NATIONAL

8 PB98-9104O3 NTSB/AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

IN-FLIGHT FIRE/EMERGENCY LANDING

FEDERAL EXPRESS FLIGHT 1406

DOUGLAS DC-1 0-10, N68055

NEWBURGH, NEW YORK

SEPTEMBER 5, 1996

〔图〕一\n The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews.

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National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

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Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(703) 605-6000

NTSB/AAR-98/03

PB98-910403

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

IN-FLIGHT FIRE/EMERGENCY LANDING FEDERAL EXPRESS FLIGHT 1406 DOUGLAS DC-10-10, N68055 NEWBURGH, NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 5, 1996

Adopted: July 22, 1998 Notation 6800B

Abstract: This report explains the accident involving Federal Express flight 1406, a Douglas DC-10-10, which made an emergency landing at Stewart International Airport on September 5, 1996, after the flightcrew determined that there was smoke in the cabin cargo compartment. Safety issues in the report include flightcrew performance of emergency procedures, undeclared hazardous materials in transportation, dissemination of hazardous materials information, airport emergency response, and adequacy of aircraft interior firefighting methods. Safety Recommendations concerning these issues were made to the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation, and the Research and Special Programs Administration.

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS $\ldots$ vi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY $\ldots$ viii

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION $\ldots$ 1

1. 1 History of Flight $\ldots$ 1

1. 2 Injuries to Persons $\ldots$ 11

1. 3 Damage to Airplane $\ldots$ 11

1. 4 Other Damage $\ldots$ 11

1. 5 Personnel Information $\ldots$ 11

1. 5.1 The Captain $\ldots$ 11

1. 5.2 The First Officer $\ldots$ 12

1. 5.3 The Flight Engineer $\ldots$ 13

1. 6 Airplane Information $\ldots$ 14

1. 6.1 Air Ventilation System $\ldots$ 15

1. 6.1.1 Cabin Air Shutoff $\ldots$ 16

1. 6.2 Cabin Pressurization System—Cabin Outflow Valve Control $\ldots$ 18

1. 6.3 Fire/Smoke Detection System $\ldots$ 18

1. 6.4 L1 Forward Passenger Door Design and Operation $\ldots$ 19

1. 7 Meteorological Information $\ldots$ 19

1. 8 Aids to Navigation $\ldots$ 19

1. 9 Communications .................................................................................................. 19

1. 10 Airport Information .................................................................................................................................... 20

1. 11 Flight Recorders 20

1. 11.1 CVR $\ldots$ 20

1. 11.2 FDR $\ldots$ 20

1. 12 Wreckage and Impact Information $\ldots$ 20

1. 13 Medical and Pathological Information $\ldots$ 23

1. 14 Fire 23

1. 14.1 Fire Damage to Lower Cargo Compartment $\ldots$ 23

1. 14.2 Fire Damage to Upper Cargo Compartment $\ldots$ 23

1. 14.2.1 Damage to Cargo Containers and Contents $\ldots$ 27

1. 14.2.1.1 Contents of Cargo Containers in Position 6R and in Rows 8 and 9 29

1. 14.2.1.2 DNA Synthesizer Found in Container 6R $\ldots$ 32

1. 14.3 Significance of Location of First Fuselage Burnthrough and Smoke Detector

Activation Sequence $\ldots$ 35

1. 15 Survival Aspects $\ldots$ 35

1. 15.1 Use of Smoke Goggles and Oxygen Masks $\ldots$ 35

1. 15.2 Emergency Response $\ldots$ 37

1. 15.2.1 Dissemination of Hazardous Materials Information $\ldots$ 38

1. 15.2.1.1 Other FedEx Accidents Involving Dissemination of Hazardous Materials Information $\ldots$ 41

1. 15.2.1.2 Postaccident Actions by FedEx $\ldots$ 42

1. 16 Tests and Research $\ldots$ 43

1. 16.1 Chemical Analysis of Substances Found in Container 6R $\ldots$ 43

1. 16.2 Procedures Used to Prepare the Synthesizer for Shipment $\ldots$ 45

1. 16.3 Reanalysis of Fluids Found in DNA Synthesizer $\ldots$ 49

1. 17 FedEx Organizational and Management Information $\ldots$ 51

1. 18 Additional Information $\ldots$ 51

1. 18.1 Postaccident Actions by FedEx $\ldots$ 51

1. 18.2 Marijuana Shipments on the Accident Airplane $\ldots$ 52

1. 18.3 Programs to Deter Undeclared Hazardous Materials Shipments $\ldots$ 53

2. ANALYSIS $\ldots$ 57

1. 1 General $\ldots$ 57

1. 2 Flightcrew Performance $\ldots$ 57

1. 2.1 Crew Coordination $\ldots$ 57

1. 2.2 Crew's Use of Emergency Equipment $\ldots$ 59

1. 3 Fire Initiation $\ldots$ 61

1. 3.1 Location from Which the Fire Might Have Initiated $\ldots$ 61

1. 3.2 Ignition Source of the Fire $\ldots$ 64

1. 4 Undeclared Hazardous Materials on Airplanes $\ldots$ 66

1. 4.1 The Synthesizer $\ldots$ 66

1. 4.2 Other Prohibited Items $\ldots$ 68

1. 4.3 Federal and Industry Oversight $\ldots$ 68

1. 5 Dissemination of Hazardous Materials Information $\ldots$ 70

1. 6 Emergency Response $\ldots$ 72

3. CONCLUSIONS $\ldots$ 76

1. 1 Findings $\ldots$ 76

1. 2 Probable Cause $\ldots$ 77

4. RECOMMENDATIONS $\ldots$ 78

5.APPENDIXES $\ldots$ 81

APPENDIX A—INVESTIGATION AND HEARING $\ldots$ 81

APPENDIX B—COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER TRANSCRIPT $\ldots$ 82

APPENDIX C – DC-10 CHECKLIST “EMERGENCY EVACUATION (LAND)” 111

APPENDIX D-CARGO CONTAINER EXAMINATION CHART $\ldots$ 113

APPENDIX E—CONTENTS OF NINE CARDBOARD BOXES LABELED "9R" $\ldots$ 119

APPENDIX F-DETAILED EXAMINATION OF FIRE DAMAGE TO DNA SYNTHESIZER $\ldots$ 120

APPENDIX G—RINSE PROCEDURE AND QUANTITIES RINSED FOR 1996 NASA CHEMICAL ANALYSIS $\ldots$ 125

APPENDIX H-SUMMARY CALIBRATION AND GC/MS DATA FOR 1996 NASA TESTING $\ldots$ 127

APPENDIX I-SERVICE NOTE 89-006 $\ldots$ 128

APPENDIX J-DEMONSTRATION OF SYNTHESIZER PURGING AND DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES $\ldots$ 136

ABBREVIATIONS

AFFF aqueous film-forming foam

AFIP Armed Forces Institute of Pathology

ANG Air National Guard

ARFF aircraft rescue and firefighting

ARTCC air route traffic control center

ATA Air Transport Association

ATC air traffic control

ATP airline transport pilot

CDL configuration deviations list

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CRM crew resource management

CVR cockpit voice recorder

DEC Department of Environmental Control

DEGMBE diethylene glycol monobutyl ether

DOT Department of Transportation

EOC emergency operations center

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FL flight level

FDR flight data recorder

FS fuselage station

FTIR Fourier Transform Infrared

GC/MS gas chromatography/mass spectrometry

GOCC Global Operations Command Center

HMIS Hazardous Materials Information System

HMRT Hazardous Materials Response Team

LOFT line oriented flight training

MEL minimum equipment list

mL milliliter

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NYSP New York State Police

PBE protective breathing equipment

pH hydrogen-ion concentration

POI FAA principal operations inspector

psi pounds per square inch

RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration

SN serial number

SPAAT skin penetrator agent application tool

STC supplemental type certificate

THF tetrahydrofuran

TRACON terminal radar approach control

$\mu$ microliter

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

About 0554 eastern daylight time, on September 5, 1996, a Douglas DC-10-10CF, N68055, operated by the Federal Express Corporation as flight 1406, made an emergency landing at Stewart International Airport, Newburgh, New York, after the flightcrew determined that there was smoke in the cabin cargo compartment. The flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a cargo flight from Memphis, Tennessee, to Boston, Massachusetts. Three crewmembers and two nonrevenue passengers were aboard the airplane. The captain and flight engineer sustained minor injuries while evacuating the airplane. The airplane was destroyed by fire after the landing.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was an in-flight cargo fire of undetermined origin.

Safety issues discussed in this report include flightcrew performance of emergency procedures, undeclared hazardous materials in transportation, dissemination of hazardous materials information, airport emergency response, and adequacy of aircraft interior firefighting methods. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were made to the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation, and the Research and Special Programs Administration.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

IN-FLIGHT FIRE/EMERGENCY LANDING

FEDERAL EXPRESS FLIGHT 1406 DOUGLAS DC-10-10, N68055 NEWBURGH, NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 5, 1996

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of Flight

About 0554 eastern daylight time,$^{1}$ on September 5, 1996, a Douglas DC-10-10CF, N68055, operated by the Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) as flight 1406, made an emergency landing at Stewart International Airport (Stewart), Newburgh, New York, after the flightcrew determined that there was smoke in the cabin cargo compartment. The flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a cargo flight from Memphis, Tennessee, to Boston, Massachusetts. Three crewmembers and two nonrevenue passengers were aboard the airplane. The captain and flight engineer sustained minor injuries while evacuating the airplane. The airplane was destroyed by fire after the landing.

The accident occurred on the first leg of a scheduled two-leg sequence from Memphis to Boston with a return to Memphis. The flight engineer stated that before departing Memphis, he received a hazardous materials briefing from a FedEx dangerous goods specialist.$^{2}$ This briefing included discussions about the locations of hazardous materials that were on board the airplane (in cargo containers 1L/1C and 3R $^{3}$) and about the Halon $^{4}$ hose connections to container 1L/1C (which was designated for flammable dangerous goods). The dangerous goods specialist then gave the captain the Notification of Dangerous Goods Loading Form (Part A)

〔图〕CONTAINER1TTAASTATIONS17恐稻1905染140R1416110③112n元141m/CSMOKE DETECTOR份STATIONS\n

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containing required hazardous materials information,$^{5}$ which the captain signed.$^{6}$ Flight 1406 departed Memphis at 0242 central daylight time (CDT); the flightcrew stated that the engine start, taxi, takeoff, and climb were normal. The first officer was the pilot flying, and the captain performed the duties of the nonflying pilot.

