report of the accident/incident is on file in the Washington office of the National Transportation Safety Board. Upon request, the report will be reproduced commercially at an average cost of 15th per page for printed matter and 85th per page for photographs, plus postage. (4 minimum charge is $2.00.)

Coples of material ordered will be asiled from the Washington, D. C. business firm which holds the current contract for commercial reproduction of the Board's public files. Billing is sent direct to the requestor by that firm and includes a $2.00 user service charge by the Safety Board for special service. This charge is in addition to the cost of reproduction. No payments should be made to the National Transportation Safety Board.

Requests for reproduction should be forwarded to the:

National Transportation Safety Board Administrative Operations Division Accident Equities & Records Section Washington, D. C. 20591

Pilla: 1-0007

XAYOCIAL TRANCIUDATION SAFETTY BOARD VALUIDENTO., D. C., 20591 AIECRAIT AOCIDENT REPORT

Adopudi: Vicker A.A.X.R.

ROTHNISP ALPLINES, INC., BONTHA 767-151, R606US

OVER THAT NORTH FACIPIC (CHUN

105 MAUTICAL MILLES VEEP OF 150° PAYT LOUGITUDE AT PATURE LATITUDE ANGUL 12, 1972

ESbOPULS

Portport at Airlines 71/18s 22 of April 12, 1972, a Boeing 7h7-11h, NOSOS, encountered under coast severe turbulence at cruise altitude approximately 50 minutes after departure from Tokyo, Japan, while en route to Hovclula, famili. there were 116 passengers and a crew of 16 aboard the aircraft. Seven of the passengers received nicor injuries, and were received serious injuries. Pliv cabin attendants received other injuries.

The aircraft: was in level flight at 33,000 feet in smooth air when it encountered turbulence which ranged in intensity from light to severe fur- approximately 55 seconds. The "Fasten Seatbelt" sign was illuminated. Lamellately when the curtailence was encountered; however, during the period of the turtailence, seen of the passengers and flight attendees were throves about in the cabin and suctized the aforementioned injuries.

The aircraft was undanged and continued on to honolulu where the injured persons were deplined and hospitalized.

The Kecal-Local Transportation Safety board determines that the probable cause of the v accident was the entry of the aircrate's Lato an area of unforecast and unexpected severe clear air turbulence then some occupants did not have their sentbelte featured.

Subsequent to the Investigations of previous 3-787 accident involving turbulence, the Safety Board recommended that the Federal Aviation Activation require regulatory improvements concerning scourability distri- place , air carrier policy on deviation of flight with injured passengers , and reassentant of the required number and types of on-board first-maid kite and assembly of their contents . Also , as the result of a special study in the Rockfield area to review meteorological , communications , and in- traffic control facilities r.d. services of the United States , a r . ' w . under- vice was made to various pilota' amuseations for Improvement of 18.8 report- lag of meteorological information in in-flight pilot reports ,

· 2 ·

DIVISTIGARION

Sortheast Airlines, Inc., Flight 22, of April 12, 1972, a Keing et al. 151, 6008, var a regularly scheduled passenger flight between Tokyo, Japan, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, with intermediate stops at Eewulu, Hwull, and Los Angeles, California. There vero 146 passengers and a cover of 14 aboard the aircraft.

The flight departed from Tokyo at 1050,0.m.t. 1/ on an Instrument Flight Rules flight plan and was cleared to climb to and maintain flight at an altitude of 33,000 feet (flight level 330). According to the crew, light turtulence was encountered during the climb to approximately 29,000 feet. At this level the aircraft was on top of an overcast. The air was smooth, the visibility was excellent, and the stars overhead were clearly visible. Lightning was observed to the left or north of the aircraft, as well as below and rearward of the aircraft. The distance from the lighting was estimated to have been at least 50 miles or more. The flight deck crew continued operating the 30.2 weather radar system with one and one-half increases of down till to the antennas. The climb can inel to 33,000 feet where the flight lereled off at its assigned altitude.

Shortly before the flight reached the cruising altitude, the crew turned off the reattelt sign. The parzer made an enhancement to the passengera, stating that although the reattelt sign was off, for their personal safety, the passengers should leave their reattelts fastmed while in their seats.

At 1180, approximately 20 minutes after reach of the cruise altitude, unexpected light-to-severe turcolence was encountered for a period of 55 seconds. Weather radar provided no formarming of the turtulence. Immediately upon encountering the turbulence, the seatbelt signs was illustrated, the autopilot was discengaged, and the aircruit was flown annually by the captain. The captain experienced no difficulty in controlling the aircraft during this encounter.

