1975_美国_HAR7502.pdf

8 PB241 574

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SERIES OF MULTIVEHICLE COLLISIONS AND FIRES UNDER LIMITED VISIBILITY CONDITIONS, NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE, GATE 15 AND U.S. ROUTE 46, OCTOBER 23-24, 1973

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C.

MAR 75

〔图〕----\n U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCENational Technical Information Service

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Washington, D.C. 20594

PB 241 574

〔图〕SS-H-33HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORTSERIES OF MULTIVEHICLE COLLISIONSAND FIRES UNDER LIMITEDVISIBILITY CONDITIONS,NEW JERSEY T

ERRATA

Make the following changes in the subject report:

Page 4, paragraph 5, line 7: Change pave to paved.

Page 7, paragraph 4, line 4: Change troppers to troopers.

Page 13, paragraph 2, line 7: Change are to area.

Page 14, first full paragraph, line 9: Change 13:15 to 12:15.

Page 14, paragraph 2, first line: Change NSW to SNW.

Page 14, paragraph 2, line 5: Change NSW to SNW.

May 5,1975

REPORT NUMBER: NTSB-HAR-75-2

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Reproduced by NATIONAL TECHICAL INFORMATION SERVICE US Department of Commerce Springfield, VA. 22151

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FOREWORD

The accident described in this report has been designated a major accident by the National Transportation Safety Board under the criteria established by the Safety Board's regulations.

The report is based on facts obtained from an investigation and public hearing conducted by the Safety Board. Assisting in the investigation were the New Jersey Turnpike Authority, the New Jersey State Police, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission, the Town of Lyndhurst, Radio Station WOR, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The public hearing was conducted in New Brunswick, New Jersey, on December 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1973.

The conclusions, the determination of probable cause, and the recommendations herein are those of the Safety Board.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SYNOPSIS $\ldots$ 1

FACTS $\ldots$ 2

The Accidents $\ldots$ 2

Accident Site $\ldots$ 2

Environmental Factors $\ldots$ 6

Police Traffic Supervision $\ldots$ 8

Operating Procedures Under Limited-Visibility Conditions $\ldots$ 8

Chronology of Events $\ldots$ 10

Activities of Turnpike Maintenance Personnel $\ldots$ 10

Rescue and Emergency Services $\ldots$ 10

ANALYSIS $\ldots$ 11

Significance of Driver Behavior $\ldots$ 15

Weather $\ldots$ 16

Prevention and Control of Sanitary Landfill Fires $\ldots$ 17

CONCLUSIONS $\ldots$ 17

PROBABLE CAUSE $\ldots$ 20

RECOMMENDATIONS $\ldots$ 20

APPENDICES:

Appendix A: Chronology of Events $\ldots$ 23

Appendix B: History of the Fire Area $\ldots$ 28

Appendix C: Chronology of the Fires and Firefighting Efforts $\ldots$ 30

Appendix D: The New Jersey Turnpike Authority Automatic Traffic Control and Surveillance System $\ldots$ 35

Appendix E: Safety Recommendation to New Jersey State Police $\ldots$ 38

Appendix F: Applicable Sections of the Emergency Fog Procedures (New Jersey State Police - Troop D) $\ldots$ 40

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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D. C. 20594

HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT

Adopted: March 5, 1975

SERIES OF MULTIVEHICLE COLLISIONS AND FIRES UNDER LIMITED VISIBILITY CONDITIONS, NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE, GATE 15 and U.S. ROUTE 46, OCTOBER 23 AND 24, 1973

SYNOPSIS

At 11:20 p.m., e.d.s.t., October 23, 1973, on the northern section of the New Jersey Turnpike, between Gate 15 and U.S. Route 46, the first of a series of nine collisions occurred. Eight accidents followed between that time and 2:45 a.m., October 24, 1973.

The latter collisions occurred under limited visibility conditions. The conditions were caused by a combination of smoke from burning material in an abandoned garbage dump in the Hackensack Meadowlands and fog.

Although responsible officials were aware of the hazardous conditions before the collisions, precautions to assure the safety of the motorists did not prevent the series of accidents. At 12:45 a.m., officials began to close affected areas of the Turnpike. By 3:04 a.m. on October 24, 1973, the areas were closed. During that time, eight people were killed in six collisions.

In all, 66 motor vehicles were involved; 9 persons were killed, and 39 others were injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this series of multivehicle collisions was the penetration of vehicles into areas of severely reduced visibility due to fog and smoke, the latter occasioned by fircs adjacent to the turnpike which had not been promptly extinguished. The delay in closing the affected roadways by the New Jersey State Police contributed to the number of accidents.

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FACTS

The Accidents

On October 14, 1973, through October 30, 1973, open fires burned on the Hackensack Meadowlands adjacent to the westerly route of the New Jersey Turnpike between mileposts 111 and 112.

Between 11:20 p.m. e.d.s.t., October 23, and 2:45 a.m., October 24, 1973, nine multiple-vehicle collisions occurred on the easterly and westerly routes of the Turnpike between Gate 15 and U.S. Route 46. (See Figure 1.) At 11:20 p.m., the first accident occurred in the southbound lanes of the westerly route at milepost 114 + 30. Between 12:15 a.m., and 1:55 a.m., five accidents occurred in the northbound lanes of the westerly route, between mileposts 110 + 27 and 111 + 8. At 2:45 a.m., the seventh accident occurred in the southbound lanes of the easterly route at milepost 110 + 24, and at 2:45 a.m., the eighth and ninth accidents occurred in the northbound lane of the easterly route, at mileposts 110 + 17 and 110 + 18, respectively. The last eight accidents occurred during limited-visibility conditions.

These nine accidents involved 47 trucks, 18 automobiles, and 1 bus. Several of the vehicles were destroyed, and the remaining were damaged in varying degrees. In accident No. 6 a tractor-tank trailer unit, which was carrying a cargo of asphalt, caught fire.

At the Safety Board's public hearing, the State Police suggested that some vehicles entered the roadways at excessive speeds. The investigative reports furnished to the Safety Board by the State Police, however, do not mention speeds.

During the 9 separate accidents, 9 persons were killed, and 39 were injured. The Turnpike in the affected areas was closed to traffic for about 8 hours after the last accident.

Accident Site

The sections of the New Jersey Turnpike, on which all the accidents occurred, are located within the Hackensack Meadowlands District. The district is administered by the Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission. The district is composed of largely undeveloped salt meadows and marshes. The land area is about 19,730 acres and extends through 14 northern New Jersey municipalities in Bergen and Hudson Counties.

〔图〕1\n 〔图〕Not ToScale3⑤DO3-73-766A17DO3-73-768A10/24/73-12:15 AM10/24/73-1:54ATRP.R, PLACETRP.J.MUIR111+8 SNWRUTHERFORD110+35 SNW1

Figure 1. Accident sites and collision data.

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The Fire Area. -- The fires from October 14 through October 30, were primarily burning on an old abandoned garbage dump. The area involved, about 100 acres, is located adjacent to the Turnpike, between mileposts 111 and 112NSW. Three parties jointly own the property: The City of Lyndhurst, Radio Station WOR, and a private party, Anthony Desiderio. The only structures are radio towers and a transmitter building, which are located on the WOR property.

On October 14, the Lyndhurst Fire Department attempted to extinguish the fires. The following day about 100 acres were burning, mostly underground.

During the 8 days immediately preceding the accidents, the fires burned at varying degrees of intensity. Attempts to extinguish the burning refuse were sporadic and unsuccessful. The fires were still smoldering on October 23, 1973, and smoke was seen rising about the Meadowlands.