The airplane's upper cargo deck was loaded with 23 cargo containers and 1 cargo pallet. The lower forward cargo compartment contained six cargo containers; and the lower aft cargo compartment contained seven containers.

At 0536:23, when the airplane was at flight level (FL) 330,$^{7}$ the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the captain asking, “what [ ]’s that?”$^{8}$ Two seconds later, both the first officer and the flight engineer said, “cabin cargo smoke.” At 0536:27, the captain stated, “You see that...we got cabin cargo smoke...cabin cargo smoke.” The flight engineer then stated, “cabin cargo smoke, oxygen masks on.” The CVR indicates that the crew then donned oxygen masks and established crew communications, as required by the first two steps on the “Fire & Smoke” checklist (see figure 2).$^{9}$

During postaccident interviews and in his deposition, the captain stated that he initially donned his smoke goggles, but had to remove his eyeglasses to do so. During the landing phase of the flight, he removed his goggles so he could replace his glasses. The captain also said that the goggles were dirty and scratched. The first officer stated that he elected not to wear his smoke goggles because he felt that they would unduly restrict his peripheral vision. The flight engineer initially donned his smoke goggles, but then removed them after noting that no smoke was entering the cockpit. At 0536:40, the flight engineer said, “okay it’s number nine

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FEDERAL

DC-10 FLIGHT MANUAL

FIRE & SMOKE

1. Die Dürfen Mark & Schöchschöch und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und der Dürfen Mark und de

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Check Mike switches set to MASK, place cockpit speaker ON, place MIC SEL switch to FLT INT, and establish crew communication.

Cocitit Door & Smolto Screen $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\ldots$ $\l

Close the cockpit door & smoke screen to exclude heavy concentrations of smoke. Leave door closed unless opening it is dictated by a greater emergency, and then at Captain's discretion.

〔图〕or\n

1. W Descent is required $\ldots$ PROCEED TO STEP 6

1. If Descent Is NOT Required $\ldots$ PROCEED TO STEP 14

〔图〕WARNINO\n Should structural damage be suspected, limit already. Gear and/or Speed Brakes may be used depending on type of damage.

1. Autopilot $\ldots$ AS REQUIRED

1. Throttles $\ldots$ IDLE

& Speed Braks $\ldots$ FULL

1. Airspeed $\ldots$ MACH_82 TO.85 (320 TO 360 KIAS)

NOTE

If structural damage is known or suspected, use appropriate turbulence penetration speed.

1. ATC $\ldots$ NOTIFY

1. Transponder (if no contact with ATC) $\ldots$ 7700

1. Tank Pumps $\ldots$ ALL ON

1. Alimeter $\ldots$ SET

1. Type Of Smoke Or Fire ______ DETERMINE & PROCEED TO APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE, THIS CHAPTER

A. ELECTRICAL FIRE & SMOKE: Can best be determined by smell or visible smoke from electrical components (e.g. circuit breaker, radio)

B. AIRCONDITIONING SMOKE: Can best be recognized by smoke emanating from overhead air conditioning outlets.

C. CABIN CARGO SHOKE: Can best be recognized by checking smoke detectors on the Second Officers panel, or by observing smoke or fire in the main deck cargo area.

(End of Procedure)

Figure 2.—FedEx DC-10 “Fire & Smoke” checklist.

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smoke detector.”$^{10}$ (See figure 1 for location of smoke detectors.) Upon the first officer’s suggestion, the nonrevenue passengers (who had been seated in the foyer area in the cabin directly behind the cockpit) came into the cockpit, where they donned their oxygen masks. During postaccident interviews, the passengers stated that at that point they had been unaware of the developing emergency; they had both been reading magazines, and neither saw nor smelled smoke in the foyer area (see figure 3 for a diagram of the foyer).

At 0537:56, the captain stated, “okay it’s moving forward whatever it is...it’s up to seven.” According to the CVR, at 0539:13, the captain asked the flight engineer to test the smoke warning system, which he did. During the test, several lights came on blinking, rather than steadily.$^{11}$ At 0539:28, the captain said, “that’s seven and eight.” At 0539:31, the flight engineer stated, “those others may be failing in the blinking mode.” At 0539:52, the captain said, “I got ten now.”$^{12}$ At 0540:07, the captain stated, “we’ve definitely got smoke guys...we need to get down right now, let’s go.” At this time, according to postaccident interviews, the captain decided that the first officer should continue flying the airplane while he coordinated with air traffic control (ATC) and worked with the flight engineer on the checklists. At 0540:43, the captain informed the Boston air route traffic control center (ARTCC) of the emergency. The flight was immediately cleared to descend to 11,000 feet. The captain told investigators that he did not call for the emergency descent checklist but said that he thought he had completed all of the items from memory.

ARTCC informed the pilots that the Albany County Airport, New York, was approximately 50 miles ahead of them and that Stewart was about 25 miles behind them. The captain selected Stewart, and the flightcrew began to divert the flight there.

At 0541:41, the flight engineer began the “Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated” checklist (see figure 4), in accordance with the last step of the “Fire & Smoke” checklist. At 0542:21, he stated, “and now we have 8, 9, and 10...we’ve lost detector 7...it’s gone out.” He

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〔图〕Escape Slide/Raft(2)(Stowed on Doors)ClearviewWindowsR1 Door3Smoke CurtainLavatory470FoyerAreaPBE Located behindcouriers

Legend

● Crew Portable OxygenCylinder with Smoke Mask(2)

• FirstAid Kit(1)

• Exits (4)

♣♣▷ Escape Lines (2)

Halon Fire Extinguisher (4) (Type 1211) 14lb Foyer

◆ Crash Axe(1)

● Smoke Goggles (7)

⎜ PBE (2)

Figure 3. Diagram of the DC-10-10,

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〔图〕FEER\n

DC-10 FLIGHT MANUAL

CABIN CARGO SMOKE LIGHT ILLUMINATED

1. Pack Function Control Selectors $\ldots$ TWO PACKS OFF

NOTE

Operate the No. 1 Pack only, if available.

1. Cockpit Air Outets $\ldots$ OPEN

1. Courier Masks & Goggles $\ldots$ VERIFY ON100%

1. Airplane Altitude $\ldots$ CAPTAIN'S DISCRETION

〔图〕orJ0\n A. Land as soon as possible.

B. If above FL 270, consider descent to FL 270. Manually raise cabin altitude to 25,000 fl.

C. If below FL 270, and an immediate landing is not possible, climb to FL 270. Manually raise cabin altitude to 25,000 ft. using the MANUAL CAB ALT control wheel.

1. W unable To Extinguish Fire/Smoke $\ldots$ MANUALLY RAISE CABIN ALTITUDE TO 25,000 FEET

6: Cabin Al Shutoff T-Handle $\ldots$ PULL

1. Maintain 0.5 PSI Diff Pressure Below FL 270, Or 25,000 Ft. Cabin Altitude Above FL 270.

1. Fire $\ldots$ CHECK EXTENGUISHED

NOTE

Restricted articles container is designed to be "relatively" air tight so that any fire which may start inside will quickly consume all available oxygen. Depressurizing airplane will further deny oxygen to fire and should result in adequate fire control.

〔图〕CAUTION\n No crewmember should leave the cockpit to fight a fire except when it is determined that the fire is accessible and then only when measures already taken have not been effective. In addition, do not open restricted articles container during flight when a fire within is known or suspected.

1. If It is Necessary To Leave The Cockpit To Fight A Fire:

A. Protective Breathing Equipment $\ldots$ DONACTIVATE

NOTE

The PBE is located in a container in the coat closet and should be worn when fighting an actual fire. The walk-around O2 bottle is also available in the cockpit.

B.Fire extinguisher $\ldots$ OBTAIN

C. Fire or smoke source $\ldots$ EXTINGUISH

1. Land At Nearest Suitable Airport.

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then stated at 0543:02, “I’m manually raising the cabin altitude...there is smoke in the ah cabin area.” During postaccident interviews, the flight engineer said that he felt rushed with the workload during the descent, and that he felt he had spent too much time trying to find the correct station identifier for Stewart on the airport performance laptop computer.$^{13}$ The CVR transcript records the flight engineer asking what the three-letter identifier for Stewart was five times between 0543:22 and 0549:09. At 0548:29, he announced that the “Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated” checklist was complete.

During postaccident interviews, the flight engineer told Safety Board investigators that he was confused by some items on the “Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated” checklist and acknowledged that he did not accomplish step No. 6, “Cabin Air Shutoff T-Handle,” (when the T-handle is pulled, airflow is maintained to the cockpit area, but all airflow is shut off to the main deck cargo area). Regarding step No. 7, “Maintain 0.5 Diff Pressure Below FL 270, Or 25,000 Ft. Cabin Altitude Above FL 270,” he acknowledged that he did not attempt to maintain 0.5 pounds per square inch (psi) differential pressure, but said that he had selected “manual” on the outflow valve control and “cranked it open a couple of times.” (For more information on the cabin outflow valve control, see section 1.6.2.)

At 0546:56, the flight was handed off from Boston ARTCC to New York terminal radar approach control (TRACON) controllers, who provided assistance until the airplane landed. During postaccident interviews, the flight engineer said that during this portion of the flight, he opened the cockpit door several times and saw grayish smoke accumulating in the foyer area.

At 0547:27, the captain advised the first officer, “keep the speed up man, don’t slow to two-fifty...we’re in an emergency situation here.” At 0550:41, after about 3 minutes of assisting the crew with the Stewart approach, the New York TRACON controllers asked if any hazardous materials were on board, and the captain replied affirmatively.

The captain stated that as the airplane approached the airport, visibility remained good in the cockpit, even though he could smell smoke through his oxygen mask. The airplane was cleared to land on runway 27, and the first officer landed the airplane at 0554:28. The captain then took control of the airplane and brought it to a stop on taxiway A3, where airport aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) trucks were waiting.

The flight engineer said that when he opened the cockpit door after landing, he saw that the foyer area was full of smoke, and he could not see the smoke barrier$^{14}$ at the aft end of the foyer. The captain later told investigators that both he and the flight engineer called for an emergency evacuation. The CVR indicates that at 0555:07, the captain stated, “we need to get the [ ] out of here,” and that 12 seconds later the flight engineer said, “emergency ground egress.” The captain told investigators that he then pulled all three engine fire handles and attempted to

9

discharge the engine fire agents (he was unsure whether all bottles discharged).$^{15}$ After the accident, the captain said that the “Emergency Evacuation” checklist had not been read. The flight engineer confirmed that the “Emergency Evacuation” checklist had not been read, but he stated that he had turned off the battery switch (which is item No. 18 on that checklist). (See appendix C for the “Emergency Evacuation” checklist.)