At the termination of the turbulence eccenter, the second officer, vent back to the cabin to assess the situation and reported to the captain that a total of nine passengers and (fire�arใสส) wire injured.

17 All times are Greenwich mean, based on too 26-host clock.

· 3 ·

Displite the purder's advisory announcement, name of the injured passengers' ind their seatbelts fastened, although the majority of two were in their seats. The five stowardesses were standing. All those injured were located in war cabin areas.

The two most av��ly to jured passengers were a young boy who sustained a fracture of his left arm just above the elbow and a young girl who sustaines a dislocated right shoulder. The other injured passengers, and the stewardesses, received traisea, abrasions, and small lacerations 2/. The capitalv vlefted the injured persons and discussed with the parents of the two most severely injured passengers the avrisability of returning to Tokyo or containing to to Honolulu. The parents requested that the flight continue on to Honolulu. Flight 22 wanted at Honolulu at 1738. The injured persons should were taken to a hospital where they were examined and treated for their injuries.

While at Hocolulu, the aircraft was given an importance check for turbulence damage and exceed was forward. Following this maintenance inspection, the diaplase was returned to service and is�ized the flight to Los Angeles, California, and Xinocapolis, Minnesota.

A realout of the aircraft's flight data recorder for the period corring the turbulence encounter disclosed that acceleration reached a man/son of +1.3? g'e, and a minist of -0.91 g'e. The duration of the turbulence period was 55 seconds. Approximate penetration values for altitude, speed, and handling were 31,000 test, 30 ELAS 3/, and 100" magnetic, respectively.

The gross weight of Plight 22 at takeoff was 610,000 pounds and the center of gravity was 19.6 percent of MAC (Henn Acrolymasic Card). At the time of the turbulence encounter, the gross weight was 578,000 pounds and the center of gravity was 20.0 percent of MAC. The gross weight and the center of gravity were within allowable limits during the entire flight.

The 1300 surface weather chart regarded by the National Not-cological Center at Nillant, Maryland, showed a 100-pressure system centered near the accident elite, an cocloted front extending eastward from the low-pressure center to near 152° East, a var front extending east-southeast-ward from the point of occlusion, and a cold front extending southward and then southwestward from the point of occlusion.

The 500,300 a.lllbar chart (apply extremely 30,000 feet m.t.l.) which was; repaired by the National Meteorological Center showed a low-pressur system centered over the northern Sea of Japan with troughing ext. thing southward and southeastward from the low.

The Latino and Serial, Japan, 1200 radioscide ascents showed the tropopause at 260 alllibars (approximately 33,600 feet m.s.l.)

The capital received a number briefing from Northwest Airlines $^{1}$ Heteorological supportant prior to departing from Tokyo. Additionally, "we was provided "the weather documents which included appropriate terminal forecasts, winds and temperatures aloft forecast, and a 300-millibar progcast (chart. The progcastic chart contained the following: temperature, wind direction and speed, tropopause height and strato-spheric lapes rate, vertical wind shear, turbulence, and quality of ride. A smooth ride was forecast for the area of the turbulence encounter. There were no in-flight reports of turbulence from other flights regarding turbulence in the area in which it was encountered by Flight 22.

MALY318

Northwest Airlines Flight 22 was routine as 1st clibbed out of Tokyo toward Honolulu. The clip was through an overcast where the aircraft encountered light turbulence, which the flightcrew anticipated. At flight level 290, the aircraft was on top of the overcast where excellent visibility and sexoth air perviled. Twenty ministes after reaching its assigned flight level 330, it encountered severe turbulence for a very brief period of time.

This passengers and Five Steurdesses received injuries during this turbulence account.

The seatbelt sign was not on at the time the turbulence was encountered, but the passage has been advised to keep their seatbelts fastened while they were in their seaks. All of the injuries were sustained by persons not occurred by seatbelts. How of the injured passengers were seated, but all of the injured stevaries were standing.

Deficencies were reported in the first-ald equipment board the aircraft. There were not enough large packages nor pain-relieving medication for children, and there were no appropriate splints for desoblizing fractured limbs.

The Boeing Company's recommended� turbulence penetration speed for the B-747 (in 280 KJAS or 0.82 Mach, whicauer 16 lower, and it is also recommended that the autopille be used on turbulence mode. The aircraft encountered this unforecast and unexpected turbulence at approximately

· 5 ·

300 KLA3, and the flight data recover airsped trace indicated that the flighterew male every effort to receive to turbulence penetration speed as soon as the turbulence was encountered. The captain elected to fly the aircraft manually rather than to use the autotilot on turbulence penetration mode.