In the 7 days following the accidents, firefighting efforts were accelerated. Additional manpower and equipment arrived on scene and the fires were contained by October 30.

New Jersey Turnpike. -- The series of accidents occurred on roadways (Gates 15 through 16) which are heavily traveled thoroughfares. (See Figure 1.) On October 23, 1973, the traffic volume was about 55,000 vehicles. Each leg, easterly and westerly, from milepost 105 to 116, includes a northbound and a southbound roadway. Each roadway consists of three 12-foot lanes. The lanes are bordered on each side by 12-foot pave shoulders and separated by a double-band, W-section steel guardrail. A single W-section guardrail is located on the right edge of each road.

The roadways are generally level and the curvature is relatively flat. The roadways near the fire and on which five of the accidents occurred are elevated 10 feet above the surrounding meadowlands. There is no artificial illumination.

Traffic controls consist of lane markings, delineators, and electronically controlled hazard-warning and speed-limit signs.

The New Jersey Turnpike Authority maintains an electronically controlled system of hazard-warning and speed-limit signs to advise motorists of adverse conditions and speed limits appropriate for those conditions. The hazard-warning sign can be activated to display in

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red neon any of the following: "Drive Slow," "Snow," "Ice," "Fog," or "Accident Ahead." The variable speed-limit signs display the normal speed limit of 60 mph in red neon and can be set from 60 mph to 30 mph in decrements of 5.

There is a combination of hazard-warning and speed-limit signs within 1 mile of the entrance to the Turnpike, with a maximum spacing of one sign every 5 miles. There are 75 hazard-warning signs and 80 speed-limit signs on the Turnpike system.

The signs are triggered by a tone-coded radio signal from New Brunswick and are activated and deactivated at the request of the New Jersey State Police, who patrol the Turnpike.

At 11:08 p.m., October 23, a State Police patrol unit reported heavy fog on the westerly route and requested that the speed limit be reduced to 45 mph for the "whole area." The speed limit at mileposts 109.1SNW, 114.1SNW, and 112.5SNW was reduced from 60 to 45 mph. The hazard-warning signs at mileposts 109.1 read "Drive Slow Ahead-Fog," at milepost 114.1, "Fog," and at milepost 112.5, "Drive Slow Ahead." At milepost 115.8NSW, the sign was not fully operational, and its message remained "60 mph," throughout the night. On October 24, the remaining signs were activated in the following sequence:

1/ DSA means "Drive Slow Ahead."

Because of construction activity, the easterly leg of the Turnpike in the vicinity of milepost 107 had been posted for 45 mph by both electronic speed advisory and illuminated placards. At 1:59 a.m., the sign at 113SNE was activated to read "45, DSA - Fog."

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All vehicles that entered into areas of reduced visibility, except those that entered at Gate 15E and 16E, first passed at least one of the above hazard-warning signs.

Fog Accident History. -- Turnpike records for 1969 through October 22, 1973, indicate 70 fog-related traffic accidents. Eight were between Gates 15 and Route 46. Six persons were injured during the eight accidents. During the 70 accidents, 8 persons were killed and 92 were injured.

Closings. -- Turnpike records from 1969 through 1973 reveal that reductions in speed caused by limited visibility were not uncommon. However, records indicated that fog-related closings of the Turnpike were rare. In 1969, the Turnpike was closed once, and in 1970, the Turnpike was closed twice.

Environmental Factors

When the accidents occurred, there was a large, high-pressure area over the Middle Atlantic States with the east-west axis of the ridge located over central New Jersey.

Teterboro Airport, about 5 miles northeast of the accident area, reported that smoke was restricting visibility on October 23, 1973, and most of the next day. The reports indicated that, at times, smoke combined with ground fog or haze. Early on October 23, a pilot reported that the top of the ground fog and smoke as 1, 100 feet, and noted that smoke was emanating from large swamp fires south of Teterboro. By midnight, the surface visibility at Teterboro was restricted to 1/2 mile by ground fog and smoke and was 1/2 to 3/4 mile through 5:50 a.m. on October 24.

At Newark Airport, about 6 1/2 miles southwest of the accident area, haze and smoke, and ground fog and smoke were reported early on October 23, and smoke was again reported after 9:53 p.m. On October 24, similar conditions were reported. The visibility diminished to 1 1/2 miles by 5:24 a.m. and to 0 by 6:07 a.m.

The October 23, 7:15 p.m. upper air observation was taken at Fort Totten, New York, about 16 1/2 miles from the accident area.

〔图〕，-\n -7 -

The observation showed an inversion layer $\frac{1}{7}$ extending from the surface to 1,059 mean sea level (msl). On October 24, at 7:15 a.m., the Fort Totten observation revealed a surface-based inversion layer with its top at 1,755 msl. These reports were not received by either Turnpike officials or the State Police.

The New Jersey Turnpike Authority receives weather forecasts from a private weather forecasting service, the Northeast Weather Service, at 7 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. daily. During adverse weather conditions, forecasts were received every 4 hours.

On October 23, at 3:15 a.m. and 5:40 a.m., the central control dispatcher for the New Jersey Turnpike Authority received forecasts of fog with visibilities ranging from 1/8 mile to 0. At 3:30 p.m., a fog alert was received. The alert indicated a chance of patchy fog after midnight with visibility between 2 and 4 miles in haze and smoke, and 1/8 mile in the fog patches. The alert was distributed to the Director of Traffic Engineering, Maintenance and Toll Collection, the Commander of Troop D, and other involved persons, all of whom are located within Authority Headquarters. A summary of the alert was transmitted by teleprinter to Troop D stations and to maintenance districts throughout the Turnpike system. The summary read as follows:

'Fog Alert. Fair to partly cloudy tonight, chance of patchy fog after midnight, dissipating early Wednesday morning. Partly cloudy Wednesday. Then mostly fair Wednesday night and Thursday.'

Weather forecasts were received in headquarters at 3:30 and 7:30 p. m., and the contents were identical. There is no record to indicate that the 7:30 forecast was transmitted throughout the system. There were no written instructions to insure that all troppers in the field were routinely made aware of the forecast.

1/ A layer in the atmosphere in which the temperature increases with height as opposed to the normal decrease of temperature with height. The base of the inversion is that point where the temperature begins to increase, and the top is that point where the temperature begins to decrease. Such a layer is characterized by stable, nonturbulent conditions. The top of the inversion acts as a cap or lid, containing below it pollutants such as dust, haze and smoke, or fog which may have developed.

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Police Traffic Supervision

Troop D of the New Jersey State Police is responsible for the full range of police functions on the 117 miles of the Turnpike. These responsibilities include traffic control and direction, traffic law enforcement, accident investigation, and general services to motorists. Manpower allocations to perform those functions are arrived at by mutual agreement between the State Police and the New Jersey Turnpike Authority.

Newark Station. -- Newark station of Troop D is responsible for a patrol area which extends from Gate 14 to U.S. 46, on both the westerly and easterly routes--13.5 miles in each direction.

Before May 1973, the area was normally patrolled by six one-man patrol units. After that date, because of personnel security, the six one-man units were changed to three two-man units during certain hours.

On October 23, the evening shift consisted of eight one-man patrol units and a sergeant. Three of the units were scheduled for duty until 11 p.m. During the following shift, Shift 3, three two-man patrol units, under the supervision of a sergeant, were assigned to patrol the Turnpike. Special detail patrol personnel (radar teams and investigators) were available to augment the patrol force, if necessary.

