NATIONAL

8 〔图〕插图 〔图〕插图 第24-910401

〔图〕SFENYBOARO\n

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHNGTON, D.C. 20594

〔图〕插图 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

MCCAULEY AVIATION, INC. MITSUBISHI MU-2B, N72B, NEAR JEFFERSONVILLE, GEORGIA MARCH 24, 1983

〔图〕N\n NTSB/AAR-84/01

〔图〕插图 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SEIVICE of the past 20 years of

CONTENTB

SYNOPIS

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1. 15 History of the Flight

1. 8 Meteorological Information.

1. 2 ... Wreckage

1. 4 Medical and Pathological Information

1. 5 Pilot Information

1. 6 Weight and Balance

2. ANALYBS

1. 1. "Human Factors

1. The CONCLUSIONS

1. 1 Findings.

3,2 Probable Cause · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · $

4. RECOMMENDATIONS. 11

APPENDIXES

Appendix A-Investigation and Hearing. 15

Appendix B—Personnel Information $\ldots$ 14

Appendix C-Airplane Information. 15

KATIONAL TRAMPORTATION SAPITY BOARD WASB KTON, D.C. 2581

AUCRAUT ACCIMENT REPLIT

A4020-31, February 31, 1984

MeCAURY AVIATION, NCI

NAR JEPPIEONYAR, GEOLOLA

MARCIN 2023

图解(1) 已知

At 0236 eastern standard time on March 24, 1983, McCauley. Flight 354, a Maritashmi MU-2B, N72B, operated as a conducted air taxl forgo flight from Jivic�aville, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia, by McCauley. Aviation, Inc., Pine Bluff, Arana,h, creased into a robded area 5 nautional miles south of Jijevanville, Georgie, killing this pilot and his three nonrevenus passengers. In the area of the crash there was light rain showers with celkings of 2,000 feet and the surface visibility was 5 miles. The clouds extended to above 17,000 feet.

The National Transportation Safety Court determines that the process can cause of this accident was the uncontrolled descent of the airplane for the determined avassed and the overstress and breakup of the airplane structure are� in the an attempted recovery by the pilo.

1. PACTICAL INFORMATION MON

14. History of the Museum

The flight was the return leg to Memphis of a regularly requited, nighting four-leg round the between Memphis, Atlanta, end JacksonVills. In purpose was in, transporte cancelled check between those cities under a ex佈out between MeCaisy, Aviitation and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, "The P.D.it was accompanied on the flight by his wife and two daughters, aged $8 and 4, with "in 1920 mission of carrying management.

The light operated Monday through Friday on the following school.

1. "The Williamham HU-2B-00 is a twin engine, high who, (1) with a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a star, a s

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On March 23, 1983, the pilot and passengers now from Pine Blint, Ackensur, to Meighls, 'Lennusee, In another airplane operating as McCaulay Flight 31. While en route from Pine Blint, the pilot received a weather bruiting at 2140 by radio from the Little Rock, Arkansas, Flight 8111 Station (F88). The beafing included the current weather for Memphis, Atlanta, and Jacksonville, and the terminal (organiz for Atletis.

N72B departed Memphis on schedule as McCauley Flight 35%, with a full fuel load of 464 gallons of jet. A turbine fuel. The internal caruley practice was to depart, Memphis with full tanks and refusal at Atlanta before departure to Memphis. The flights to Atlanta and Jacksonvills and the cargo transfer at both stages were accomplished without incident. N71B departed Jacksonville at 0202 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan as McCoulley Flight 354 with 126 pounds of cargo and an estimated 82% gallons of fuel on board.

According to the agent who transferred the part of Jackcavivils, the pilot, appended to be alert, in good spirits and noted normally. The pilot's wife and childright seats and the pilot's wife occupied the right front seat.

Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) clear it McCuil, Flight 354 to cruise at flight level (FL) 200 to Atlanta via airway J-45, "The magnelid course of J-45 is 320." At about 0203, the pilot of Flight 354 requested and received controller approval to domain at flight 10ypl 180; also at the plots request, the controller then cleared Flight 354 direct to Atlanta. At 0224:57, a J-1000 hard-off of Flight 354 was accomplished between traffic controllets of the Jacksonville and Atlanta Csnure. At 0225:20, Flight 354 contracted the Atlanta ARTCC controller and reported at flight level 180; this was Flight 354's last can and, during the early morning hours when traffic volume is low, Atlanta Center opbiated using a backup computer while the primary computer is out of service for normal scheduled maintenance. The backup computer has limited data display capability and no data recording capability. The data does: displayed with a radar target is limited to only transponder code and altitude. At 05:50, the radar controller observed a radar target with lifted data block. If displayed the transponor, code assigned to Flight 354 and passed the March VOC. Can a nornotcately you see. According to the controller, the light disappeared from the radar screen about the musical miles north of the VOC. "The controller radioed a clearance for Flight 354 to send and to 11,000 feet but received no reply. He then attempted usuccessly to support radio contact.

$$ \text{Savual persons in the area south and east of defterion, the range, supported, reported, the sounds of an�ine engine, alternately at high species, then dmishing. Some creaching sounds. The euplane wroage later was found pattered over e-ad-ab-out. A millist long in a msignative heading of about 10°, about 15 meas cast of the speed VDR and about 17 miles. The start of where the target directed from rack. The euplance broke up in flight during the hours of iting and cr-c. And at lattice so 12° 17:01. It was the was located in a woosted swamp in 1 to 1 foot of water.

1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 41 43 45 47 49 50 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 64 68 69 72 73 75 78 79 84 88 89 94 95 98 99 100 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 22 23 24 25 26 29 33 35 37 39 43 49 53 59 64 68 68 73 79 79 89 94 93 95 93 94 95 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93

We're conditions as light will, light radius, and any charge. It is a啟用 is open at at 0.052 for Micon, 16 nautial miles wordt of the accident she, which is an oratist

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ceiling at 3,200 feet and a viability of 10 miles . At 0240 rain began at the airport, and at 0248 the ceiling decreased to 2,000 feet broken with 5 miles visibility in light rain and (log. surface weather observation at 0155 for Warner Rockins Air Force Base, Georgia, 13, nautical miles west of the site, indicated a celling of 8,000 feet overcast any visibility of 13 miles . At 0245, the visibility decreased to 7 miles in light rain while the ceiling remained unchanged.

National Weather Service (NWS) Information from A there and Reception indicated that at 0380 and 0355 week radar echoes indicating light rain were observed within a 90-natural-mile radius of Macon. The radar to be were reported uniform at 17,000 feet at 0230 and uniform at 20,000 feet at 0283. NWS had for exist light to occasionally moderate mixed img above the freezing level of 6,000 feet up to 18,009 feet for the time and area of this accident,

Wide between 15,000 feet and 19,000 feet were from the southwest et between 50 and 35 knots. Below 15,000 feet the varieties gradually decreased and the wind direction shifted to southvery around 0,000 feet to southeastly at 8,000 feet to northeastly at the surface.

Tranamerica, Logair Flight 2451, a Lockweed Harevial L-382, departed Warmer Stocks Air Force Base for Dover, December 18, 0225. According to the captain, Iling did not occur during the cliff to 29,000 feet. He reported light to moderate turbulence below 10,000 feet but no turbulence above that altitude. The captain also observed an overcast type of cloaks near 19,000 feet. Winkle during the climb were west-southyesterly at 78 koots.

in Swearingen airplane, N3094T, was in the area of Macon at about 0390. The pilot stated that, while descending from 22,000 to 11,000 test, he encountered light time loy; and snow by the turbulence. In addition, the pilot states that the airplane was in clouds from 12,000 feet to 11,000 feet and that the rate of too accumulation was almost negligible on the leading areas of the wings.

1.5 2019定500

Pices of the airplane were scattered over a 2-mise area along a bearing of about 305°. (See figaro 1.) The ground's term was relatively 1 well and consisted of " great , fields , and swamps . This having sanction was the largest item res overed along the movie path and was found at the greatest distance from where the first disappeared from a radar in a wooded swamp where the water was about 1, to 2 feet upon.