The flight data recorrier indicated that the aircraft was in level flight at approximately 33,009 feet when it encountered turbulence, which lasted about 55 seccs and rangel in intensity from 11ft to severe. One orlef, severe jolt produced a positive load factor of 1.32 g and a negative load factor of alous 0.91 g. The aircraft gained about 1,007 feet of altitude during the turbulence encounter. Changes in healing were since, Upon entry into the turbulence, the strapeet increased to a peak of 318 knots, then decreased to 253 knots, increased agals to a peak of 312 knots, and decreased again to 272 knots at the end of the turbulence. The characteristic sine waves exhibited in the acceleration and airspeed traces suggest that the aircraft encountered two waves in the atmosphere.

The aircraft encountered the turbulence near the tropopause, near an upper level trough, and near a jet stream, all of which are likely loca- tions for clear air turbulence. The turbulence encountered was probably produced by gravity waves in the tropopause boundary.

A secooth ride was forecast for the area of the turbulence encounter and the aircraft's weather rarlar showed no echoes which slight have pro- duced convective turbulence . None of the pilot weather reports that were reviewed pertinent to the area and time of co-xern indicated any turbu- lence; however, it appears that only wind and temperature data were belog transmitted in these reports. The inclusion in these reports of informa- tion concerning turbulence and other supplementary weather data would have been very helpful to the forecaster, dispatcher and all others conected. the science of forecasting has not advanced to the point echic accurate, clear air turbulence forecasts can be made, particularly over large oceans where meteorological data are very sparse.

تءمنة Ch. 2

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the entry of the aircraft into an area of unforecast and unexpected severe clear air turbulence when seen occupants did not have their scabelts lasted.

ROOMENDATIONS

Although no specific recommendations resulted from the Board's Incess- tigation, this accident does support these prior toly mile to the Federal Aviation Hirination and pilots' associations regarding seatbolt.

· 6 ·

discipline, deviation from fill at plan when injuries occur atord aircraft, the aquency of first-all equipment in large aircraft, and pilots' in-flight meteorological reporting. Copies of these preics recommendation letters to the PAA, and FAA's responses, and the recommendation letter to the pilots' associations are included in Attachment 2.

IT THE NATIONAL TRANSPORDATION SAPTY BAPD:

$$ 1051 \frac{H. RESD}{Qalman} \quad 1052 $$

$$\frac{M \cdot A M C 18 \cdot N \cdot M \cdot A D \cdot M 35}{M \cdot A D \cdot M 35}$$

/s/ IABEL A, WURGESS Member

/s/ VILLIAN R. iviet jender

Louis H. Tayer, Heller, was absent, not roting.

October 1972

Attention 1

CM INCIAL

Captain William Hazen Arnold, age 34, holds Airline Transport? Pilot Certificate No., 32, 21-0, The date of his last proficiency check was April 18, 1972. His first-class airmen's artificial certifi-caste was dated October 20, 1971, with the limitation that he possess corrective glassers for meer vision while exercising the privileges of his own certificate. 'Captain Arnold, at the time of the accident, had a total of 23, 218 flight hours, of which 952 were in the Boeing 747.

First Office Harry L. Comm., aged 40, holds Commercial Pilot Certificate No. 1031006 for airplane single- and multiengine lead. He last proficiency check was in Hog 1971. His first-class medical certificate was dated April 14, 1971, with co limitations. He had, at the time of the accident, a total of 4,664 flight hours, of which 1,272 were in the Boeing 147.

Flight Engineer John P. Kelley, aged 44, holds Flight Engineers Certificate No. 1603001 . No. last proficiency check was on September 7, 1971 . His first-class medical certificate was dated December 2, 1971 , with no limitations . He had a total of 10,872 flight hours, of which 372 were in the Coating 717 . Additionally , Mr. Kelley holds Commercial Pilot Certificate No. 1578704 for airplane single- and multiengive land and instrument rating .

var 2

"Cralal" NICH

ΔΊ 44 (1948) 112

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HATIONAL TRAMORIA: ON SANITY BOARD VASHINGTON, O.C.

INDUSTRY LOCATION ( 1441) NO CHODMS CHODAL AURUS, IAC, HONGSHI, 1971, MOMOS OVER THE NUTH FACE, CCAH 105 la MULTA MES WIST OF 130 (LASI LOCHUO) AT 36 NUTH LAULOO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C.