Operating Procedures Under Limited-Visibility Conditions

The State Police employ a Standard Emergency Fog Procedure (see Appendix F) as a guide for action during hazardous fog conditions. It sets forth criteria for activating appropriate hazard-warning signs, for reducing speed limits, and for assigning special-detail patrols. Three fog conditions are defined: Light, medium to heavy, and dense. Visibility range is defined in terms of the number of reflectors (spaced 150 feet apart) a trooper can see ahead when patrolling.

On April 13, 1973, the Traffic Engineer for the Turnpike Authority sent a memorandum to the Commanding Officer of Troop D, to the Director of Maintenance, and to Director of Tolls. The memorandum contained an addendum to the fog procedures which was issued as a temporary measure until the new fog procedures could be completed. A section of the addendum read:

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"Our present experience shows that both the east and west alignments have equal density of fog. This means that thus far we have not had fog on one alignment and not the other. In view of this, we shall have to close both alignments when fog occurs in the northern end of the Turnpike."

In response to an inquiry from the Safety Board as to the operational status of the addendum, the Turnpike Authority, in a letter dated March 7, 1974, stated:

"In answer to your inquiry regarding the significance of the Addendum to Fog Procedure (Exhibit II-C(1)), that memorandum was not a directive to Troop "D" requiring compliance.

"The involvement of the New Jersey Turnpike Authority in the operating policies of Troop 'D' is limited to the role of providing consultation for the purpose of outlining related operating policies. All final decisions regarding operating policies of Troop 'D' on the Turnpike are made by the Commander of Troop 'D' and/or the Superintendent of State Police. That memorandum was a directive to the Maintenance and Toll Collection Departments in the event they were requested and required by the State Police to close certain areas of the Turnpike and provide assistance at the locations indicated."

The Safety Board sent a similar inquiry to the State Police. No response was received. In testimony at the public hearing, however, the Deputy Commander of Troop D testified that the addendum was a proposal which had not been adopted by "our office" and was not in effect on the date of the collisions.

The Turnpike Maintenance Department utilizes an Emergency Fog Procedure as a guide to allocating personnel and assignments when they are notified by the State Police that adverse fog conditions require that the Turnpike be closed. The Maintenance Department's central control dispatcher normally notified the New Brunswick police dispatcher if any of the three fog conditions exist and prescribed operating procedures are then invoked.

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Chronology of Events

Based on evidence from police and central control communications tapes and records, statements from the participants, and testimony at the public hearing, a detailed chronology of the events as they occurred between 10 p.m., October 23, 1973, and 3:35 a.m., October 24, 1973, is contained in Appendix A.

Activities of Turnpike Maintenance Personnel

Based on need, the Turnpike Maintenance Department allocates personnel to assist the State Police. During adverse fog conditions on the Turnpike, central control (maintenance) is usually notified by the police, and the prescribed operating procedures found in the Emergency Fog Procedures (maintenance) are activated.

Although on October 23 there was no formal request from the police to activate the fog procedure, central control followed the procedure as necessary. Night maintenance crews were dispatched to assist the police at accident sites and in the closing of the Turnpike. Management and supervisory personnel were notified of the situation. Additional personnel were called in between 2:30 and 2:50 a.m. to supplement those already on duty.

Rescue and Emergency Services

Vehicle fires were extinguished by the eight fire units from the City of Newark Fire Department and an undetermined number of units from other communities. Personnel participated in both firefighting and rescue activities. Nine ambulance or rescue units responded to the westerly route. Six units responded to the easterly.

A fact-finding committee of the Interagency Commission on Emergency Medical Care (New Jersey) reported, "The victims were treated, handled, and transported to hospitals as efficiently as pos- sible in the circumstances that prevailed." $^{2}$/

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ANALYSIS

These accidents suggest that certain characteristics of the system in operation on October 23 and 24, 1973, lowered its reliability and subsequently its effectiveness. Those characteristics were: (1) The erratic human detection capability and reporting of the reduced highway visibility; (2) the time lags between limited-visibility reports and affirmative police action; and (3) the time-consuming techniques employed to actually stop the flow of traffic on the affected sections of roadway.

The following is an analysis of the events as they occurred on October 23 and 24, 1973, and their relationships to the system then in use.

Detecting and Reporting Visibility. -- Any system designed to protect motorists against hazardous conditions which are created by changing weather conditions and traffic problems requires continuous observations and continuous reports of those conditions. Visual ranges on the highway must be continuously and accurately detected and evaluated. The system is usually implemented in one of three ways: (1) Individuals in the field report their observations; (2) sophisticated electronic-detection devices are used; or (3) both 1 and 2 are used. The New Jersey Turnpike Authority relied on reports of human observations; police patrol units were used.

Over a 14-year period, 51 men were added to Troop D. The Turnpike environment includes not only adverse weather conditions, but also criminal law enforcement. One-man patrol units were discontinued during certain hours, and two-man units were dispatched instead. Unfortunately, manpower was not increased when the two-man units were utilized. As a result, the number of patrol cars and the frequency of patrols over the roadways were reduced.

On the night of the accident, the number of patrol cars was reduced for shift 3 from 6 to 3. During the investigation of accident 1 by two of the police units assigned to the northern portion of the Turnpike (Gate 14 to U.S. Route 46), there was only one police patrol vehicle available to patrol both the easterly and westerly alignments. While the two units were investigating the accident and a

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replacement unit from another command was en route (11:30 p.m. - 12:15 a.m.), accidents 2 and 3 occurred. The fog and smoke condition at the site of accidents 2 and 3, had it been reported by a patrol unit, might have initiated the closing of SNW under the Emergency Fog Procedure.

Fortunately, fog and other adverse weather conditions can be predicted with reasonable accuracy. Whenever such conditions are forecast or reported, additional manpower should be alerted for recall to patrol duty. The human observation capability must be increased before a situation becomes hazardous. Before additional personnel arrive, patrols can be increased by reverting back to one-man patrol units. By doing so, points of patrol would be increased, and the one-man units would be at risk for only a short time. Two-man units can be reformed and operational again when the additional personnel arrive for duty.

The New Jersey Turnpike Authority is installing an automatic traffic control and surveillance system. The system will cover 36 miles of roadway in the northern section of the Turnpike and is expected to be in operation at the end of 1975. (See Appendix D.)

Time lag in affirmative police action. -- The human-observation system requires conscientious decisions and prompt actions. The official-in-charge on the scene had the information available to him to make prompt decisions and to implement prompt actions. He had information sufficient to indicate that visibility on the Turnpike was reduced; he was aware of the guidelines in the Emergency Fog Procedure; and he had been granted permission to recall additional patrols and to close the roadway whenever necessary.

Visibility on the westerly route was reported at 11:08 p.m. to be 1/2 delineator. The speed limit signs on the SNW roadway between mileposts 109.1 and 112.5 were actuated to read 45 mph. Accidents 2 and 3 occurred at 12:15 a.m. at mileposts 111.10 and 111SNW under a posted speed of 45 mph. The criterion for the posted speed limit under visibility conditions of 25 - 100 yards in the fog procedure requires a limit of 30 mph in each direction to adequately cover the affected area.

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It is also to be noted that the reported visibility of 1/2 delineator is only 75 feet, since the delineators are 150 feet apart. Accordingly,the condition was not only at the lowest visibility which would justify as much as 30 mph but was also at the margin for application of Section III in which "consideration" is given to closing. Instead of either of these actions, the posted speed was lowered only to 45 mph. The fog procedure specified 45 mph for visibility of 200-300 yards (5-6 delineators). It is not known how the visibility in the area of mileposts 111 varied during the period between the 45 mph reduction and accidents 2 and 3. It probably varied both as to density and length of the obscured area. The procedure, as written $\frac{3}{4}$ did not permit these to be considered, although they would have an effect on the risk.