The fuselage came to rent on its left 853 and was broken into their seotions all of which runalned interconnected by loose cables , cast in interior , fussenting & a , and broken structure . The upper funnelage assembly between fissage at the line (£5) 4516 and 4859 , which contained the forward attachment flittings for the rings , was separated from the fuselage and was recovered scattered along the pain . ( 840 figures 2.1). The left forward wing: attachment ' s fitting was partially attached to the francis act was cut to the left . The right forward ving attachment fitting was broken off and remained with the King center section .

All three landing your automobiles were found within the fussage wreckage. The landing area joked for the main gear was in a position that occurred to the gear-structured pition . The taken gear assembly was also in a retracted position .

The flight which was committed at 1999 in the 1999's joint inbound of the needle, and thus occurred relatively long at the right angle and groupother assembly attached. The shift to the top half separated from the 1998

〔图〕N352O①④\n

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1. Fusage

1. Left Engine

1. Why Center Section

1. Fuseage/Wing à trั�nment FRÜG

表1. Lett Yuez

1. Right Wing and Engine.

1. Note Type 3

表 1.4 打 59

B. 300hr 身 Fio Fioal

1. 1 H L H S H G I H S I D C D I

1. It's Fap.

1. 11-15 V 外墙

1. 19-24th Cover 109–11

图. 7-16 13-14

1. 19 103-105

1. F. "J41, Lefti Uvar O"

1. In 1981. F 3000 (cm/L)

1. Left Propeet & Goat Sup.

Chapter 1.—We take the distribution chart.

〔图〕1\n Appropriate the Operation Life

All Dimensions in Centimeters

〔图〕8023FETAm7\n 104.23-69

Figure 2: Stepman History and Proachage Sition Diagram.

The right wing upper surface had several chordwise compression buckles along the leading edge. The surface contained several spanwise tension buckles just att of the leading edge. The upper skin along the separation line at W8 1950 was pulled from rivets at the forward area and was sheared off at the rear area. The structure in this area was bent upward. The fracture surfaces appeared typical of overload.

The ring center section was recovered in one piece. The leading edge along the right side was wrinkled and pulled away from the attachment hinge along the top. The wing spor on the right side was bent upward in the area where the outer right wing panel had separated.

The right forward wing-to-fuselage attachment assembly was torr away from the fuselage frame and remained with the wing center section. The left forward wing-to-fuselage attachment assembly was separated toward the right at the bolt hole on the wing center section. The rear wing-to-fuselage attachment assemblies had separated from the spar attachment rivers or the right side and were broken at the olevis holes on the left side. The spar fractures at WS 1950 appeared typical of overload. The chordwise pivot attachment lines for the wing skin at WS 1950 just failed due to tension on both the top and bottom wing surfaces.

The outboard panel of the left wing was recovered relatively intact, except that the left tip tank and engine had separated. The upper skin at WS 1950, which had been sheared from the attachment rivets of the wing centor section, was sent in a downward direction. The upper skin was buckled in a spanwise direction aft of the engine area and near the outboard leading edge. The lower surface of the wing exhibited spanwise buckling along the leading edge. The lboard engine mount for the left engine had separated from the wing together with a section of wing frame and was recovered attached to the left engine. The firewall red where the inboard mount had separated was pulled forward and inboard. The outboard mount was still attached to the wing; however, the attachment area of the firewall was pulled forward and inboard. The outboard isolator bolt that attaches the engine to the outboard mount was recovered with the engine. The bolt had failed due to bending overload in a direction corresponding to the engine mount's collapsing downward and inboard.

The lending edge of the left wing outboard of the nacelle contained a 18-Inch-wide gash that extended back to the forward spar. The wing skin at the upper inboard side of the gash was crushed downward and simulated with black paint. A piece of sheet metal is thes wide by 2 inches long was recovered about 0.7 hantical mile back along the wreckage path from the left wing; it uptared to be from the gash out in the wing.