(3000: April 120, 1971

Adopted by the SATATIONAL TRANSPOATION SAFETY DOAKS at its office in Washington, D. C., on the 7th day of April, 1971

FORMANCE TO: Honorable John H. Shaffer Administrator Federal Aviation Administration) Department of Transportation Washington, D. C., 20590

SAFETY RECONSUMATIONS A-71-25 thro 30

As a result of a recent incident involving a Boeing 747, which encountered severe turbulence, six passengers and one stewardous were hospitalised, and 13 passengers and one stewardous were treated for minor injuries. All injuries were the result of the severe turbulence encountered while climbing through flight level 280 nt an indicated air speed of 200 knots.

The National Transportation Safety Board believes the following areas require review by the Federal Aviation Administration:

Saatbelt, Disciplining: During this accident, seatbelt ligne were on throughout the flight; however, of two hospitalized passengers, or indicated the did not have her seatbelt fastened, and another had his seabele fastened, but it was very loose because he was not able to take up the slack of the belt. Both of these passengers were injured when their heads struck the ceiling on the initial sharp domordraft but were able to maintain their seated position during the remaining turbulence encounter.

The Safety Board recommends that:

1. Seabalt discipline be strictly enforced when the seabelt sign is on, letendants should make

as $N_0 \to N_0$

a careful visual inipation of all sentbelts before takeoff and offer assistance to anyone encountering difficulty with a big lit . When the seabult sign is on for prolonged periods , a public addressan announcement should be state at regular intavance .

747 Overhead Bin Failures: Nuring this encounter with turbulence, several of the overhead storage kins in the passenger compartment dropped upon, allowing their contents to spill out. It is not known if these reported failures contributed to any injuries of cabin occupants. However, the Safety Board recommends that

1. Locking mechanism be inspected and either be replaced with lock off a new design or the defective lock mechanism be returned to serviceable condition by rework or repair.

1. The PTA correct any crashworthiness deficiencies in Posing 747 overfield storage line by establishing a deadline date for compliance with any modification requirements.

Economy Seat Headrest Seperations. During this accident, several seat headrests were reported to have been thrown from their seat units . Examination of like headrests in another PAA 747 revealed that all such units tasted were easily removed by hand without destitivating the lock mechanism. It is not known if them reported failures contributed to injuries , but the Safety Board recommends that

1. PAt examine these seats with a view toward improving the crashworthiness of uata/headrests and establishing a deadline date for compliance with any modification requirements.

Harrow Alele Stretchers: Following the abort of the Tlight and the landing, difficulty was encountered in removing from the male passenger suspected of having back injuries. This was because the able width were too narrow for standard stretchers; resulting in great difficulty transferring patients from lying positions in the male to stretchers. The Safety Board recommends that:

-3=

1. The PAA advise medical facilities serving air- ports to stock narrow "carrying boards" or narrow stretchers that can be easily used in the space of an air carrier passenger competent alsile to facilitate removal of non-abulatory patients.

Air Carrier Policy on Deviation of Flight : Following this encounter with turbulence, the flight service director went forward to the cockpit and advised the captain that several passengers were severely injured or ill. The captain requested the service director to return to the passenger compartment and to reassess the situation. After reassessing the cabin injuries, the attendant reported to the captain a second time that several persons appeared to be severely injured. Ten to fifteen minutes elapsed between the initial report of passenger injuries and the captain's decision to divert the flight and return to his destination. The aircraft was not by the only physician at John R. Kennedy International Airport. The Safety Board recommends that

6 . The PAA review and , where appropriate , and air carrier policy concerning in-flight assessments of injury or illness of passenger in order to produce unnecessary delays in securing necessary medical assistance.

Members of the Safety Board staff would be pleased to discourse those recommendations with your staff should you feel further clarification is required.

These recommendations will be released to the public on the issue dates shown above. No public dissemination of the content of this document should be made prior to that date .

head, Chairman; Laural, Holdings, Thayer and Purgee, Humberb, occurred in the above $r$ scamations.