The number of patrols had already been reduced by the use of two-man patrols after 11 p.m. However, the increased patrols required by the Emergency Fog Procedure for a 45 mph speed limit were not requested until 12:11 a.m., an hour after the speed limit was reduced and only a few minutes before accidents 2 and 3. (Unit 825, dispatched from New Brunswick a little earlier, was for the purpose of covering the are vacated by units to attend the scene of accident 1, and did not provide increased patrol coverage.)

It cannot be determined whether a reduction of the speed limit signs from 45 mph to 30 mph would have insured speeds at the accident sites of accidents 2 and 3 which were lower and would have prevented the accidents. Some vehicles continued to operate at high speeds, while others slowed, according to the evidence. The pre-sumption for using the procedure, however, must be that the different speeds are intended to have an effect when displayed. The display of the 45 mph speed instead of the required 30 mph speed permitted all drivers to move at 45 mph, and did not warn those drivers who obey such signs to move at the 30 mph speed which was justified by the poor visibility that had recently existed.

The duty officer stated that a decision to close the Turnpike is difficult to make for the following reasons: (1) Traffic must be rerouted to other roadways not as well equipped to handle it as the Turnpike; (2) a large number of people would be inconvenience;

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and (3) the person, or persons, who made the decision could be subject to much criticism.

The flow of traffic into affected sections of the Turnpike. Based on the discussion above, it may be concluded that limited-access roadways endangered by limited visibility must be closed timely and efficiently. To do so is the most effective emergency measure to save lives. Thus, the actual closing of the Turnpike also requires examination. Based on the evidence available, the southerly flow of traffic on the westerly route was blocked by wreckage of accident 1. Traffic entering south of accident 1 was slowed or stopped at milepost 111NSW because of 0 visibility. Accidents 2 and 3 at 13:15 a.m. blocked northbound traffic on the westerly route. The order to close the southerly to northwesterly roadway (SNW) at 1:36 a.m., 1 hour 16 minutes later, did not prevent a number of vehicles from moving into the area. Three additional accidents (4, 5, and 6) occurred on the SNW roadway at 1:54 and 1:55 a.m. blocking northbound traffic. According to radio transmissions between police units and Newark station and central control and maintenance units, the westerly was not secured by Turnpike personnel until some 40 minutes later. The closing of the westerly did not, as would have been required by the addendum to the fog procedures, initiate the closing of the easterly route. Three additional accidents (7, 8, and 9) occurred on that route at 2:45 a.m.

A basis for closing NSW existed 54 minutes before the occurrence of accidents 4, 5, and 6. This basis was the report of 0 visibility at mileposts 112 northwesterly which, according to the fog procedure required consideration of closing. A decision to close NSW at that time would not have required a significant rerouting of traffic to other roadways off the Turnpike, nor would a large number of people have been inconvenience. The requirement of the addendum to the fog procedure not implemented would have been that the easterly route be closed at the same time. However, that addendum was not in effect and the potential threat of fog and smoke to the easterly route could have been handled by a directed patrol.

It is to be noted also that the words of the Emergency Fog Procedure, Section III (Dense Fog), do not definitively order that the Turnpike be closed when conditions of 0 to 75 feet of visibility

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are experienced, or make it entirely clear who in the field has the authority or responsibility to give the direct order for closing. In this case, the State Police had sufficient evidence of a need for closing to request the necessary permission once under the provisions of the existing fog procedure, then have it confirmed, but the actual direct order to close was not made until accidents had already occurred in areas of 0 visibility. It is possible that conditions which met the closing criteria came and went much faster than closing could be accomplished or reversed. The fog procedure made no mention of what should be done in that situation. A fog procedure with concrete predetermined criteria and authority for immediate closing could be promulgated for, and effectively implemented by, field personnel. It is likely that such definitive instructions would eliminate hesitancy in the closing of the Turnpike under conditions of 0 to 75 feet of visibility because of considerations of possible criticism for doing so. It is also possible that conditions which met the closing criteria came and went much faster than closing could be accomplished or reversed. The fog procedure makes no mention what should be done in that situation.

Motorists need to be warned explicitly that they are approaching hazardous areas. Although signs which read 45 mph and those with the message "fog ahead" obviously warn of a hazard, they do not inform the motorists accurately of the immediacy and seriousness of the danger. In at least one instance the sign did not reflect the lower speed justified by the fog procedure.

If motorists had been advised to exit the roadway as soon as the order to close the SNW roadway was issued, fewer vehicles, if any, would have been involved in the 1:54 and 1:55 a.m. accidents.

Significance of Driver Behavior

In addition to an adequate warning system at the location of hazard, the public must also be made aware of the need to reduce speed posed by restricted visibility on high-speed, limited-access roadways. The variety of dangers posed has not been systematically solved as yet. General awareness of hazard, however, can be brought about through public and driver education. In addition, the public must be made aware of existing or predicted limited-visibility conditions. This information can be disseminated most readily through the news media.

The Safety Board is cognizant of the importance of driver behavior in limited-visibility conditions. Driver behavior, or

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driver error, as it may have affected these collisions, was not different from that found in other limited-visibility accidents which have been investigated and documented by the Board in two previous accidents $\frac{4}{5}$ and a special study $\frac{5}{5}$. The study included findings that influence driver behavior or error in an environment of limited visibility.

Weather

The limited visibility at the accident sites was brought about by a combination of smoke and fog in the area and the influence of a temperature inversion on the dispersion of that smoke and fog. Weather data collected for the Middle Atlantic States from two local (New Jersey) airports, from a New York weather station, and from the observations of persons involved in the happenings on October 23 and 24, 1973, were studied. These data indicate that a high-pressure area, which persisted from October 18 to October 28, was located over the Middle Atlantic States. The general weather situation created by the high pressure affected New York City, the accident area, southern New Jersey, and western Pennsylvania. The high-pressure system was conducive to radiation fog. Radiation fog occurs mainly from the cooling of the ground on clear and calm nights.

Statements from persons at the accident site, substantiate that smoke and fog conditions were prevalent at eight of the accident sites and did in fact affect drivers' visual range. The dispersion of prevailing fog and smoke was adversely affected by a temperature inversion.

4/ National Transportation Safety Board, Multi-Vehicle Collisions Under Fog Conditions, Followed by Fires, New Jersey Turnpike North of Gate 2, November 29, 1969, NTSB-HAR-71-3. National Transportation Safety Board Interstate Bus-Automobile Collision and Rollover on Indiana Route 57, South of Petersburg, Indiana, November 24, 1969, NTSB-HAR-71-4.

5/ National Transportation Safety Board, Reduced-Visibility (Fog) Accidents on Limited-Access Highways, NTSB-HSS-72-4.

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Prevention and Control of Sanitary Landfill Fires

The Safety Board emphasizes the need to manage abandoned and existing landfills to eliminate hazards to public safety--particularly those near high-speed highways. 6/

Although there is little chance of fire at landfills being operated under current guidelines, abandoned dumps, such as the Hackensack Meadowlands site, are susceptible to underground fires. Current guidelines and operating practices adequately provide for fire control, but do not apply to abandoned or closed dumps. 7/7 If the abandoned dumps within the Hackensack Meadowlands remain exposed, the potential for fires will continue. The fires may be reignited by spontaneous combustion, hunters' firearms, children's playing, etc. Should a substantial fire start, it could take days, or even weeks, to assemble sufficient men and machines to fight the fire. Hence, it is possible for the hazardous conditions of October 23 and 24 to recur.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The design, construction, and maintenance of Turnpike roadways were not factors in this accident.