The flight engineer attempted to open the primary doors (doors L1 and R1),$^{16}$ but the doors would not immediately open. Meanwhile, the captain attempted to open his cockpit window and felt resistance, and when he broke the air seal he heard air escape with a hissing noise. He shouted to the others that the airplane was still pressurized. The flight engineer then rotated the outflow valve control to the open position (thereby depressurizing the airplane), and again attempted to open the L1 and R1 doors. Both of the evacuation slides deployed; however, the L1 door only partially opened. After the airplane was depressurized, both the captain and first officer opened their cockpit windows. The captain said that at that point the smoke was colored gray to black, and then turned black and had a “horrible acrid” smell. He said he had to hold his breath until his window opened and the smoke “billowed out the window like a chimney.”

Smoke coming out of the cockpit windows and evacuation doors was immediately visible to the firefighters. After the captain and first officer opened their respective sliding windows, they positioned their upper bodies outside the airplane. The captain knelt on his seat with his upper body outside the window. The first officer was seated on the window sill with his feet on his cockpit seat and his upper body outside. They remained in these positions until after the flight engineer and the jumpseat riders had evacuated the airplane (via the R1 evacuation slide) and called to them from the ground beneath their windows. The captain and the first officer then evacuated the airplane using the cockpit windows' escape ropes. During the evacuation, the captain sustained rope burns on his hands, and the flight engineer received a minor cut to his forehead.

The flight engineer said that while he was in the airplane, the smoke was “oily and sooty” and acrid smelling, and that it made breathing unpleasant and difficult. He said that before he left the cockpit, he used his oxygen mask to fill his lungs with oxygen and then entered the foyer area. He stated during his deposition that he did not consider using the PBE that was available in the cockpit because he was anxious to open the exit doors, and he thought this could be accomplished relatively quickly. He also indicated that he forgot that the PBE was available in the cockpit.

As soon as he evacuated the airplane, the flight engineer gave the top sheet of Part A of the “Notification of Dangerous Goods Loading” form to a firefighter, who radioed the

10

information contained on that sheet (the classes and locations of the declared hazardous materials on board the airplane) to the incident commander. The flight engineer also told firefighters that the cargo containers holding hazardous materials were located in cargo containers 1L/C and 3R and recommended that the firefighters discharge the airplane's Halon bottles that were connected to those containers, even though the fire appeared to be aft of the hazardous materials containers. The flight engineer also indicated that he told firefighters that the more detailed Part B shipping papers were in a plastic folder on the outside of the cockpit door.

As soon as the occupants had evacuated the airplane, the firefighters punctured the slide at the L1 door and used a ladder to enter the foyer area. They attempted to fight the fire from there using handheld hose lines, but the cargo net and the forward cargo containers blocked their access to the cargo compartment. The flight engineer then provided instructions to the firefighters on how to open the fuselage cargo door using the door controls located on the floor of the foyer area. During these efforts, one of the firefighters broke off the control handle. However, they were able to open the cargo door with the damaged control by using pliers to grip and position the control valve.$^{17}$

After the cargo door was opened, firefighters began attempting to fight the fire by aiming handheld hose lines through the cargo door into the cabin. Within approximately 5 minutes after the cargo door was opened, flames burned through the top of the fuselage. (The airport operations log recorded that flames breached the crown of the fuselage about 0655.) In postaccident interviews, many of the eyewitnesses who described seeing the flames coming through the fuselage did not specify the portion of the fuselage where they saw the first flames. Some of the witnesses, who did specify a location, and video footage taken by firefighters of the right side of the airplane, indicate that early visible flames came through the top of the fuselage at a point approximately even with the trailing edge of the wings (in the area roughly corresponding to the junction of cargo container rows 8 and 9). However, a FedEx mechanic who had assisted firefighters in opening the cargo door said that just before observing the fire erupting through the top of the fuselage he saw paint bubbling, aluminum melting, and "fingers" of fire coming from the left side of the fuselage 5 to 8 feet back from the leading edge of the left wing (which roughly corresponds to the forward portion of cargo container position 6L). One other eyewitness, the ATC tower operator,$^{18}$ described the location where he first saw flames appearing as "the first third of the fuselage."

After the flames began venting through the fuselage, the incident commander withdrew the firefighters from the interior of the airplane and reassessed his tactical approach to fighting the fire. Shortly after the fire first burned through the crown of the fuselage, firefighters began using truck-mounted turrets aimed at the breached areas of the fuselage. These firefighting

11

efforts continued until approximately 0925, when the fire was extinguished and cleanup operations began.

The accident occurred during the hours of darkness. Stewart is at 41°30.25' north latitude and 74°06.29' west longitude.

1.2 Injuries to Persons

1.3 Damage to Airplane

The airplane was destroyed by fire after landing. The estimated replacement cost of the airplane is about $95 million.

1.4 Other Damage

Most of the cargo was destroyed by fire and smoke and by the firefighting agent applied during the emergency response operation. Insurance estimates of the value of the destroyed cargo totaled about $300 million.

1.5 Personnel Information

The captain, first officer, and flight engineer were certified in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. A search of FAA records indicated no history of accidents, incidents, or enforcement actions; a search of the National Driver Register indicated no history of driver's license suspension or revocation for the three crewmembers.

1.5.1 The Captain

The captain, age 47, was hired by FedEx on October 8, 1979. He held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate with airplane multiengine and single-engine land and commercial pilot ratings, and type ratings in the Boeing 727 (B-727), Cessna 500, Douglas DC-10, and Lockheed L-382.

His first-class medical certificate was issued on August 8, 1996, with the restriction, "must wear corrective lenses." Company records indicate that at the time of the accident, he had accumulated approximately 12,344 total flying hours. He had logged 883 hours in the DC-10 as first officer and 1,621 hours as captain.

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The captain's most recent pertinent ground training, flight training, and checks, according to FedEx records, were as follows:

Before his employment at FedEx, the captain was briefly employed as an air taxi pilot, flying light twin-engine airplanes. Before that, beginning in 1971, he served in the U.S. Air Force as a C-130 pilot.

The captain described his activities for the 72-hour period before the accident. Regarding his sleep cycles, he said he went to bed at 2350 central daylight time (CDT) on September 1, 1996, and awoke at 0900 CDT on September 2. He was off duty on September 2 and 3. He said he went to bed at 2230 CDT on September 2 and awoke at 0700 CDT on September 3; he went to bed at 2000 CDT on September 3 and awoke at 0015 CDT on September 4. On September 4, he served as captain on a flight from Memphis to Boston, which was scheduled to leave Memphis at 0245 CDT. He slept at Boston for approximately 1 hour 45 minutes and arrived back at Memphis at 1116 CDT. He arrived home at 1215 CDT, ate lunch, and ran some household errands. He slept from 1400 CDT until 1800 CDT and had dinner at 1830 CDT. He went to sleep at 2100 CDT.

He awoke at 0015 CDT on September 5, 1996, and checked in for the accident flight at 0125 CDT.

1.5.2 The First Officer

The first officer, age 41, was hired by FedEx on December 27, 1989. He held an ATP certificate with airplane multiengine and single-engine land, commercial pilot, rotorcraft-helicopter, and instrument helicopter ratings, and a type rating in the Douglas DC-9 airplane.

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His first-class medical certificate was issued on July 29, 1996, with the restriction, “must wear corrective lenses.” The first officer indicated that he was wearing his glasses throughout the accident flight. Company records indicate that at the time of the accident, the first officer had accumulated 6,535 total flying hours. He had logged 1,101 hours in the DC-10 as flight engineer and 237 hours as a first officer.

The first officer's most recent pertinent ground training, flight training, and checks, according to FedEx records, were as follows:

Before being employed by FedEx, the first officer served in the U.S. Navy as a naval aviator flying fixed-wing airplanes and helicopters. He began pilot training with the Navy in November 1979.

The first officer described his activities for the 72-hour period before the accident. Regarding his sleep cycles, he said he went to bed at 2030 CDT on September 1, 1996, and woke up at 0830 CDT on September 2. He was off duty on September 2 and 3. He said that he went to bed at 2245 CDT on September 2 and awoke at 0600 CDT on September 3; he went to bed at 2130 CDT on September 3 and awoke 2½ hours later, at 2400 CDT. He left home at 0040 on September 4 and flew on the same flight sequence as the captain. He arrived home on September 4 at 1215 CDT, had lunch, and went to bed at 1245 CDT. He woke up at 1830 CDT, had dinner, and picked up his son from football practice. He went to bed at 2030.

He awoke at 2350 CDT on September 5, 1996, and checked in for the accident flight at 0125 CDT.

1.5.3 The Flight Engineer

The flight engineer, age 45, was hired by FedEx on March 20, 1996. He held an ATP certificate with airplane multiengine and single-engine land and commercial pilot ratings, and a type rating in the B-737 airplane.

His first-class medical certificate was issued on March 11, 1996, with the restriction, “must wear corrective lenses.” The flight engineer stated that his glasses are only for

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distance vision, and that he removes them periodically when he does not need them. He stated that he was not wearing them during the emergency portion of the accident flight.$^{20}$ Company records indicate that at the time of the accident, the flight engineer had accumulated 3,704 total flying hours. He had logged 188 hours in the DC-10 as flight engineer.

The flight engineer's most recent ground training, flight training, and checks, according to FedEx records, were as follows:

From October 1995 until his time of employment with FedEx, the flight engineer was employed as a DeHavilland DHC-8 (Dash-8) first officer by Horizon Air. He flew the Cessna 310 for Copper State Air Service from February 1995 until October 1995. He also flew jet trainers and fighters in the U.S. Air Force.

The flight engineer described his activities for the 72-hour period before the accident. Regarding his sleep cycles, he said he went to bed on September 1, 1996, at 2100 CDT and awoke at 0600 CDT on September 2. He was off duty on September 2 and 3. He said that he went to sleep at 2100 CDT on September 2 and awoke at 0600 CDT on September 3; he went to sleep at 1830 on September 3 and awoke at 2400 CDT. On September 4, he flew on the same flight sequence as the captain and first officer. After he arrived home, he exercised, ate lunch, and took a 2-hour nap. He awoke and had dinner at 1700 CDT. After dinner, he went to bed, sleeping approximately 6 hours.