The empenage section had separated from the fusage at the upper and lower kviseron attachment filings at P8 8895. All four attachment fittings remained with the empenage. The upper right attachment fitting contained a 3-inch section of fusage frame which was bent to the right. The circumferential stiffness at P3 8895 was crushed aft at the top.

The vertical stablizer was still attached to the empenage, with the top 18 inhese separated from the remainder. The skin was bent toed the left along the upper vertical fin where the $\langle \rangle$ had separated. The remaining section of vertical fin was relatively undamaged.

The rudder was recovered in one piece except for the top area, which was torn off at the upper hige. The leading edge of the rudder was created end term back to the front star. The right side of the rudder was crushed. The right funder stop on the erapenhage was sent forward; the left rudder stop was straight.

$$ \frac{n}{3} = \frac{4}{3} $$

The right horizontal stabilizer and elevator were still attached to the empenage. The trim natuator was intact within the stabilizer, with the rod and still attached to the right elevator.

The right: elevator was partially attached to the right stabilizer by the outboard bings and by the trim actuator assembly. The elevator was buckled on the upper surface about 8 inches inboard of the outboard hinge.

This left horizontal stabilizer was separated from the empenage. The failed inboard ends of the forward and aft spars were bent downward. The fractures appeared typical of those issued by bending overload failure.

The left elevator was separated from the stabilizer at the inboard and outboard hinge brackets. Both brackets were pulled from the stabilizer and remained with the elevator pieces.

The right engine remained mounted on the right wing with the propeller still mounted. The engine exhibited impact damage and distortion on the lower right glend. One of the propeller blades was embedded vertically into the ground. The other three were bent slightly aft but exhibited no other damage. The left engine had separated from the left wing. It power section was found against the have of a tree about 300 yards from the usolage. The left engine cowling was recovered nearly a mile farther back along the wreckage path. The housing for the output reduction gear, the reduction gear assembly, the propeller shaft, and propeller were recovered about another 200 yards farther, along the wreckage path, between the power section and the left wing. One propeller blade was embedded in the ground and bent into an "to" shape. The other three blados were bent slightly forward, with no other damage. Attach bolts for the reduction gear housing had been pulled out of the main gearbox and remained with the reduction gear housing. The thread insects were pulled from the main gearbox, and remained on the ends of the mounting bolts with the reduction gearlox.

Both engines were disassembled and examined under supervision of a Safety Board Investigator, Compressor shrouds and compressor impiller blads of the left engine showed circumferential tub. Blades on the second and third-stage turbine wheels had been rubbed and were bent opposite the direction of rotation. Very light rub marks appeared on the third-stage turbine wheel blades of the right engine. The compressor impeller shrouds contained impact gouge marks that matched the impaller blades, the

This airplane has five fuel tanky two wingth tanks, an outboard tank in each wing and a main tank in the center wing. Fuel from the outer tanks flows to the engines through time main tank. Valves of the left and right wingtlp fuel tanks were found in the closed position. Both left and right main fuel shutoff valves from the center tank to the engines were found in the open position. The McCauley Director of Opetio is stated that, based on fuel consumption records for this itinerary, fuel from the tip tank normally was exhausted near Jacksonville. Flight 354 normally departed Jacksonville (the fuel from the outer wing tanks. This fuel was typically depleted in the vicinity of Mason and the flight continued on fuel from the main tank.

Because of the extensive breakup of the airplane, Use electrical and avionics systems and light instruments were all severely damaged. Little or no information could be gained from their examination.

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1.4 Medical and Pathological Information

Postmortum and toxicological examination of the pilot disclosed no evidence of factors that would have affected his ability to operate the airplane. The cause of his death was severe trauma from impact. His first-class medical certificate required that the pilot wear corrective terms for pair and distant vision. A pair of bifocal glasses was found in the wrackage. Postmostem examination of the passengers discussed that all had died as a result of multiple trauma.