1. The exact proportions of smoke and fog involved at each area of 0 visibility could not be determined.

1. Before the accidents, sufficient equipment and manpower were not made available to fight the dump fire. After the accidents, such manpower and equipment were made available.

6/ The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has published "Proposed Guidelines For Thermal Processing and Land Disposal of Solid Wastes" in the Federal Register on April 27, 1973 (40 CFR 240, 241). However, the proposed guidelines do not relate to the closing of abandoned landfills.

7/ Chapter VIII of the New Jersey State Sanitary Code, "Refuse Disposal," requires sanitary landfills and prohibits open burning. It does not require, however, for the proper closing of currently abandoned landfills. The only reference to abandoned landfills is Regulation 8, which cites responsibility for landfill fires as follows: "The primary responsibility for current operations or in the case of discontinued operations in the event of a fire shall be with the local board of health and the person, agent, or municipality having title to the premises whereon the fire exists and they shall be responsible for extinguishing the same."

• 18 -

1. Smoke generated by the dump fire combined with patchy fog and a temperature inversion to cause limited visibility on the Turnpike.

1. Based on weather data from the Northeast Weather Service, a temperature inversion was predictable. The temperature inversion created a "lid" on the area in the vicinity of the accident site and prevented the fog and smoke from rising into the upper atmosphere.

1. Neither Federal nor State environmental protection regulations apply to abandoned dumps.

1. Limited visibility was not a factor in the first accident which occurred at 11:20 p.m. near milepost 114 + 30 NSW.

1. When the Troop D station received the "fog alert" at 3:30 p.m., no extraordinary precautions were scheduled for the purposes of observing and reporting visibility conditions on the Turnpike.

1. Had State Police (Newark Station) been aware of the 7:30 p.m. "fog alert," additional personnel might have been placed on patrol for visual observations.

1. There was no written policy or procedure to assure that each on-duty trooper of State Police Troop D is made aware of weather reports as they were received from the Northeast Weather Service.

1. The State Police failed to decide promptly to close first the westerly and then the easterly routes, in the manner authorized by the Emergency Fog Procedure. The Emergency Fog Procedure did not assign the duty to decide closing action to anyone.

1. If the provisions of the addendum to the Emergency Fog Procedures, dated April 13, 1973, which required the closing of both routes when fog occurred on the northern end of the Turnpike, had been implemented, it is probable that accidents 7, 8, and 9 (all of which occurred

〔图〕一\n $$ -19= $$

on the easterly route) would have been prevented. An emergency fog procedure should provide the basis for prompt orderly actions and decisions so loss is minimized.

1. The two-man patrol units not only decreased the frequency of patrol to detect rapidly developing limited-visibility conditions over any given location, but also seriously taxed the police in their efforts to cope with the multiple emergencies on the Turnpike.

1. The hazard-warning and speed-limit signing system on the Turnpike did not provide a method which was fully responsive to the problems associated with highway operations under the limited-visibility conditions.

1. In the time period before the 2nd and 3rd accidents, the State Police did not follow the Emergency Fog Procedure in that the first speed reduction was less than that literally required by the procedure and the required increase in patrols to provide necessary coverage in the area was delayed for one hour after it was justified.

1. The reliance on human observers to locate limited visibility on the roadway could delay activation of the hazard-warning system.

1. The lapse of time between the occurrence of accidents 2 and 3 (12:15 a.m.) and the decision to initiate manual procedures to close the SNW at Gate 15W (1:36 a.m.) was excessive in relation to the conditions and criteria of the Emergency Fog Procedure, and permitted the occurrence of accidents 4, 5, and 6.

1. The automatic traffic control and surveillance system being installed on the Turnpike will provide an effective means through which traffic conditions on the roadway can be continuously determined and translated into meaningful driver actions and vehicle speeds.

1. State Police at the public hearing testified that the severity of vehicle damage in several of the accidents was evidence that vehicles penetrated those areas of limited visibility at rates of speed which prevented appropriate evasive action.

~ 20 -

1. The actions of drivers involved in this series of collisions support the concern of the Safety Board that, at present, there is a need for improved criteria in driver education that will aid drivers in determining safe driving speeds under various conditions of limited visibility.

1. The response of other jurisdictions in providing emergency rescue services was excellent. The delay, in some cases, in arriving on-site can be attributed to the conditions that existed on the Turnpike.

PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this series of multivehicle collisions was the penetration of vehicles into areas of severely reduced visibility due to fog and smoke, the latter occasioned by fires adjacent to the turnpike which had not been promptly extinguished. The delay in closing the affected roadways by the New Jersey State Police contributed to the number of accidents.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On January 2, 1975, the National Transportation Safety Board made a recommendation relating to this accident to the New Jersey State Police. (See Appendix E.)

The Safety Board further recommends that:

1. The New Jersey State Police insure that all Northeast Weather Service reports are distributed, as received, to all Troop D stations and are thoroughly understood by all patrol personnel. (Recommendation H-75-3)

1. The New Jersey Turnpike Authority consider, in the implementation of the automatic traffic control and surveillance system, methods through which the manual closing of the Turnpike could be accomplished immediately and traffic movements deterred safely and without delay. (Recommendation H-75-4)

• 21 -

1. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency revise its proposed guidelines, "Thermal Processing and Land Disposal of Solid Wastes," to include measures to prevent abandoned dumps and landfills from becoming hazards to public health and safety. (Recommendation H-75-5)

1. The State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection revise its sanitary code for solid waste disposal to require owners of properties that contain old dumps to close such sites properly. (Recommendation H-75-6)

1. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission, and the U.S. Corps of Engineers cooperate to eliminate the possibility of fire and smoke from the old dumps within the Hackensack Meadowlands. (Recommendation H-75-7)

1. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration modify Federal Highway Traffic Safety Standard No. 4, "Driver Education," to include more definitive information relative to reduced-visibility driving. This recommendation was also made by the Safety Board in its special study, "Reduced-Visibility (Fog) Accidents on Limited-Access Highways," issued in 1972. (Recommendation H-75-8)

• 22 -

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

/s/ JOHN H. REED Chairman

/s/ FRANCIS H. McADAMS Member

/s/ LOUIS M. THAYER Member

/s/ ISABEL A. BURGESS Member

/s/ WILLIAM R. HALEY Member

March 5, 1975

• 23 -

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

October 23, 1973, 10 p.m. Patrol unit 836 (two-man car) left the station to patrol the area between Gates 12 and 14 and the Bay Extension. They received no information on adverse weather conditions.

10:05 p.m. Patrol unit 844 (two-man car) departed the station with the responsibility to patrol both the easterly and westerly for the first hour and the easterly thereafter. They received no fog alert or any other weather information.

10:15 p.m. The shift 3 sergeant (unit 837) telephoned central control to inquire about a current weather forecast. No forecast was available.

10:20 p.m. The night supervisor of central control dispatch received a verbal report of smoke conditions on the westerly route of the Turnpike. He was neither advised of, nor read, any other weather reports.

10:40 p.m. The shift 3 radio dispatcher of the Newark Station neither read nor received any weather reports.

10:55 p.m. Unit 844 was dispatched to check smoke conditions on the westerly route between Gates 16W and 18W.

11 p.m. Unit 897 was advised by the sergeant to check continually for fog and smoke on the westerly route. Although the sergeant did not see a weather report, he was aware of weather forecasts (radio) predicting patchy fog in the vicinity. Unit 897 was assigned to the westerly route.