Ma N. Reed

By: "John H., Read Chai mean

DEPARTMENT OF YAMPONTATION FEIRAL AVATION AGBMCISTATAW

曾建明消息？视：2024

181

〔图〕。常\n Honovahle John, et. Read Chapter 20, Festival Transportation Safety Department Department of Transportation Washington, D. O. 20160

No.600

Beer Hr. Chalman :

This to be reply to your communication lesued 20 April 1971 evaluating safety recommendations A-71-23. This to restelling from a B-747 turbulence enhancement to which pisiengage were injured. We have carefully reviewed these recommendations and that, in the use the "olloving comments to offer,

Basketball.Dieslella

PAR 121,317(b) require this "...... each punong隳 shall fasten his uint hole and keep is fastened while the sont belt align to lighted," It is apparent that some post-to-to not abide by this rule especially when the ont both align to. In the lighted for protected periods. We will have an operation bulk-in to all of our inspectors having certificate responsibility for air barrier and their training progress, or phasticing the Importance of oral announcements and better surveillance to access compliance with ant both fastened commands and security. PAR 121,317(a) require that ones belt using be visible to all passengers.

241. 溶液泡融，もしないはぼ

During the 3-341 type confictional program typeal attention was given to two adequary of the letting unckonions for the new type overhead storage blue. The investigation currently underway has revealed that the stationary latch fine in the "In supporting structure failed, alluring the bies to fall open under flight to be. A constructive retrofit andification has been separated by Buating in Service Bulletin superior 35-39%. It are studying this unter and outstanding the need for mandatory action.

Reference: Soas, By (1915), 3-32-33-34-09.

The business which become separated from onto are parts of the Acorthors' state installed in the each version of Pan American's B-P47^{. No untercount the problem in limitel to those Pan American each only. A corroctive service bulletin is being prepared and were it modification parts for 14 a.d.31.23224, about 40 pervert of the Pan American B-P47.Float, have been de"yored, A deadline for recomplishment as the retrofit will be established as seen as details of the retrofit are estimated, the delay is actifipaced.}

3.

kandul.Elulul, Alusiskor

We will include the fire in our locations. Bulletin and hum our inspectors recommend to the operators that narrow stretchers be blocked at each station not only for B2H38s, but all illerate having narrow alive.

Al. S.Erier_Rolles_in_Periation_91. 18. 18

he will request our Inspectors to review correct air carrier directive and policy on this subject. where necessary, directives will be amended, and policies developed to include delays in securing section assistance for injured passengers, as recommended.

sineersels.

X. Shak

J. II. Bafforst Admissionator

UMIND STATES OF AMERICA

HATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BONID WAPHMKHOL I.C.

199803: February 4, 1998

Adjusted by the NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY & SAGTY QAIED in the office to�er the, v. c. a: the 15th day of December 1971

林耿(2020) To: Air Lian Piloto Association Air Transport Association of America Allilant Piloto Association National Air Carber Association

SVMIL.KAROSHOLLE. A-72-11

The National Transportation Safety Board conducted the step of study. In Use Pacific area to review anturological, communicative, and air trusts, local facilities and services of the limited state, in well in the name of other countries. As a part of the special study, the您't's member lavedured (and! in the cockgilt and various 9.0. all carter's after-off on regularly used-led flights and discovered with a light-ersive their vision on the y�-1al facilities, services, and procedures in the Pacific area. In order to improve operating condition over the Pacific for all flights, we would like you to know that we are transmitting, we various against, a support of safety recommercial time.

Elections with personal of the International Percent Office at Monocule brought to light a problem they are leaving which concertor and's logical information derived from in-flight pilot reports. It appears 'at little if any weather information, except wind and temperature date, in being received from civilian airers's no compared with that from military flight. Since such information is helpful to the�tenceologist in updating himself in order better to strre the ann in flight, it would certainly benefit all concerned if additional information would be updated.

Prece� apply, the Safety Board is collecting your assistance by rockman, 62

Writing to the attention of your number operating in the Pacific, the捶-traltilيز and importance of lockbarling in direction 3 of their air reports, supplementary information (on which is authorised under 18th of the seorang and reporting instruction of the AIII's item, in every of which is one could for your convenience.

.

The recommendation will be released to the public on the issue date shown store. The publication of the contents of this document should be rate prior to that date.

Beed, Chast man, Lasavl, Nikama, Thayer and Georges, Menbarro, consumrable in the abreed recommendation.

ABN.�015

By 107 John 24. Need Class/Class

Bae: leurea

ATTACHICIENT B. — MODEL FOR RECORDING AND REPORTING IN 'THE AIR BORD' OF AIR-REPORT

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Chapter 3

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BND

· 17

UNITED STAWS OF AMERICA NATKINAL TRANSP�TATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C.