He awoke at 2400 CDT on September 5, 1996, and checked in for the accident flight at 0115 CDT.

1.6 Airplane Information

N68055, a DC-10-10CF, serial number (SN) 47809, was manufactured by the Douglas Aircraft Company and was issued an airworthiness certificate on January 21, 1975. The airplane was originally operated by Continental Airlines; FedEx acquired the airplane on May 14, 1980. In May 1989, the airplane underwent supplemental type certificate (STC) modifications to its cabin interior, changing its configuration from a passenger-carrying to a cargo-only full

15

freighter airplane. These STC modifications included changes to the overhead cabin ventilation ducting, and installation of smoke detectors, cabin floor pallet tiedown and movement systems, and panels covering the interior walls.

A review of the airplane records revealed that a possible hazardous materials spill (of an unknown white powder) was reported on August 5, 1996, and was cleaned up on August 23, 1996. The spill occurred on the right side and at the rear of the main cargo deck areas at cargo container positions 14R, 15R, and 16R. Testing at that time found the spilled substance not to be corrosive, and no further action was taken. No other pertinent discrepancies were noted in the maintenance logs, the minimum equipment list (MEL),$^{21}$ or the configuration deviations list (CDL).$^{22}$

As of September 5, 1996, N68055 had been flown 38,271 hours, with 17,818 cycles. Three General Electric CF6-6D engines powered the airplane. The takeoff gross weight of the airplane was 364,144 pounds. The maximum allowable takeoff gross weight was 446,000 pounds.

1.6.1 Air Ventilation System

The air conditioning/ventilation system on the DC-10 consists of three environmental control units (air conditioning packs) located beneath the main cabin floor. The three packs feed conditioned air through a distribution system for cooling/heating the airplane's cockpit and cabin compartments. (The system also provides pressurized air for cabin pressurization.) On the accident airplane, air entered the main cabin from an overhead duct just aft of the cockpit in the foyer area.

The STC modifications to the accident airplane in 1989 included modifications to the overhead cabin ventilation ducting. No tests of upper cabin airflow patterns have been conducted on this airplane configuration or with cargo pallets in place. A Boeing systems engineer with Douglas Products Division who is familiar with the DC-10 ventilation system testified at the Safety Board's deposition proceeding that although there is an attempt to minimize axial airflow $^{23}$ on passenger airplanes as much as possible, axial flow can and does occur in cargo configurations. A FedEx engineer who is familiar with the accident airplane's configuration testified that he had observed axial (aft-flowing) airflow in an empty cargo airplane (i.e., without any cargo containers in place).

Safety Board investigators considered conducting smoke/fire tests to observe what the airflow patterns would have been during the accident sequence. However, because any such

16

test would have had to include a re-creation of the heat produced by the fire (and not just the smoke) and also the effects of the airplane's maneuvering at altitude, the members of the fire group determined that no meaningful tests could be done safely.

To further study the ventilation system, on January 30, 1998, Safety Board investigators examined an undamaged FedEx DC-10 with the same configuration as the accident airplane. From the initial entry point behind the cockpit, air was routed both into the cockpit area and into the main cargo cabin. The main cargo cabin ducting consisted of a 12-inch diameter fiberglass duct installed in the crown of the cabin. Eight outlets from the main overhead duct (the first of which was installed at fuselage station (FS) $^{24}$ 700 and the last at 1740) directed conditioned air into the cabin. (The outlets were 4-inch tubes that extended about 4 inches down into the cabin from the main duct.)$^{25}$ The air exited the cabin through a series of metal floor vents installed in the cabin floor where the floor abutted the cabin walls. The floor vents were 9.48 inches high and between 10.5 and 16.25 inches long. The floor vents were not evenly distributed; more were installed in the aft portion than in the forward portion of the main cargo cabin. (See figure 5 for the arrangement of floor vents.) After exiting the floor of the main cargo cabin, the air passed through holes, known as cusp holes,$^{26}$ and exited the airplane from the outflow valve, which was located on the left side of the airplane forward of the wing.

The accident airplane's pneumatic systems were examined for abnormal conditions or malfunctions. The pneumatic lines from the engines and the auxiliary power unit were found attached to the airframe except in the areas where the aft fuselage had separated during the postlanding fire. The pneumatic lines from the environmental control units were examined. They remained attached to the airframe throughout the lower portion of the airplane.

1.6.1.1 Cabin Air Shutoff

According to the March 20, 1994, edition of FedEx's DC-10 Flight Manual, page 8-2-1:

Three shutoff valves are installed, one in each cabin conditioned air supply duct.... A single handle recessed in the cockpit ceiling above the second observer [flight engineer] operates the three shutoff valves in the cabin conditioned air manifolds and the overpressure relief valve in the main conditioned air manifold.

〔图〕OUTFLOW WALVESOVERHEAD AIR DUCTING108017411200135014909301630790STATIONS1969SMOKE DETECTOR STATIONS635675751111979184597

Figure 5.—DC-10-10, N68055, cargo container, smoke detector, and main cabin overhead ducting locations.

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In the event of smoke indication in the cabin cargo compartment, pulling the handle shuts off all air to the cabin and opens the relief valve under the floor to dump excess air directly to the pressure control outflow valves.

1.6.2 Cabin Pressurization System—Cabin Outflow Valve Control

According to the March 20, 1994, edition of FedEx's DC-10 Flight Manual, page 8-2-2/8-2-3:

Cabin pressure is controlled and maintained by metered release of conditioned air in either an AUTO, SEMI-AUTO, or MANUAL mode.... The cabin pressure controller maintains the desired cabin pressure in relation to the altitude set.... In the AUTO mode, cabin pressurization is automatically controlled during takeoff, climb, cruise, and descent conditions to the lowest cabin altitude compatible with aircraft and flight requirement.

When MANUAL control is selected, the control wheel engages a locking mechanism to secure the outflow valve in its existing position. After selection, manual control is achieved by pressing the control wheel inward (to disengage the control wheel locking device) and rotating the wheel to position the outflow valve to attain the desired cabin altitude. When the control wheel is released, the outflow valve is again locked in its existing position. Selecting the valve at more than two-thirds open can cause a negative pressure and create a noise in the cabin. At touchdown, the Second Officer [flight engineer] must manually depressurize the aircraft.

In the DC-10, the manual cabin outflow valve control wheel projects vertically through the flight engineer's panel. Approximately one-third of the wheel projects through the panel. During a ground test conducted by a Safety Board investigator on a similar DC-10, two full manual cranks of the outflow valve control wheel in the cockpit did not perceptibly open the outflow valve from the full-closed position. (During the test, a full "crank" of the control was considered to be the most rotation of the wheel that could be obtained with one hand motion.) During the test, the valve began to perceptibly open after about 3 full cranks and was completely open after about 16 full cranks.

1.6.3 Fire/Smoke Detection System

Smoke detection systems were installed in the main cargo cabin and lower cargo areas. The smoke detection system consisted of 16 main deck smoke detectors suspended from the cabin ceiling, each of which was connected to an indicator light in the cockpit, and 4 lower forward cargo compartment detectors. Postaccident examination of the smoke detection systems in the upper cabin cargo area revealed that they had been destroyed by fire. The lower cargo compartment detectors were in place and were not damaged. The system could not be functionally tested because of the damage to the upper cabin system and the associated wiring bundles.

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The airplane had fire extinguishing systems for each of the three engines (two bottles for each engine) and one bottle for the forward lower cargo compartment. In addition, three Halon fire extinguishers were installed in the forward portion of the main deck cargo compartment connected to cargo container 1L/1C.

Examination of the engines' fire extinguishing systems revealed that on some of the bottles, the squibs (discharge devices that rupture to discharge the fire extinguishing agent in the bottle) had discharged. The No. 1 and No. 3 engines each had bottle 1 fired, and the lower cargo compartment had its bottle fired. None of the three main deck Halon bottles had been used. Neither of the No. 2 engine squibs had discharged.

1.6.4 L1 Forward Passenger Door Design and Operation

The L1 and R1 cabin doors are plug-type doors that are normally powered up and down by an electric motor through a gearbox, cable drums, sprockets, and torque tube, and 1/8-inch nylon-coated drive cables that are attached to the door. During emergency operation, an air motor drives the door open through the same electric motor gearbox, cable drums, sprockets, torque tube, and drive cables. The air motor supply is provided by an air bottle charged with nitrogen to 1,500 psi. When the door handle is moved to the emergency position, the air motor opens the door within 9 seconds. A fully charged bottle is capable of providing air pressure for up to approximately 30 seconds. The door is designed to open when activated when the cabin pressure differs by less than approximately 0.5 psi from the external pressure. If an attempt to open the door is made with the pressure differential greater than 0.5 psi, the bottle pressure will bleed off and the door will not open. A ratchet-type lock prevents the door from closing all the way if it is only partially opened.

1.7 Meteorological Information

The weather logged by the Stewart tower when flight 1406 landed was as follows:

Wind from 280° at 4 knots; surface visibility 2 statute miles restricted by mist; a broken layer of clouds at 3,000 feet above the ground and an overcast layer of clouds at 7,000 feet above the ground; temperature 64°F (18°C); dew point 63°F (17°C); altimeter setting 30.18 inches of Hg.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

No problems with aids to navigation were reported.

1.9 Communications

No communications difficulties were reported.

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1.10 Airport Information

Stewart is located approximately 3.5 miles northwest of Newburgh, New York, and has a published elevation of 491 feet above sea level. The airport has two intersecting runways oriented approximately east-west (runway 9-27, which is 11,818 feet by 150 feet) and northwest-southeast (runway 16-34, which is 6,006 feet by 150 feet). The airport is certified under 14 CFR Part 139 and is an Index C aircraft ARFF facility.$^{27}$

1.11 Flight Recorders

A digital flight data recorder (FDR) and a CVR were installed in the airplane. The FDR was a 37-parameter Sundstrand Model UFDR (SN 2783). The CVR was a Fairchild Model A100 (SN 4225). Both recorders were removed from the airplane by investigators and sent to the Safety Board's laboratory in Washington, D.C., for readout.

1.11.1 CVR

The four channels of the CVR contained information from the cockpit area microphone, the captain's position, the first officer's position, and the flight engineer's position. Although the top of the CVR unit was lightly coated with a soot-like substance, it did not show evidence of either fire or structural damage. The quality of the recording was excellent.$^{28}$ A transcript was prepared and is included as appendix B.