11:07 p.m. Unit 844 advised Newark Station of a "very heavy" fog condition on the westerly route from 15W north to Route 46 with about 1/2 delineator visibility and recommended that the speed limit be reduced to 45 mph. One trooper later recalled, "The visibility problem we encountered was a thick, white smoke and not fog--it was worse than fog."

11:08 p.m. Newark requested the hazard-warning and speed limit signs on the north and southbound roadways of the westerly route be activated because of "fog due to that smoky condition."

11:20 p.m. Accident No. 1 occurred.

APPENDIX A

• 24 -

11:20 p.m. Central control received from the Northeast Weather Service a "fog followup" on the 7:30 p.m. fog alert report. The report was shown to the New Brunswick Police dispatcher.

11:37 p.m. Unit 897 was displayed by Newark to accident 1. Unit 844 was displayed to assist at the accident site.

11:46 p.m. Unit 897 requested that the southbound roadway of the westerly route be closed. Wreckage blocked traffic from proceeding south.

11:50 p.m. Central control telephoned several operations officials of the Turnpike Authority and advised them of the fog alert.

11:59 p.m. Unit 844 advised Newark that visibility at the accident site was not impaired.

October 24, 1973, 12:03 a.m. Unit 825 was dispatched from the New Brunswick area to cover the southern portion of Newark's patrol area.

12:11 a.m. The shift sergeant telephoned the Troop duty officer and requested permission to activate the Exxon patrols, 1/ extend New Brunswick patrols into Newark's area, close the westerly route, and call in off-duty troopers, if necessary. Permission was granted. The conservation did not include any discussion of visibility conditions.

12:15 a.m. Accidents 2 and 3 occurred under conditions of limited visibility.

12:16 a.m. Newark requested that the Exxon patrols be activated for the Newark and New Brunswick patrol areas. Newark was alerted to recall off-duty troopers.

12:17 a.m. Unit 836 was detailed to accidents 2 and 3. Exxon patrols were dispatched by central control from service plazas 7S through 12S, for a total of seven units on duty.

12:22 a.m. The sergeant informed the Acting Station Commander of the current situation and was advised that the Commander would respond to accident No. 1.

• 25 -

APPENDIX A

12:45 a.m. Unit 837 and the Station Commander were on-site at accident No. 1. Unit 844 was detailed to help maintenance personnel close the westerly to southbound traffic.

12:50 a.m. The southbound roadway of the westerly route was closed to traffic. Traffic was diverted to the easterly route.

12:57 a.m. Unit 836 advised Newark that they were engulfed in smoke at milepost 111.10SNW.

1. a.m. The sergeant requested the station to recall two off-duty troopers and advise the duty officer "we're getting zero visibility, 112 northwesterly," and that "it may become necessary to close the westerly." Confirmation from the duty officer was requested on earlier permission to close the westerly if required. Permission again was granted.

1:11 a.m. Gates 15W and 15E were instructed to direct all north-bound traffic to the easterly route.

1:12 a.m. Central control advised unit 837 that the district (maintenance) supervisor was calling in five additional men.

1:13 a.m. Unit 836 advised that the smoke was lifting at 111SNW and that they expected traffic to move. Unit 837 proceeded south on the westerly route. They noted "light patchy smoke" at milepost 112NSW, which did not present a hazard to traffic.

1:20 a.m. Central control recorded weather and road conditions on the Bell telephone line. 2/

1:30 a.m. Unit 837 was requested by Newark Station to advise on the closing of the westerly route. Unit 837 responded by stating that milepost 110 through 112SNW now had visibility, but there was less than one delineator north of 18W and up to the missing mile. Newark was instructed by unit 837 to assign the incoming off-duty troopers to one-man units for exclusive patrol of the fog area.

APPENDIX A

• 26 -

1:32 a.m. Central control was advised by unit 837 to prepare for the closing of the westerly route.

1:36 a.m. Unit 837 ordered that the westerly route be closed and that all traffic be diverted to the easterly route. Visibility on the easterly route was unlimited.

1:54 - 1:55 a.m. Accidents No. 4, 5, and 6 occurred on the westerly route. The first of the recalled troopers arrived at the Newark Station.

2:03 a.m. Unit 897 was dispatched to the accidents. En route via the southbound roadway of the westerly route, 897 encountered stalled traffic at milepost 111NSW. As it proceeded around the stalled traffic, 897 became engulfed by heavy smoke and fog. Visibility was 0.

2:15 a.m. The duty officer was notified by New Brunswick of the situation. The duty officer telephoned the Troop Commander and requested the Newark District State Police lieutenant to survey the situation and report back to him.

1. 22 a.m. Explosions and fire were reported in the vicinity of accidents 4, 5, and 6.

2:25 a.m. Unit 837 instructed Newark to recall the police radar team to duty and to notify the duty officer of accidents 4, 5, and 6.

2:33 a.m. Newark advised unit 837 that the duty officer was notified and en route.

2:34 a.m. Central control was advised that the section of the westerly located at the split was secured.

2:42 a.m. Central control notified the Executive Director, Traffic Engineer, and Maintenance Engineer (of the Turnpike Authority) of the situation.

2:45 a.m. Accidents 7, 8, and 9 occurred on the easterly route.

2:49 a.m. Unit 837 advised that personnel at Gate 15E were closing the easterly route and the entrances to the westerly route. Unit 837 advised central control to close the easterly route immediately. Units 848 and 895 were dispatched from Gate 14 and north to effect the closing.

• 27 -

APPENDIX A

3:04 a.m. Unit 895 advised Newark that all traffic was "routed out of 14" and "the inner and outer are both detoured out of 14."

3:08 a.m. Central control recorded weather and Turnpike closing information on the Bell telephone line.

3:35 a.m. The district lieutenant advised the duty officer of the current situation. The duty officer, Troop Commander, and traffic lieutenant came to the Newark Station.

• 28 -

APPENDIX B

HISTORY OF THE FIRE AREA

About 2,500 acres, including eight major garbage dumps, are located within the Hackensack Meadowlands District. All, including the fire area, have been abandoned as garbage dumps for some time.

The fire area measured 98 acres and contained a depth of 12 to 15 feet of compacted refuse. It had been abandoned for about 10 years.

In 1963, RKO General (WOR Radio) purchased 67 acres within the fire area. The land was obtained from the Township of Lyndhurst who advised the new owners that the area was compacted garbage with a light covering of silt. In 1968, RKO General added an additional 3 feet of silt to protect against the ignition of fires and subsequent damage to their radio towers, antennae, ground systems, and transmission stations.

The remaining portion of the fire area was owned by the Town of Lyndhurst and the Desiderio family. This section of the fire area, when abandoned as a garbage dump was not covered with adequate layers of dirt. An EPA official who visited the site before, during, and after the fires stated that it contained about 1 or 2 inches of dirt cover.

Two types of fires, marsh and landfill, are commonly found in the Meadowlands. Marsh fires, the most common, occur about 12 times a year. Landfill fires are not so common, but usually of greater magnitude and concern. Fires of approximately 2 weeks in duration were fought on the landfill area in 1966, 1967, and 1969.

The method of disposing of refuse 10 years ago was simply to dump it openly. Whenever possible, dump operators would burn refuse and compact it by driving heavy equipment over it. It was not required that the refuse be covered with layers of dirt.

Unburned and partially burned refuse contains about 50 percent paper and other combustibles. If layers of refuse are not tightly compacted, air voids form. Such air voids support combustion. Consequently, when a surface fire starts, it can spread downward as well as horizontally.