1.5. $\blacksquare$ Pilot information

The pilot held Airline Transport Pilot Certificate No. 432066872 with airplane multi-engine and single engine land ratings and commercial privileges. His certificate was issued February 16, 1991. He also held a flight instructor's certificate issued the same date, and an airframe and powerplant mechanizer's certificate issued April 29, 1991. His most recent check was a 14 CFR Part 135 competency and proficiency check, which was satisfactorily completed on February 17, 1993. His last recurrent training in the MU-2 was completed December 31, 1992. The pilot had accumulated about 3,747 flight-hours, 547 of which were in the MU-2B-30.

He had flown 196 hours in the previous 90 days, 48 hours in the previous 30 days. He had been off duty for 12 hours prior to reporting for this flight. It could not be determined how the off duty time had been apent. He had been on duty for 6 hours at the time of the accident and had flown 5.0 hours in the previous 24 hours. He had been flying this schedule regularly for at least 5 months prior to the accident.

1.6 Weight and Balance

The aircraft was refueled with 29% gallons of jet-A fuel at Memphis for a total fuel load of 404 gallons (2,723 lbs). A review of documents concerning previous flights on the same schedule indicated that the airplane, upon reaching Jacke-ville, Plорite, would have depleted the fuel from the tiptanks, leaving fuel only in the main and outer tanks. The approximate 45-minute flight from Jacksonville to the accident are would have consumed about 59 lbs of fuel, resulting in an airplane weight of about 9,735 lbs at the time of the accident. Maximum allowable gross takeoff weight was 11,575 lbs.

A copy of the cargo manifest recovered from the wreckage indicated a cargo weight of 726 lbs on board when the airplane deposited Jacksonville. This weight and the previously described estimated weight of fuel remaining were used in the following weight and balances computations.

Center of gravity location : moment → weight Center of gravity (e.g.) 199.18 in/the (e.g., Units are 190.9 to 199.4 in/the).

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2. ANALYSE

The location of the loss of the radio-target relatively to the location of the wreckage indicated a course several . The unusual engine noises described by witnesses, and the course reversal, indicated that the airplane departed from normal cruise flight . Rezod on available evidence, however, the Safety Board could establish no reason for the plane's departure from level cruise flight or its course reversal. The extensive wreckage scatter indicated that the airplane broke up structurally during an attempt to recover control. Although light rain was beginning at the surface at the time of the accident, analysis of NWS data and reports of two pilots who passed through the same area indicated there was no significant turbulence and probably little being at the higher altitudes . Postmortem examination of the pilot disclosed no evidence of incapacitation or inability to function. The airplane's weight and center of gravity were within the proper limits and were not factors in the accident.

To airplane broke up and crashed in an area it had easily passed over -- 10 miles back along its flight track from the last location indicated on the controller's radar screen. Therefore, the loss of the radar indication was not a result of the breakup but may have indicated some difficulty which initiated a departure from altitude and lead to the breakup.

The widespread distribution of the wreckage indicates that the airplane broke up while in flight . The relatively smell scatter pattern of the heaviest pieces of wreckage--fuselage, outer wings, center wing, and engines-indicates that there was not a long descent after breakup), If the airplane had broken up at high altitudes, the componente would probably have been more widely separated. The lightest pieces of wreckage, most affected by winds, were the farthest away from the main wreckage and to the northwest of it . A meteorological analysis of the winds revealed that at the cruising altitude 18,000 feet, they were southwesterly at 65 knots, at 3,000 to 6,000 feet they were from the southeast at about 30 knots, and below 3,030 feet they were esterly with velocities of 4 to 6 knots at the surface . Because the wreckage was scattered along a southeast to northwest line, it can be concluded that the airplane broke up 6,000 feet or below . The lighter fragments, most subject to the influence of wind, were scattered away from the heaviest piece, the fuselage; in a northwest direction. If the break up had occurred above 6,000 feet, the higher velocity southerly and southwesterly winds would have produced a more widespread, less directional scatter pattern.

All of the major fractures were determined to have been caused by overload stresses, which exceeded the design strength of the structure . The fractures observed at the wing and empennage preparations indicate the right wing failed in an upward direction and the left wing and left horizontal stabilizer failed in a downward direction . This pattern of structural breakup indicators that the right wing failed in positive arodynamic overload followed by failures of the left wing and stabilizer in a negative direction from inertia and air loads induced by the rapid roll that resulted from the joas of the right wing . Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the in-flight structural breakup of the airplane was the result of extreme airplane noseup elevator input at high alrpeed ; most likely caused by an attempt to recover from an unwanted high-spased descent , or unusual attitude .