1.11.2 FDR

The FDR showed evidence of slight thermal damage and sooting, but the recording medium was undamaged.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

The upper cargo containers and fuselage were destroyed by fire. The fuselage had separated in two places: at FS 1531, just aft of the rear wing spar, and at FS 1986, just forward of the aft pressure bulkhead. Several areas of the fuselage were consumed by fire. (See section 1.14.) Examination of the L1 and R1 doors found that the doors were seized in their respective

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tracks with severe heat damage around the door jambs and their drive cables. (See figure 3 for location of L1 and R1 doors.)

The nose of the airplane was lightly sooted above both cockpit windows. The area above the L1 door was burned and sooted. The fuselage above the L1 and R1 doors was heavily sooted, with soot trailing outwards from inside the airplane. The top two-thirds of the R1 door was also heavily sooted. The window in the R2 door was ruptured inwards. No smoke, soot, or fire damage was observed in or around the ruptured portion of the door.

A light residue of soot and oil was observed trailing aft from both air conditioning pack cooling outlets on the left side of the fuselage. There was a 6-inch diameter hole on the left side of the airplane, forward of the main cargo door, slightly below the window line. Heavy soot trailed approximately 2 feet aft of the outflow valve along the left side of the fuselage. The cargo door's hydraulic line remained attached at the lower right side of the fuselage and at the upper fuselage crown at the centerline attachment. No evidence of soot or fire damage was found on the lower fuselage and belly of the airplane.

The vertical stabilizer, rudder, horizontal stabilizers, and elevators were intact and free of fire damage. The No. 2 engine nacelle was sooted about 4 feet aft of the engine intake and was burned through the lower nacelle at four locations that corresponded to the consumed fuselage below the nacelle. The right side of the No. 2 engine pylon and exterior fuselage were sooted and burned from the top of the engine pylon to fuselage longeron $^{29}$ 13 at the right horizontal stabilizer fairing. (See figure 6 for a diagram of longeron locations.) The tailcone and lower fuselage skin were compressed vertically along its bottom surface, and there was a vertical wrinkle 2 feet from the end of the tailcone.

The lower cargo compartments, wings, landing gear, and No. 1 and No. 3 engines were undamaged and free of soot or fire damage.

At the separated empennage section, the upper interior fuselage crown and the canted area of the aft pressure bulkhead were heavily sooted between longeron 15 left and longeron 23 right. Four of the upper fuselage ring frames were burned and melted between longeron 1 left and the upper canted bulkhead, parallel to longerons 18 left and right. The No. 2 engine bleed air duct was separated about 3 feet forward of the bulkhead. Electrical wires protruded about 20 feet from the aft pressure bulkhead and had cut and separated ends. The wire insulation remained intact on the wires that protruded from the left side of the aft pressure bulkhead, and the wire insulation was burned around the wires that protruded from the right side of the aft pressure bulkhead. No evidence of arcing of airplane wiring was seen. The lower section of the aft pressure bulkhead that was common to the lower cargo area was undamaged and had no soot or fire damage.

〔图〕2900.111997.7301060194219751305.290000.2901851.10041921194217011741170110211941381146119011581121111099t79111911991199-1 〔图〕TVOLUTAMOAI ZON TALFFWPIFUSELAGE LONCER ONNUMBERING ARRANGEMEITICONSTANT SECTION\n

Figure 6.—DC-10-10, N68055, fuselage station and longeron number locations.

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The left No. 1 engine and its engine pylon and the right No. 3 engine and its engine pylon were structurally intact and were attached to the fuselage. Neither of these engines or their pylons had any sooting or heat damage.

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

The captain, first officer, and flight engineer submitted urine specimens approximately 25 hours after flight 1406 landed. The specimens were analyzed and found to be negative for THC,$^{30}$ cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), amphetamines, and opiates. The results of the postaccident breath alcohol tests conducted approximately 25½ hours after flight 1406 landed were invalid under DOT regulations because of the elapsed time since the accident.

1.14 Fire

1.14.1 Fire Damage to Lower Cargo Compartment

No evidence of smoke or fire was observed on any of the cargo containers from the lower forward and lower center cargo compartments (the lower aft cargo compartment was empty). The undersides of the main deck cabin flooring, above the center accessory compartment, had several areas where the bottom fiberglass face of the main cabin flooring was scorched. Two larger scorched areas were found near the forward inboard side near FS 1149, below the 6R container position. A smaller scorched area was found under the forward outboard side of FS 1515 (at the interface of container positions 8L and 9L), and another smaller scorched area was found between FS 1641 and 1661 (under the vacant area aft of cargo container row 9). There was some melting of the insulation blanket cover under the cabin return air grills in the right forward corner of the center cargo compartment. Burned debris from the cabin had also fallen through the return air grills in that area.

1.14.2 Fire Damage to Upper Cargo Compartment

There were melted and partially consumed aluminum fuselage skin, longerons, and frames $^{31}$ throughout the interior fuselage. The cabin interior of the forward fuselage was burned and sooted between FS 470 and 765. The cabin sidewall panels in that area were destroyed by fire on the right side of the fuselage, exposing the burned and melted fuselage ring frame flanges. The center of the fuselage crown was consumed by fire from FS 515 through 575, above container row 1. (See figure 7.) Two small areas of fuselage crown were consumed by the fire between FS 595 and 615 on the right side of the fuselage and between FS 615 and 635 on the left side of the fuselage, also above container row 1. The center of the fuselage crown was consumed in the area of the main cabin cargo door from FS 635 through 735, above the location of cargo container row 2.

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〔图〕91021R54L3L2 1L2R3R6R 5R 4R162071513138712611135STA STA STA STA6OR 7R9R16L15L149L14R16R 15R\n

Figure 7.—DC-10-10, N68055, airplane with overlaid cargo container positions

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The cabin sidewall panels were lightly sooted and remained attached to the left side of the fuselage between FS 450 and 840, above container position 3L. Burned and sooted upper sidewall panels hung down directly above the attached lower sidewall panels. The right side of the fuselage between FS 808 and FS 919, next to container position 3R, exhibited severe heat and fire damage, along with melted fuselage frame flanges. The airplane's exterior paint was scorched and bubbled on the left side, next to the first two windows between FS 859 and 899, near the aft of container row 3 and the front of container row 4.

The fuselage crown was consumed by the fire between FS 939 and FS 1039, from approximately the middle of container row 4 to the middle of container row 5. The frame flanges on either side of this consumed area of the fuselage crown were burned and melted. The left side of the fuselage crown was also consumed by fire between FS 1179 and FS 1531, an area corresponding to approximately the middle of cargo container 6L to the middle of cargo container 9L.

Light soot deposits were found on the cusp holes under the cabin floor vents and on floor structural components on the right side of the cabin between FS 1039 and FS 1099, outboard of the 5R position (on the accident flight, position 5R was occupied by a loaded cargo pallet, not a cargo container). A floor vent panel at FS 1119 was melted. Intense heat and fire damage was observed in the area of container position 6R at the level of the cabin cargo deck floor on the right side of the fuselage. Three floor vent panels outboard of container 6R were melted or fire damaged, including a floor vent panel between FS 1199 and 1219, which was melted on the corner near FS 1199 and at FS 1139, where the baffle and floor vent grill were melted. The bottom surface of cargo container 6R was melted through the bottom of the container onto a seat track and through the cargo compartment floor into the lower cargo compartment. No other cargo container floors or bottom surfaces were breached.

Examination of the section of the fuselage that separated at FS 1531 and FS 1986 revealed interior skin sooted throughout the crown. Soot deposits on the left side of the cabin interior just forward of FS 1531 (which was at the front of cargo container row 9) were in a “V” pattern with the lowest point of the “V” being on the floor level at the fuselage separation point. At this separation, there was no evidence of thermal damage to the cabin floor or to the fuselage structure. The fiberglass floor board on the left side outboard between the interface of containers 8L and 9L was burned. Examination of the left outboard airplane structure just aft of the separation showed soot deposits on the lower outboard floor panel between FS 1561 and FS 1581, adjacent to cargo container position 9L. There was no evidence of soot deposits on the floor beam lightening holes $^{32}$ between FS 1541 and FS 1561. The left side blow-out panel $^{33}$ between FS 1561 and 1581 showed no evidence of heat damage.

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There was a melted aluminum shield (a small wall panel that abuts the floor) between FS 1581 and 1601 (outboard of 9R). The ventilation grill at this point was intact. There was no evidence of soot flow along the left or right side tunnel in the area of the blow-out panel or on the cusp holes under the floor. The binder in the fiberglass floor board on the outboard left side of FS 1641 was burned away, leaving only the fiberglass strands. (No containers were in this area [FS 1639-1728] on the accident flight.) There was some scorching of the underside of the floor panel between FS 1641 and 1661. This heat damage was about 24 inches to the right of the airplane centerline. Cabin sidewall panels on the left side of the cabin between FS 1621 and 1851 were burned and sooted throughout the upper half of the panels (this area began above container 9L and extended through the forward portion of container 15L). A portion of the seat track in the cabin floor was melted between FS 1641 and 1656. The fuselage skin and frames between FS 1900 and 1986 were undamaged.

The center of the fuselage crown was consumed by fire between FS 1741 and 1781, above container row 14. The fuselage crown frames forward and aft of FS 1741 and 1781 were melted, and the fuselage skin was consumed on the right side of the fuselage between FS 1781 and 1821. The area surrounding the consumed skin was free of soot. Light sooting was observed above the horizontal stabilizer between FS 1986 and 2163. The center of the fuselage crown was also consumed by fire between FS 1868 and 1942, above container rows 15 and 16.

Three cabin fluorescent light ballasts were recovered. One ballast was found in container 6R, one in container 4L, and one next to the forward cargo door near FS 695. All were fire damaged but showed no evidence of arcing or internal failure. The switch for the cabin fluorescent lighting, which was installed on a control panel aft of the L1 door, was found in the "off" position. A FedEx representative reported that the main cargo compartment fluorescent lights are normally turned on during cargo loading at night and are turned off before flight.

During the on-scene portion of the investigation, four aerosol cans were found in the debris on the main cabin floor. Two of them were found in the area between cargo containers 6R and 7R. The tops of both of these cans were intact. The propellant filling port plug on the bottom of one was missing; the plug on the bottom of the other one was present. Two additional cans were found in the area of container 9L. The tops of both of these cans were missing, and the metal bodies where the tops attached were unfolded (uncrimped).