-29-

APPENDIX B

The spreading of water across the surface of a landfill fire causes the paper refuse to absorb the water as it drains downward. As a result, fires that extend 1- to 15-feet below the surface area are difficult to extinguish. To extinguish such fires, it is necessary to dig them up, spread the burning material out, and thoroughly soak it with water.

To dispose of refuse in a well controlled, fire preventive, and sanitary manner, sanitary landfills are now used. The main function of the sanitary landfill is to spread the refuse in thin layers about 2-feet thick and compact it with heavy equipment. At the end of each day of operation, no less than 6 inches of earth is placed on the compacted refuse. Unless a second layer of refuse is going to be put on the landfill within a 6-month period, an intermediate cover of 12 inches is provided. Finally, when a landfill is to be closed permanently, a 24-inch cover of earth is recommended.

• 30 -

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY OF THE FIRES AND FIREFIGHTING EFFORTS 1/

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1973

The fire began at approximately noon time in the marsh area northeast of WOR towers. The Lyndhurst Fire Department was dispatched and attempted to extinguish the fire.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1973

The fire had spread from the marsh area on WOR property, both north and south, to the old landfill on Lyndhurst and Desiderio property. Approximately 100 acres were burning, mostly underground, on the abandoned garbage dump. Although responsibility for abatement of the fire by concerned officials was not agreed upon, several agencies responded and engaged in firefighting efforts.

At 9:30 p.m., the fire was confined to the area identified as the western lot. It was impossible to fight the fire in the other location because of lack of water, inexcessability to the area of the fire and the safety hazard of sending inexperienced men under nighttime conditions into the fire area.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1973

The efforts to control the fire from spreading westward were successful. However, the fire was still burning on Lyndhurst property and both lots adjacent to it. Some progress was being made between 4 and 5 p.m. to contain that fire.

Concerned parties sought assistance from State agencies.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1973

A bulldozer was at work and water was pumped from a creek to assist the bulldozer operator. This operation continued for the entire day.

• 31 -

APPENDIX C

Because the smoke could threaten visibility on the Turnpike, the Authority was requested to assign personnel, or equipment, to help extinguish the fire.

Although a (N. J.) Bureau of Forestry official visited the site, many other forest fires in the northwestern portions of the State at that time precluded their assistance at this time in firefighting efforts.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1973

An overnight wind shift in direction caused the fire to spread and firefighting efforts had to be expanded. Information was received that neither the Turnpike Authority, nor the Forestry personnel could send either personnel or equipment. Private industries located in the surrounding area were contacted for assistance. The use of an additional large water pump was volunteered.

As the result of the meeting between concerned officials, the HMDC agreed to coordinate firefighting efforts.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1973

The additional pump arrived at 1 p. m. and was prepared for use.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1973

An inspection of the fire area at 8:30 a.m. revealed that the area was too hot to allow firefighters to enter.

Bulldozers were used to establish a beachhead at the northeasterly corner of the fire. This would enable men to enter, and afford extra protection for a gas pipeline which crosses the area and roadways of the Turnpike.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1973

Although the fire was burning underground with very little open flame, it was now more intense. The smoke was heavy and limited the activities of bulldozer operators. They, however, had already extin-guished approximately 20 acres of the fire along its southerly boundaries. It was anticipated that at least 3 bulldozers, 2 pumps, and about 10 men would be working at the site the next day.

APPENDIX C

• 32 -

MONDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1973 (VETERAN'S DAY)

Adverse northerly winds had subsided and enabled bulldozer operators to work along the area closest to the Turnpike. The purpose was to suppress the smoke as soon as possible. The smoke threatened visibility on the Turnpike. At 2:30 p.m., an additional bulldozer arrived at the scene.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1973

The site was engulfed at 8 a.m. by dense fog. Some progress against the fire was being made. The wind was from the north, however, making it difficult for the bulldozer operators to function at full capacity.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1973 (The morning after the collisions.)

The site at 8 a.m. was extremely foggy.

Twenty inmates from the Rahway State Prison were obtained by the Bureau of Forestry to assist in the fighting of the fire. The prisoners arrived at 3 p.m., and assisted in the layout of approximately 500 feet of casing for connection to the pump. At approximately 5 p.m., the pump which was installed on October 19 was successfully tested.

During the day, the 3 bulldozers were all working at the site. Offers of assistance were received from the New Jersey National Guard and Forestry Service. Both agreed to dispatch equipment and personnel.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1973

The National Guard arrived on the site at 7:30 a.m.

Meanwhile, firefighting efforts were proceeding through the work of prisoners, water pumps and hoses, and 2 bulldozers which were located at the hottest point of the fire.

Three Guard bulldozers had arrived at the site and began oper- ations along with two private bulldozers. The large pump continued to operate and a decision was made to keep it operating all night. Forestry Department personnel arrived at 6 p.m. The pump failed and was shut down for the night.

33

APPENDIX C

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1973

The pump was repaired and pumping operations resumed. The three Guard bulldozers plus the two private bulldozers, continued operations. At approximately 12 p.m., the pump again failed. At 1:30 p.m., the pump resumed operations.

At the end of the day's operation, 50 acres, or 50 percent, of the fire area was contained.

SATUR DAY, OCTOBER 27, 1973

An irrigation-pumping system was installed. A strong wind coming from the north in huge gusts made it very difficult to work.

By noontime, the irrigation-pumping system was operating. The fire was being wetted down through 3 large sprinklers. By the end of the day, about 75 acres of the fire area was being controlled.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1973

The wind was slight and from the north. The fire by day's end was reduced to ten acres of the landfill area. The ten acres, however, were burning in the center of the site.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1973

Heavy rain and high winds prevented all water abatement work at the site except for three (N. J.) Department of Transportation bulldozers. The prisoners were sent back to Rahway and the pumps were shut down.

The three Department of Transportation bulldozers, and a private bulldozer continued to operate. With the help of the rain, they controlled the fire.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1973

The prisoners operated both pumps and hoses all day. By 4 p.m. the last ten acres burning were contained, and only small puffs remained.

APPENDIX C

• 34 -

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1973

No fire at the site, consequently, no operations.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1973

No fire in evidence at the site. The Forestry Department was requested to provide prisoners to assist in casing removal.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1973

Prisoners arrived at 9 a.m. and removed all casings. The pump was removed.

Small puffs of smoke were observed at the northwest edge of the Lyndhurst property.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1973

A bulldozer and the Lyndhurst Fire Department assisted in the abatement of the puffs of smoke.

• 35 -

APPENDIX D

THE NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE

AUTHORITY AUTOMATIC TRAFFIC CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

The system will cover all portions of the Dual-Dual roadway, the easterly and the westerly roadways, and all interchanges north of Interchange 9 (except for Interchanges 14A, 14B, and 14C located on the Newark Bay-Hudson County Extension). The total length of coverage is 36 miles.

The field components of the system consist of:

760 detector loops,
detector equipment,
120 detector equipment cabinets,
communication cable.

The vehicle detectors will be loops embedded in the pavement. An electronic sensor located in a roadside senses the inductance change caused by the passage of each vehicle and sends a tone signal to the computer. The computer calculates from this signal the vehicle speed and length, totals and averages the results, compares with normal values, triggers an alarm if congestion is detected, and adjusts signs to caution drivers and to discourage additional traffic from entering a congested roadway.

The Computer Control Center will be located at the New Jersey Turnpike Authority Administration Building and will consist of:

Three PDP 11/40 computers, computer peripherals, Map display showing the area covered, the location of the detectors, as well as the location and status of changeable message signs, speed warning signs and speed limit signs, and communication console.

In addition, a fourth computer with some peripherals will be installed at the Interchange 14 area.