193043: July 11, 1972

Adapted by the NATICAL TRUPPORTICATION SAFETY BOAGED of the office in washinge, B. C. so that 14th day of June 1912

P0010000 T0: Admiator Podical Aviation Administration K�owington, T. C. 20591

1401-1502-1503-1504-1505-1506-1507-1508-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-1509-

The institutional Transportation Safety Board has under Investigation the Nacional Airlines including B-74%, Flight 41, turbulence accident which occurred on January 4, 1972, near Grand Xele, Louisiana.

Our investigation into disse/esal as part of concern regarding the adequacy of first-end supplies on board the airplane. The number of first-end kitt, as well as the contents of the kite, appeared to have been indiquette to treat the 36 passengers and four guardeeses who sustained injuries. It was necessary for more than 2 hours to use mitzishift arragemente to imbillise fracture, stop bleeding and dress wonde.

As you know, the requirement for providing first-second kita is contained in PAR 121.309. Appendix A of Part 111 specified the type of first-second kita and the kita constant based upon the capacity of the alplane. Gima, a Fe, 1 h12 is required for alplane of one to five percount compatibility, as in. 2 kita is required for airplane of six to 25 percount capacity, and a 10.3 kita is required for airplane of over 25 percount capacity. In a type of�件 in these kita are eventually the minimum however, the quantity of itous are in receive of approximately 2000 kita, and three, respectively.

Although the result of relating bit also to different occupant capacity in logical, the 2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-

Maxorable John N. Staffor - 2 -

today's airline aircraft. In this regard, it would seen highly unlikely that one kit site would be appropriate for capacities ranging from 26 to the more class 300 passengers. We believe that a ratio specifying some principal number of reviewed No. 3 kit, should be required for airpleased capable of carrying 16 to 300 plus occupants. Two further considerations are suggested. First, kit size should be kept to a minimum to secure case of handling in confined species. Second, kits should be strategically located throughout the cable to permit ready access for treatment of in-flight injury. Also, the location of kits should be considered from the standpoint of accessibility following cabin deformation resulting from survivable takeoff and leading accidents, as well as ditchings.

Although the standardness on National Flight II were added by trained medical personnel, assistance of this type is not always available, nor can it be expected. A sufficient supply of material should be available to permit $L/N$ treatment of Locations and time-uissination of fractures without having to rely on unshift arrangements to composite for the lack of certain supplies. Additionally, existing first-sid kit contents should be augmented by including, for example, larger compresses, adhesive tape, additional triangular handages, aspirin, công depressor, and inflistable splists.

Morsover, although a large percentage of accidents occur in the vicinity of all points, the aforementioned accident illustrates that two or more hours' time may ellipse from the time that injuries are incurred until ground-based treatment is administered. Current requirements for on-board medical supplies appear inadequate to afford appropriate means for treatment for such time periods.

In view of the situation illustrated by this accident, the Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

1. Amendment PA8 121, 309 to provide a more appropriate basis for determining the number, type, as, 1, locations of first-third kite required an airplanes capable of carrying more than 25 persons.

1. Upgrade the required first-old hit content to ensure satisfactory capability for treatment of fracture and severe lacertase for extended periods of time.

Our technical staff to available for any further information or clarification, if required.

Bcororable John H., Shaffer

These recommendations will be released to the public on the issue date shown above. No public dissemination of the counter of this document should be made prior to that date.

Read, Chairman; Hacasa, Thayer, BergwaS, and Haley, Hebebe, concurred in the above recommendations.

John K. Reed,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PEDELL AATION ADMINISTRATIM

DAMENGYOR, B.C., 2009

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Permissible Jobs: II. Feed Chairman, General Annual Transportation Safety Board Department of Transportation Washington, D. A., 2021

Böze Ny, Upadman:

This ab-th response to the recommendation contained in your conventional of PDA Safety recommendation A 72-102 and 102 referring to the National Airplane Beating B-247, Flight 41 , turbalence accident which occurred to January 1922 now Ground 1916, Louisiana.

The substance of Safety Recommendations A-72-82Z and 103 has been reviewed by our technical personnel La emulation with the Aeromedical Applications Division of the Officer of Aviation Medicine , The side-sided transporters aircraft may remeasure a reconconsideration of the first and supplyire currently required in PAR 121 operations. We are currently working with the ADA National Committee on this problem in conjunction with our program of improving overall cubic safety. If the documented service history after our joint study indicates a need for a change, we will initiate the necessary section to modify the regulation.

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1. 19. Kaffor

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