A specially trained accelerant residue detection K-9 Labrador retriever (trained to detect ignitable vapor residues from petroleum products, alcohol, and other common accelerants), was brought into the main cargo compartment a few days after the accident to check for accelerant residue. No accelerant residue was detected.

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1.14.2.1 Damage to Cargo Containers and Contents $^{34}$

After the accident, the cargo containers that had been in the main cabin were removed from the airplane and arranged in the same order in which they had been in the airplane. The bottom surface of each container was examined and photographed as the containers were removed. None of the container bottom surfaces exhibited evidence of fire damage except for container 6R. The forward inboard corner (as viewed from aft looking forward with container 6R in its original position in N68055) of container 6R's bottom surface was melted.

The cargo containers were arranged with a 10-foot wide center walkway and about 2½ feet between the forward and aft sides of the containers for walkaround space. Orange rubber traffic cones were placed along the center walkway to simulate the positions of the cargo compartment smoke detectors in relationship to the individual positions of the cargo containers. One-inch wide orange plastic surveyor's tape was connected to cornerposts of each cargo container, front to rear, on both sides to trace the height of the burned and melted container corner posts. A conical “V” burn pattern was observed from right to left and from forward to rear with the lowest (deepest burned) area centered over container 6R.$^{35}$ It was observed that the cargo in containers surrounding 6R (position 6L, 7R, and 5R) was burned to a greater depth along the sides next to container 6R than in the other areas of those containers. For example, the cargo in container 6L was burned to the floor along the inboard (right) side of the container, which bordered on 6R. Likewise, the cargo in container 7R was burned deeper along the container's forward edge (next to the aft of container 6R). An overhead view of the cargo containers also showed that the deepest (lowest level of consumed wreckage) fire damage had occurred at container 6R.$^{36}$

Container 6R's aluminum roof, three Lexan $^{37}$ walls, and nylon roll-up curtain (the fourth wall) were completely consumed by fire, except for a small portion at the bottom center of

28

the aft Lexan wall.$^{38}$ The outboard forward cornerpost was completely consumed. The outboard aft cornerpost measured 3 feet 9 inches, the inboard forward cornerpost measured 1 foot 2 inches, and the inboard aft cornerpost measured 3 feet 6 inches. The roll-up door spring assembly, including the spring cover, was melted to the floor near the inboard forward cornerpost. Solidified melted aluminum was puddled on the container floor along the inboard side of the container floor. Portions of the container's 8-inch high aluminum lower sidewall had melted along the outboard, inboard, and forward sides of the container.

Other containers that sustained significant fire damage were those in positions 6L, rows 7 and 8, and 9R. Appendix D describes in detail the damage to each of the cargo containers from the main cabin, except for containers 1L/1C and 3R, which contained declared hazardous materials and are described below.

Containers in positions 1L/1C and 3R contained declared hazardous materials. The container in position 1L/1C was a full-contour aluminum container designed for hazardous materials. The container, when viewed from the side with its access door facing forward, had soot in varying degrees of thickness on the outside of the upper half of the container. The roof of the container had a hole approximately 12 inches left of its center and about 4 inches in from the edge of the door side. The hole was 16 to 18 inches long (left to right) and 12 inches deep (forward-aft dimension) and was centered in an area that had been dented inward. FedEx reported that the hole had been caused by the equipment used to remove the container from the airplane after the fire. No soot was observed on the container's interior surfaces. A small amount of water was present on the floor of the container.

The contents of container 1L/1C were secured by netting, and the packaging was tight and in place. No discrepancies were noted during the postaccident examination regarding the separation, segregation, and orientation of the packages in the container. On September 8, 1996, each package within the container was also inspected. The package containing a vial of an infectious substance (HIV) appeared to be undamaged and was opened and examined. The inner contents were intact and undamaged. One package containing a flammable liquid showed signs of wetness along the bottom of the package, even though this box was on top of another box within the container. When the wet box was opened, a cooler pack was found to be the source of the wetness; the glass bottle of flammable liquid within the box was not damaged and did not leak. Other than the light sooting of some packages, there was no evidence of damage or leakage from any of the other packages in this cargo container.

The container in position 3R was a full Lexan container. It had an aluminum floor, roof, frame, Lexan sides, and a draw-down nylon curtain to cover the door or opening of the container. Eighty percent of the roof, 100 percent of the rear wall opposite the door, 75 percent of the left side, and 75 percent of the right side were consumed by fire. The floor area of the container was intact. The inboard cornerposts were intact; the outboard cornerposts were slightly burned at the top.

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The cargo container was emptied and its radioactive contents inventoried. All of the inner containers for the radioactive materials were found intact. Ten separate shipments of radioactive materials were found in the container. All other recognizable shipments declared as hazardous materials were also unloaded from 3R and inventoried. Some contents were consumed by fire; others had sustained some level of water and/or fire damage. Excluding the 10 radioactive shipments, 36 packages were identified and inventoried as hazardous materials.

1.14.2.1.1 Contents of Cargo Containers in Position 6R and in Rows 8 and 9

Each of the containers was inspected to assess the degree of its fire damage and the depth to which its contents were burned.$^{39}$ A layered inspection of the debris in each cargo container$^{40}$ was initiated starting with the top, outermost layer of burned cargo and working inward and down towards the center of the cargo. The examination revealed that container 6R was the only cargo container that exhibited fire damage throughout its debris and down to the container floor. The investigation found four cargo shipments in container 6R:$^{41}$ one consisting of industrial metal valves, one consisting of a DNA synthesizer, and two separate computer shipments. All of the contents of 6R were removed and examined.

The metal valves were found in the aft outboard corner of 6R. The various-sized valves were stacked on top of cardboard on a single wooden pallet, wrapped in newspaper, and banded with steel bands. Some of the newspaper wrapping was slightly discolored by heat but had not been impinged by flames. Other portions of newspaper and cardboard were charred. The aft part of the pallet was unburned under the cardboard, but the forward part of the pallet was charred and burned. A variety of electronic equipment was also found in the remains of container 6R: a Texas Instruments Extensa laptop computer; two Power Station power servers; a

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computer manufactured by Power Computing Company; and a DNA synthesizer Expedite Model 8909 manufactured by PerSeptive Biosystems. Investigators examined all of this equipment to assess internal and external fire damage and to search for possible ignition sources.

The Extensa plastic computer case was partially melted and burned along its left side, but the remainder of the case was undamaged and remained encased in its Styrofoam and plastic packaging materials. The computer was pried open, and a service invoice was found between the keyboard and computer screen. The invoice revealed that the computer had been repaired by Texas Instruments on the day before the accident. When questioned by investigators, the Texas Instruments technician who repaired the computer stated that the computer's connectors to the hard drive had been upgraded. According to the technician, the computer's battery had not been recharged before it was shipped to its owner. Further examination of the computer components and its battery pack found that the left side of the plastic computer case was burned and melted, exposing the end of the battery pack. (The Extensa laptop is equipped with two rows of seven nickel metal hydride batteries mounted to a plastic circuit board.) The plastic covering on two of the outboard batteries in the pack was burned and melted, exposing the metal cases, which were undamaged. The remainder of the batteries and the circuit board were intact and showed no further fire damage. A voltage check across the positive and negative battery leads measured 0.26 volt. No other fire damage was noted on the interior of the computer.

On the two Power Station power servers, the plastic external surfaces were melted and charred. No batteries or other power source was found in the power servers. No fire damage was found inside the units.

The outer case of the Power Computing Company computer was burned on the front of the case. No evidence of internal fire damage was found in the unit. No batteries were found inside the computer. Several coils of burned and charred computer connection cables were found near the power server and the computer monitor.

The following additional items, some of which were burned, were found among the debris in 6R:

· Packages labeled Warrick Pharmaceutical Albuterol Sulfate USP Inhalation Solution .083 percent, and packaging and products labeled Sodium Chloride Inhalation Solution.

· A partially melted plastic bottle labeled ICE P__, empty B__, Contain water on 42

· A box labeled Texas Instruments Computer Box.

· Pieces of broken glass bottles (similar to wine bottle glass).

· Pieces of broken, flat, clear glass.

· Various unidentified electronic/electric components imbedded in melted and solidified aluminum.

· Pieces of copper wire conductor of various gauges with many areas of melted copper.

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· An unknown green, red, and cream-colored material on the inboard side of the container floor.

· Fluid that leaked from a large, silver-colored valve.

(An analysis and identification of the unknown green, red, and cream-colored material and the fluid sample are discussed in section 1.16.1.)

After removing the burned debris from container 6R, the container floor was examined. It consisted of an aluminum top skin covering an aluminum framework that was on top of another aluminum bottom skin. Most of the top skin of the flooring was melted and had sagged down between the supporting framework underneath it. In several areas, the flooring had melted through the bottom skin as well. Along a portion of the inboard edge of the container (beginning approximately 3 feet aft of the front wall) molten aluminum had flowed through the container floor onto the cargo tracks on the cabin floor in that area and had resolidified. The floor along the aft edge of the container under the three wooden pallets that had supported the industrial valves, computer equipment, and the DNA synthesizer, respectively, was not melted.

Because of the comments on the CVR regarding the smoke detector activation sequence and because of the early fuselage crown burnthrough observed by ground witnesses in the area of cargo rows 8 and 9, investigators also focused on the containers and cargo located in this area. At the request of a party to the Safety Board's investigation, the stored contents of containers 9L and 9R were examined by members of the fire group on November 7, 1997. After the accident, FedEx had hired a contractor to clean out the cargo containers from the accident airplane and store the contents at Stewart. One large box labeled 9L was found in the storage area. In addition to miscellaneous debris, this box contained some unburned computer parts and some burned and unburned cardboard packaging material. A Packard Bell laptop computer was found burned with a melted case and exposed internal circuit boards, but the circuit boards were unburned and showed no heat damage. A substantial amount of material in the box was unburned, including material with a low melting point, such as polyurethane, polystyrene, and polyethylene. Ten plastic bottles containing liquid were found undamaged by heat. The caps were tightly secured on the bottles. Analysis of the liquid in these bottles indicated that the liquid was aqueous, rather than organic. The aqueous liquid in one of the bottles had a pH of 2.0 (acidic) and the liquid in the other nine bottles had a pH of 0.5 (also acidic).

A wooden pallet with the number 9L written on it was also found in the storage area. It contained a computer tower and some pieces of aluminum structure that appeared to be from an aluminum cargo container. There was a large piece of resolidified aluminum with two bottle caps melted into it with what appeared to be sample bottle impressions. The smaller cap had parts of the cardboard seal still inside of the cap, although it showed darkening/charring.