APPENDIX D

• 36 -

Upon integration of all the field components, signs, and the computer system, the system will perform the following:

Maximum Capacity -

The New Jersey Turnpike has made a substantial investment in constructing the Dual-Dual roadway and the westerly roadway. The Automatic Surveillance and Control System will achieve maximum utilization of all open lanes when one roadway is congested and the other is not, by replacing manual sign control with an automatic sign control.

Rapid Detection of Accidents -

By distributing detectors at half mile intervals along the main roadway, incidents that produce congestion will be rapidly detected. The more serious the incident, the more rapidly it will be detected. A complete blockage of saturated flow will be detected in three minutes or less and the required sign changes will be made immediately after incident detection.

Routing Data for Emergency Vehicles -

To facilitate emergency vehicle services, the system will automatically provide emergency vehicle routing data for each source of congestion. In this way, the dispatcher can direct police to the incident by the best possible route. After police evaluation, the dispatcher can also direct ambulance, fire, or tow equipment, as required, by the fastest route.

Improve Safety -

By automatically setting the speed limit and "congestion ahead" displays, warnings of impending danger will be accurately and quickly provided. Further, when the congestion is dissipated, the signs will automatically be returned to normal, creating driver confidence in the signs and improving compliance with reduced speeds, when displayed. Rapid, accurate sign settings and improved driver compliance will all further enhance the safety record of the New Jersey Turnpike.

• 37 -

APPENDIX D

Data Management -

In addition to the significant improvements in traffic flow provided by the system, the system has other important features. The system will produce printed reports including:

TRAFFIC REPORT - volumes, speeds, occupancy SYSTEM STATUS REPORT - sign status, incident status, failure status SYSTEM LOG - time of sign changes, incident detection, operator inputs

These reports can be used for future planning, permanent records of accidents and breakdowns, and system evaluation.

The system will also provide four data terminals for monitoring and controlling the system. Finally, a dynamic map will be provided for displaying and demonstrating overall roadway performance. The map will show traffic levels at all detector stations and the settings of all signs.

• 38 -

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

APPENDIX E

ISSUED: January 2, 1975

Forwarded to:
Superintendent
New Jersey State Police
Post Office Box 68
West Trenton, New Jersey 08625
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION(S)
H-74-44

In its continuing investigation of the multi-vehicle collisions on the New Jersey Turnpike, between Gate 15 and U. S. Route 46, on October 23 and 24, 1973, the National Transportation Safety Board has become aware of a major safety improvement being installed on the Turnpike--an automatic traffic control and surveillance system.

As the system has been explained to us, it will provide a sophisticated means through which traffic congestion can be rapidly detected and reported on the easterly and westerly roadways and at interchanges north of Interchange 9 (except for Interchanges 14A, 14B, and 14C on the Newark Bay-Hudson County Extension). Total coverage is 36 miles. The system can detect congestion in 3 minutes--sooner than it would be detected by more frequent police patrols.

The Safety Board recognizes that such a system can be effective in the prevention of large-scale accidents, such as those which occurred on October 23 and 24, 1973. However, until such system is fully operational, additional police patrols should be used, particularly in the winter months when the incidence of fog is greatest.

The National Transportation Safety Board therefore, reiterates its recommendation of April 16, 1971, that:

The New Jersey State Police take steps to provide more frequent patrols on affected Turnpike sections when fog or other weather conditions are forecast to reduce visibility, so that earliest practical warning may be available when conditions warrant

$$ -39- $$

APPENDIX E

-2-

the activation of hazard-warning and reduced-speed-limit signs. Increasing patrol frequency should take priority over routine police matters, if necessary, during periods of potentially hazardous weather or visibility conditions.

REED, Chairman, McADAMS, THAYER, BURGESS, and HALEY, Members concurred in the above recommendation.

of plu/6. Reed

By:V John H. ReedChairman

• 40 -

APPENDIX F

APPLICABLE SECTIONS OF THE EMERGENCY

FOG PROCEDURE (NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE-TROOP D)

Section II - MEDIUM TO HEAVY FOG - Visibility 75 feet to 1/2 mile and/or medium to heavy fog occurring adjacent to Turn-pike roadways.

Notifications

The New Brunswick Police Dispatcher will notify:

1. Troop Duty Officer.

1. Central Control Dispatcher.

1. Division Headquarters, West Trenton, N. J., (via teletype) including information on any speed reductions.

1. In the event of a speed reduction to 45 miles per hour because of fog, this information will be relayed to the Newark office of Associated Press (201-MI 2-0151) and United Press International (201 - MA 4-7070).

1. Weather and road condition announcements will be placed on the Bell Telephone (CH 7-0900) by the Central Control Dispatcher.

Action

1. Activate the necessary "Drive Slow - Fog Ahead" signs in each direction to adequately cover the affected area.

1. Post the following speed limits in each direction to adequately cover the affected area:

Visibility 500-700 yards (11-14 delineators) 55 MPH Visibility 300-500 yards (7-10 delineators) 50 MPH Visibility 200-300 yards (5-6 delineators) 45 MPH Visibility 150-200 yards (3-4 delineators) 40 MPH Visibility 100-150 yards (2-3 delineators) 35 MPH Visibility 25-100 yards (1-2 delineators) 30 MPH

Increase patrols to provide necessary coverage in fog areas. Central Control will put Exxon on patrol in any area vacated by State Police patrols at the request of the New Brunswick Police Dispatcher.

• 41 -

APPENDIX F

1. Whenever fog conditions necessitate the reduction of the speed limit to 35 miles per hour, the following personnel will be notified immediately by shift leader, and report for duty:

a. Station Commander in affected areas.

Immediately upon arrival at station, the Station Commander will immediately proceed to patrol the station area affected by fog to ascertain overall conditions. He will be held directly accountable for the immediate reporting of changes in conditions, supervision of all patrols, and for rendering assistance to the Duty Officer.

1. When the speed has been reduced to 35 miles per hour or below, all marked cars will be operated with dome light in operation.

SECTION III - DENSE FOG - Visibility 0 to 75 feet on Turnpike roadways.

1. Consideration of closing the Turnpike in the affected area will be made known immediately to the Central Control Dispatcher and time allotted, before closing, to enable him to contact Toll Collection and Maintenance, in order that they can dispatch their forces.

1. After having obtained authorization from the Commander of Troop "D" or Duty Officer, close the Turnpike in the affected area, manning all posts as assigned in the following paragraphs.

1. The Duty Officer will correlate the procedures of the Troop with the Maintenance Duty Supervisor and requests for assistance will be made by the Duty Officer to the Maintenance Duty Supervisor.

1. State Police patrols will conduct continuous sweeps of their assigned areas, noting changes in weather conditions, assist stranded motorists, and report the presence of any unauthorized traffic moving within the closed areas. Service areas will be checked from time to time to discourage illegal departures onto the Turnpike.

APPENDIX F

• 42 -

1. Patrol charts will be used during all emergencies, day or night, and patrols will not frequent station unless called.

1. Marked patrol cars will be assigned to the nearest service areas to convoy stranded patrons to the nearest exit in their direction of travel.

1. No section of the Turnpike will be closed to traffic except after authorization and direction has been received from the Commanding Officer of Troop "D" or the Troop Duty Officer.

1. All emergency measures taken must be constantly reviewed and removed as promptly as possible.

1. ALL MAINLINE CLOSINGS will be set up, manned, and terminated by State Police personnel. At each mainline closing and at the Route 3 westbound ramp, Maintenance personnel will furnish a sign trailer and two men, to assist, as soon as possible, once the locations of the closings have been determined.

〔图〕一\n

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