Because of the extensive damage to the electrical system no positive evidence could be found to confirm that electrical power was available when the airplane broke up. A loss of electrical power could have resulted in autop傘 disengage, ment and partial loss of Lighting and flight: instruments and loss of transponder signal. Such a situation in clouds at night could easily have led to a departure from level flight. ; Which it cannot be dismissed as a possibility, po, positive conclusion, can be made that a loan of electrical power occurred and was the reason for the departure from normal flight.

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A loss of power from an engine could also have led to a yaw and possibly a ion of control. However, the damage in one engines appear to have been from the breakup end subsequent ground impact.$^{1}$ There was no internal damage in the housing of the isit main gearbox or the output reduction gear which indicates that the reduction gear did not undergo massive internal failure. The damage pattern of the bolt holes on the main gearbox housing suggests that the reduction gear housing and propeller separated from the left engine in an churoa and upward direction, while the failure of the engine mount structure indicates the engine separated in an inboard and downward direction. The direction of separation of the propeller and gearbox was might probably be used by high gyroscopic loads induced by the roll that followed separation of the right wing.$^{1}$

Although there is some evidence that the propeller may have struck the left wing leading edge, the safety Board would not determine where in the breakup sequence (12) contact was made. However, the mating skin from the propeller cuts in the loading edge were found within the wreckage path, indicating that the propeller may have struck the wing during the breakup and that the gearbox and propeller were still intact on the engine when the radar target disappeared from the radar so seen northwest of the crasty site.

2.10 Xüman's

In addition to possible airworthiness reasons for this accident, the Safety Board considered possible human factors which could have led to the loss of control and subsequent all frame breakup.$^{1}$ One possibility considered is that the passengers, particularly the young children, might have become sick, restless; or otherwise caused a distraction to the pilot sufficient to initiate the loss of control. However there is no evidence to conclude that this occurred.

The Safety Board also considered the possibility that the pilot fell hissep, along with his passengers, and the airplane divided from controlled flight. Researchers into the Human circadian rhythm (biological clock) shows that the biological functions decrease and human performance, including vigilances and reaction time, is degraded during the early morning hours. This is true even when the human has "adapted" to the nighttime work schedule, as had this particular pilot. However, the pilot did make a radio call to Jacksonville ARTCC about 6 minutes before the apparent time of the chset of the accident scenario. Therefore, the possibility that he fell asles. In that short time is unlikely. However, the lowered awareness state because of possible fatigue and ch�adian: desychronosis would have precluded a pilot from being as vigilant and reactive to abnormal situations such as turbulence or an otherwise minor mechanical problem.

The pilot's total and recent flight experience are not considered a factor in this case. His wife was not a pilot and consequently would not assist the pilot in his flying outics. Nor would it be likely that she could have controlled the airplane in the likely event that he was incapacitated. The autorsy findings rule out of the possibility that the pilot was incapacitated and therefore this is not consisted of a possible case of the accident.

In summary, no alworthiness reasons for this accident could be estatavassai not could airworthiness reasons be ruled out. Similarly, human factors could not be ruled out as causal or contributory, although the probability of reduced pilot performance existed and would have contributed to the plect's fellure to cost with airworthiness or other problems or instructities, and would have alensed its�action time and vitiminess to maintain safe fight.

The Mitsubiah MO-S (with turboprop Alphine) has been involved in a table of final occidentals in the past sayend 11 years. "The circumstances of several accounts�ents suggested

一选一

that some of the causal factors might be designed-related $\alpha$ design-induced. Some involved engine failure or loss of power. (Severly others were unexplained decently into the ground from cruise similar to this accident.