A small cardboard box labeled “Special, Hold for Security-Fire Investigation, 9L #400,” which contained miscellaneous material, was also found in the storage area. The box contained a 1-gallon paint-type can with a heavily carbonized lightweight solid inside. The can was not distorted, and some of the black carbonized material was found over the edge of the can inside the lid groove. The box also contained what appeared to be part of a microscope and two

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parts of starter motor housing, a paint can cover, and what looked like an ashtray lid (undamaged).

Another wooden pallet labeled 9L had miscellaneous parts stuck to burned debris, including microscope slides, open sample bottles (about 2 inches high) and crimp-style closures, main automotive engine bearings, an automotive seat track, and spools of magnetic tapes.

Nine large cardboard boxes were found in the storage area numbered 66 through 74 and labeled "9R." The contents are listed in appendix E.

An additional examination of the stored cargo took place from March 24 through 26, 1998. The salvaged cargo (from containers other than 6R and the hazardous materials containers), which had been packed and stored in approximately 122 large cardboard boxes, was searched for aerosol cans and other items that might have constituted undeclared shipments of hazardous materials. Seven aerosol cans and various other items were retrieved. Because all the aerosol cans were breached, it was determined that their testing would not be of value because it would not reveal their original contents. Testing of the other items revealed that the liquids in four plastic bottles and several milliliter (mL) vials had a hydrogen-ion concentration (pH) of 1.0; the liquid in another plastic bottle had a pH of 1.8; the liquid in a plastic cylinder had a pH of nearly 9.0. There were also two containers of liquid with flash points of 60°C (140°F) and 65°C (149°F), respectively.

1.14.2.1.2 DNA Synthesizer Found in Container 6R

The Expedite Model 8909 DNA synthesizer was found in the center of container 6R lying on its left side with the top facing forward (as viewed from aft looking forward), the front towards the right side of the airplane, and the bottom facing aft (see figure 8 for a diagram of the synthesizer). The unit contained several bottles with labels that included flammability symbols, and some of the bottles contained liquid. One large bottle in the aft row had a very strong odor when it was removed from the unit. Because this unit was found at the lowest point of the "V" burn pattern, the Safety Board investigation evaluated and analyzed the liquids contained in this unit.

The synthesizer, which was designed to produce synthetic DNA from a variety of chemical reagents,$^{43}$ was owned by the Chiron Corporation of Emeryville, California, and was being shipped to Chiron Diagnostics, a subsidiary company in East Walpole, Massachusetts. The manufacturer of the synthesizer was PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc., headquartered in Framingham, Massachusetts.$^{44}$

〔图〕33Waste LinesReagentLinesReagent trayDrtp Trmy\n

Figure 8.—Expedite Model 8909 DNA synthesizer instrument cabinet.

According to PerSeptive, when the synthesizer is set up for normal operation, the reagent bottles contain a variety of liquid reagents, several of which are regulated as hazardous materials, including acetonitrile $^{45}$ and tetrahydrofuran $^{46}$ (THF), both of which are classified as flammable liquids under the DOT hazardous materials regulations. Acetonitrile is the primary reagent and solvent used in the machine.

The synthesizer was housed in a metal cabinet about 2½ feet high. An access door on the lower portion of the front was designed to include a glass panel in the top half. Fifteen brown glass reagent bottles, ranging in size from 25 mL to 250 mL, were installed

Chiron noted the following operational problems with the synthesizer from its installation date to its shipment date: the trityl monitor was replaced because it was not functioning properly when the unit was first installed; blockage of the flow lines occurred on August 7, 1995, and on September 1, 1995; a leaking valve was replaced in 1995 (the exact date is not known).

PerSeptive's maintenance records reflect the replacement of the trityl monitor in February 1995 and five undated field service reports to repair blocked flow lines or low flow rates. The field service reports indicate that the problems were resolved by flushing the flow lines and/or replacing the solenoids that operate the valves.

The Chiron research scientist in charge of the laboratory where the synthesizer was located stated that he was not aware of any problems with the instrument when it was prepared for shipment on August 28.

$^{45}$ Acetonitrile has a flash point of 42°F and a flammability limit of 4.4 to 16 percent by volume in air. (Flash point of a liquid is the lowest temperature at which it produces sufficient vapors to sustain a momentary flame across the surface of the fuel. Standard methods for measuring flash point are ASTMD93 and ASTMD92. Flammability limits are the concentration limits of a combustible fuel in an oxidant (usually air) through which a flame, once initiated by a spark, will continue to propagate.) Acetonitrile vapors are heavier than air and may cause a flame to travel back from a source of ignition to the source of the fuel.

$^{46}$ THF has a flash point of -4°F and a flammability limit of 1.8 to 11.8 percent by volume in air. After prolonged exposure to air, THF can form peroxides, which can explode on contact with strong bases or metal or spontaneously if the peroxide concentration is greater than 0.5 percent. The THF supplied by PerSeptive for use in its synthesizers contains a stabilizer to prevent the formation of peroxides. Because the stabilizer is consumed over time, it has a recommended shelf life of 3 to 5 years, with the precaution that it should be discarded sooner if the liquid is exposed regularly to air or moisture. The PerSeptive Nucleic Acid Synthesis System Service Guide states that opened bottles of amidite solution containing THF should be discarded if “over six months old.”

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internally in four rows and screwed into caps attached to the synthesizer. Each cap had a hole in it, which allowed a tube to extend from inside of the synthesizer into each bottle. (When it was set up for operation, the unit also included two external 4-liter reagent bottles and two external waste bottles for spent reagents from the synthesis process. These four external bottles were not shipped with the accident unit.) The unit weighed approximately 97 pounds.$^{47}$

The bottom portion of the exterior of the synthesizer had areas of undamaged gray paint. A substantial amount of solidified melted aluminum debris had adhered to the top of the unit, and there was solidified melted aluminum vertically along the right side of the unit. The glass panel was missing from the lower access door. The inside of the lower portion, when viewed through the access door, revealed the four rows of brown glass bottles. The bottles were found intact with a strip of shipping tape placed across the front of each row of bottles. The back of the synthesizer was fire damaged.

Loose debris from the bottom of the synthesizer consisted of broken glass (the unit's access door window was made of glass) and other loose debris. A plastic drip tray had some heat damage and was melted along the left side. A paper diagram on the inside of the large access door was sooted but otherwise intact.

At the accident site, the glass bottles were removed one at a time along with portions of the tubes extending into the bottles. The bottles were individually identified, capped, and placed in plastic bags for further examination. The individual “O” rings for the bottles were intact and in place. The tightness with which each bottle had been screwed into the machine was assessed by the position that the shipping tape had been secured across each of the bottles. A chemical analysis and testing of the fluids found in the bottles were conducted at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Kennedy Space Center, the results of which are discussed in section 1.16.1.

Investigators packaged the synthesizer in new shipping materials supplied by PerSeptive and transported the package to Safety Board headquarters for further examination. The synthesizer was then sent to PerSeptive Biosystems' manufacturing facility, where, on February 18, 1997, investigators further examined and documented the accident DNA synthesizer. During that examination, an undamaged synthesizer provided by PerSeptive was examined for comparison purposes.

(See appendix F for a detailed description of the fire damage to the DNA synthesizer.)

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1.14.3 Significance of Location of First Fuselage Burnthrough and Smoke Detector Activation Sequence

At the Safety Board's deposition proceeding several witnesses commented on the usefulness of the location of the first fuselage burnthrough and the smoke detector activation sequence in determining the origin of the fire. An FAA fire expert, who took part in the investigation and has participated in numerous other Safety Board accident investigations, testified that experience has shown that the location of first burnthrough is not always above the point of the fire's origin. He also testified that because of the many unknown factors at work during a cargo fire (such as temperature, smoke buoyancy, tightness of cargo door seals, and the effects of ventilation) the sequence in which smoke detectors activate cannot be correlated to the location of the source of the fire. He stated that the purpose of smoke detection systems is to detect the presence of fire, not to indicate the location of a fire. A Boeing engineer with the Douglas Products Division, who also took part in the investigation, testified that smoke detectors are installed to detect smoke, not to indicate the location of the fire's origin.

A Boeing engineer, who participated in the design and development of the DC-10 airplane, testified that smoke tests conducted on passenger airplanes showed that the smoke detectors closest to the source of smoke were not always the first detectors to activate.

A fire consultant to one of the parties stated in written reports and in his deposition testimony that Safety Board accident reports show that the location of first burnthrough does occur above the point of the fire's origin. He also indicated that he believed there was minimal axial flow in the DC-10; therefore, the first smoke detector to activate would necessarily be directly above the source of the fire. Another fire consultant hired by the same party indicated agreement with the first consultant's conclusions; however, he also acknowledged in his deposition testimony that smoke detector activation sequence is not necessarily an indicator of the fire's origin.

1.15 Survival Aspects

1.15.1 Use of Smoke Goggles and Oxygen Masks

The FedEx Aircraft Operating Manual for the DC-10 outlines emergency procedures for use in the event of fire and smoke, and contains additional checklists for specific types of smoke (electrical smoke, air conditioning smoke, or cabin cargo smoke). All of these procedures call for the immediate donning of the oxygen masks and smoke goggles, if required, by the cockpit crew followed by a series of steps including (for cabin cargo smoke) depressurizing the airplane by manually opening the outflow valve.

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In an informal survey of air carriers conducted by the Safety Board during its investigation of the May 11, 1996, accident involving ValuJet Airlines flight 592,48 pilots from several air carriers indicated that they would not don oxygen masks and smoke goggles for situations such as reports of a galley fire, smoke in the cabin, or a slight smell of smoke in the cockpit. Based on the circumstances of that accident and the results of its survey, the Safety Board concluded that air carrier pilots had inadequate guidance about the need to don oxygen masks and smoke goggles immediately in the event of a smoke emergency. Thus, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation A-97-58 to the FAA, asking it to issue guidance to air carrier pilots about the need to don oxygen masks and smoke goggles at the first indication of a possible in-flight smoke or fire emergency. In a November 17, 1997, letter, the FAA responded that it agreed “with the intent of this safety recommendation and will issue a flight standards handbook bulletin...contain[ing] guidance on procedures to don protective breathing equipment for smoke and fume protection.”