3. CONCLUSIONS

4.1 Prediste

1. The airplane broke up at an altitude between 5,000 feet and 6,000 feet.

1. All the Initial fractures of the right wing were determined to be the result of overloed.

1. 'the initial structural failure of the right wing was caused by aerodynamis overload under positive loading.

1. Turbulence and idrig at the airplane's cruise altitude were light.

1. The alplane weight and center of gravity were within the limits and were not factors in this accident.

1. Evidence relating to a loss of viotrical power was inconclusive.

1. Pilot distraction from passengers, or fatigue, may have slowed his performance and reduced his reaction time to cope with an alplane problem.

1. The reason for the departure for normal flight could not be determined.

3.3 Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the possible cases of this accident was the uncontrolled desont of the airplane for undetermined reasons, and the overstress and breakup of the airplane structure during an attempted recovery by the pilot.

4. RECOMMINDATIONS

This accident was another in a series of accidents involving the Mitsubish MU-2 over the past several years in which the airplane made an uncontrolled descent for unexplained reasons. Because of these and other MU-2 accidents, on August 21, 1995, the Safety Board issued the following Safety Recommendation to the Federal Aviation Administration:

Conduct a special certification review of Mitsupisit MU-2 airplanes relative to the engines, fuel system, autopilot, and light control systems; flight in known lying conditions; engines, inoperative ovaracteristic as and installing characterities; darly, MC landing approaches and takes the appropriate action to cross any deficiencies identified.

The FAA Special Certification Review Team, began think evaluation on October 24, 1991. All flight evaluations had been completed by February 10th, "The FAA has projected a project completion data of April 30, 1991. Panding reaccept of the Indigors of this team, the Safety Board has classified the status of this recommendation of "Corpt-Acceptable Action."

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BY TEIGAN AATIONAL TRANDIONATION BAPPY IWARD.

JIM BURNETT Chairman

$$ / \frac{1}{2} \frac{\text{PATRICIA A. GOLDMAN}}{\text{Vice Chalman}} \quad 1.5 $$

/6/ G.H. PATRICK BURGLY Member In 1978-2014

/s/ DONALD D, ENQEN Membering

/s/ VERNON L. GROBB Chapter V. 2000/m

Page 11, 1984

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APPENDIK A.

INVESTHAI VIGA AND KIBI WNO

The safety Board was notified of the resident about 6530 on March 24, 1981, and a term of six investigative was displayed to the scene immediately. Im�istive, groups were established for the�endation in the areas of operations, wasless-less, structurver, systems, and powerplanture. On all, exactly 100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

Parties to the investigation beided the Federal Aviation Administration, Michaelish A.K.or.ft International, McG 4.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.

Hearing

No public hearing was held.

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APPENORX B:

2020 INSL INFORMATICS 19

Joe Michael Holland, 28, hold Airline Transport Pilot Certificates 432066819. Help. hold a Plight Instructor Certification with Triphatal, single engine land, malum engine land, and instrument re-linger. His first when medical certificate was used density, 14, 1983 with a limitation requiring glasses for noer and digital valions, and is as noor.

This initial Mitsubahl MU-2B training, both flight and simulator, was completed at Flight Safety International, Inc., Houston, Texas in July 1992. He completed a 2015 pilot refresure: courses there on December 8, 1992. He had 18,47 total. Light-huy, with 547 hours in MU-2B-60 airplanes.

图1-28

High-Low-High-Low-High-Low-

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APPENIMX O

AKPLANIS INFORMATION

Mitsubishi MU-2B-8, serial No., 1855A, N72B, was issued a Certificate of Airworthiness on December 31, 1978. It was issued by Mitchell Aksas International, San Angelo, Texas, and leased to McCaul’s Aviation. It had flown a total of 1,718.5 hours. The last inspection was on March 28, 1999, and the airplane had flown 2.9% to have since the inspection.

The engine were Garrett TPR 331-10-501M, installed on February 21, 1993.

The propellers were Hartzell HC-86TN-5DL/LT702-83B - 11/2R, installed on February 27, 1981 at about time since overhaul. The left-propeller was serial No. CD-889, the right propeller was serial No. CD-843. They had floss 75,1 hours 7/78 overhead and installation.