Title 14 CFR Part 121.333 requires that pilots of pressurized airplanes operating above FL 250 be provided a “quick donning type of oxygen mask that...can be placed on the face from its ready position, properly secured, sealed, and supplying oxygen upon demand, with one hand and within five seconds.” This regulation also requires that the mask can be “put on without disturbing eyeglasses and without delaying the flight crewmember from proceeding with his assigned emergency duties.” The Safety Board notes (as it did in its ValuJet Miami accident report) that FAA regulations do not establish any similar performance requirements for smoke goggles.$^{49}$ In that report, the Board issued Safety Recommendation A-97-59, which asked the FAA to establish a performance standard for the rapid donning of smoke goggles and then ensure that all air carriers meet this standard through improved smoke goggle equipment, improved flightcrew training, or both.

In its November 17, 1997, response to this recommendation the FAA stated that it believed this issue was addressed by 14 CFR 121.337, which establishes standards for PBE, and 14 CFR 121.337(8), which requires that such equipment be conveniently located and easily accessible. The FAA further stated that a “preliminary review of industry practices concerning equipment and carrier procedures indicate a need for further guidance on the location and donning of this equipment. The FAA will issue a flight standards handbook bulletin to provide additional guidance on the location and donning of this equipment. The bulletin will also include equipment and procedural guidance on flightcrew training requirements.”

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1.15.2 Emergency Response

ARFF at Stewart is primarily provided by the New York Air National Guard (ANG). Pursuant to mutual assistance agreements, municipal fire departments also responded and provided assistance during this accident. Other state and local agencies that responded to the accident included the New York State Emergency Management Office, the New York State Police (NYSP), the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), the New York Department of Health, the Orange County Office of Emergency Management, and the Orange County Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT).

At 0545, about 10 minutes before the airplane landed at Stewart, the ATC tower at Stewart notified the airport operations department and the ANG fire department about the inbound DC-10 and its emergency and advised them that hazardous materials were on board the airplane. About the same time, the NYSP detail at Stewart was also notified of this information. No details about the specific hazardous materials or the quantities on board were provided.

Six trucks from the ANG fire department responded and were in standby position when the airplane landed. The assistant fire chief on duty assumed the role of incident commander. Airport operations and NYSP personnel were also on scene when the airplane landed. After the airplane landed on runway 27 and stopped on taxiway A3, the ANG fire trucks were positioned around the airplane to fight the fire.

About 0600, the Stewart FedEx station manager was advised by his ramp personnel that a FedEx DC-10 was on the runway and that smoke was coming from the airplane. The station manager arrived about 0603 at the ramp facility, where ramp personnel were on the telephone with the FedEx Global Operations Command Center (GOCC) in Memphis. Approximately 0615 or 0620, an airport operations employee arrived at the ramp facility and transported a FedEx ramp agent and an aircraft mechanic to the accident scene to provide assistance to the firefighters in opening the cargo door.

About 0630, an off-duty assistant fire chief, who had been called from his home by the incident commander, arrived on the scene. He suggested the use of a skin penetrator agent application tool (SPAAT)$^{50}$ to puncture the fuselage. During his deposition, the assistant fire chief, who was at that time serving as the incident commander, testified that at the flight engineer's suggestion,$^{51}$ they attempted (without success) to call Douglas to find out if there were alternate methods for entering the airplane without damaging it. He acknowledged that this effort delayed the use of the SPAAT tool somewhat. Before the SPAAT was rigged and ready to use, and just as the firefighters succeeded in opening the cargo door, flames were observed venting through the fuselage. Accordingly, the SPAAT tool was never used. The fire chief

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testified that, based on “lessons learned” from this accident, if a similar situation were to arise again they would immediately employ a penetrator tool with a firefighting agent.

About 0700, the ANG fire chief arrived on scene and took over as the incident commander, relieving the assistant fire chief who had until then been serving in that role. The fire chief continued to serve as the incident commander until approximately 1430 or 1445 when he turned command of the scene over to the joint control of the State DEC and the Orange County HMRT.

By 0730, an emergency operations center (EOC) had been activated in building 110 of the airport operations department, staffed by representatives from airport operations, the NYSP, and the Orange County Office of Emergency Management. About 0925, officials from the FedEx corporate office in Memphis advised airport operations that a team from Memphis was en route to Stewart.

After this accident, the Stewart Airport emergency plan was revised to provide for enhanced coordination with state and local agencies. (For more information about emergency response, see Section 1.1, History of Flight.)

1.15.2.1 Dissemination of Hazardous Materials Information

FedEx uses multiple forms for documenting the shipment of hazardous materials on board its cargo airplanes. The “Notification of Dangerous Goods Loading (Part A)” is completed for all flights, including those without hazardous materials on board. The Part A is an envelope with a multicopy form on the front that identifies the cargo containers by their positions on the airplane and the classes of hazardous materials (such as flammable liquids or corrosives) in each container. The Part A envelope contains copies of all shipping documentation about the hazardous materials on the airplane, and the top form is signed by a hazardous materials specialist and the captain of the airplane.

A “Dangerous Goods Separation Pouch” for each cargo container that transports a declared hazardous materials package is inserted into the Part A envelope. The separation pouch is also an envelope with a multicopy form on the front that identifies the various classes of hazardous materials in a specific cargo container. A copy of the form on the separation pouch is also affixed to both ends of each hazardous materials cargo container. The Part A and the separation pouch do not indicate the specific hazardous materials and the quantities on board the airplane.

Specific information about the hazardous materials in a given package, such as the proper shipping name, United Nations identification number, and hazard class, quantity, and 24-hour emergency telephone number, is found on the “Notification of Loading of Dangerous Goods (Parts B or C)” or, if applicable, a “Notification of Loading of Dangerous Goods Radioactive Materials (Parts BR or CR).” This form, which is affixed to a package containing hazardous materials, also has the FedEx tracking number and remains on the package throughout shipment.

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Copies of these forms (Parts B, C, BR, or CR) are placed in the separation pouch for the appropriate cargo container.

The assembled Part A, separation pouches, and copies of the Parts B, C, BR, or CR forms are carried in the cockpit so they can be available to the flightcrew. Copies of the Parts B, C, BR, or CR forms for each shipment of hazardous materials are also retained at the originating station where the shipment is accepted. Further, copies of these forms and the Part A and the separation pouches for a given flight are retained at the departing hub of the flight. The DOT hazardous materials regulations require that the proper shipping name, hazard class, identification number, packaging group, and total quantity of the material appear on the shipping papers for hazardous materials. Further, the regulations require an operator to provide this information in writing to the pilot-in-command and also require that a copy of the shipping papers accompany the shipment on board the airplane.

Both the initial incident commander and the ANG fire chief (who took over at 0700 as incident commander) indicated that they were concerned about the safety of the firefighters and the possible exposure of personnel at the scene to the hazardous materials or their combustion byproducts.$^{52}$ Consequently, both requested (but did not receive) copies of what they referred to as "manifests" from the flightcrew and other FedEx representatives so they could identify the specific hazardous materials on board and their quantities and locations on the airplane. The ANG fire department log had entries at 0730, 0815, and 1125 logging ANG personnel's efforts to have FedEx fax copies of the "manifest" to airport operations or to the FedEx ramp facility at Stewart. The fire chief also stated that he gave a local FedEx employee two fax numbers at the ANG command center, and he assigned two ANG personnel to stand by those machines. However, no faxes from FedEx were received at those machines.

According to FedEx personnel, the FedEx dangerous goods hub in Memphis and the GOCC faxed several copies of the Part A, Parts B, BR, or CR, the dangerous goods loading pouches, and the weight and load plans throughout the morning to various fax numbers at Stewart. Although the receipt of the faxes by the facilities to which they were sent could not be verified in most instances, the faxes appear to have been transmitted to the fax numbers located at the FedEx ramp facility at Stewart, the airport operations office, and the NYSP barracks at Stewart. The airport operations log contained entries at 0635 that the FedEx “manifest” had arrived by fax, and, at 0656, that additional hazardous materials “manifest” information had been received. Airport officials who received those faxes indicated that they were of poor quality and therefore did not provide them with the needed information. Twenty-eight partially legible Part B forms were received by 0733 by the Orange County HMRT coordinator. Additional Part Bs were faxed from the GOCC from 0858 and throughout the morning, with the last fax transmitted by 1340.

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According to postaccident interviews, many of the Parts B, BR, and CR forms containing the specific information sought by the incident commander were seen by airport operations staff, the NYSP personnel, New York DEC law enforcement officers and spill technicians, and the Orange County HMRT coordinator and team members. Representatives from airport operations, the NYSP, and the Orange County HMRT indicated that the information they received was forwarded to the incident command post. The ANG fire department log did not contain any entries of faxes received from FedEx about the hazardous materials on the airplane.

Of the shipping documentation carried on board the airplane, only the original form on the Part A envelope was retrieved by the flightcrew before the evacuation (the flight engineer had placed the form in his pocket). Immediately after evacuating (about 6 minutes after the airplane had landed), the flight engineer provided the Part A form to one of the ANG firefighters. The firefighter immediately read the information on the Part A $^{53}$ over the radio to the incident commander and then placed the Part A in his fire vehicle where it remained until the fire was extinguished, when another firefighter recovered it. Some time before 0700, the initial incident commander received a one-page typewritten sheet from the FedEx station at Stewart containing the same information.

The flight engineer stated that he told firefighters that the Part Bs and other shipping documents were located on the back of the cockpit door. However, they were not retrieved until the day after the accident when the burned and water-soaked remains of the shipping documents were recovered. During the deposition proceeding, the ANG fire chief stated that about 1 hour and 15 minutes after the firefighting operation began, FedEx employees advised that the Part Bs were on the aircraft. The fire chief indicated that no attempt was made to retrieve the Part Bs at that time because of the severity of the fire.

About 0915, the HMRT coordinator gave the fire chief (who was by then serving as the incident commander) a handwritten list of chemicals and United Nations identification numbers provided by local FedEx personnel. The local FedEx personnel also gave the fire chief a copy of the weight and load plan. During postaccident interviews, the fire chief acknowledged receiving the handwritten list, but noted that the list did not specify the amounts of the hazardous materials on board.

About 1200, the ANG base commander received a call from FedEx's vice president for security in Memphis. According to the base commander, the vice president called to provide the ANG with what information he could about the hazardous materials on board the airplane, but he indicated that hazardous materials were not his area of specialty. The base commander provided the vice president with a fax number located in the ANG incident

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command post. When checked an hour later, no information had been received at the command post. Shortly before 1300, the base commander directed the chief of the ANG command post to contact the FedEx vice president for the information. According to the ANG command post chief, the vice president advised the command post chief that he could not provide the information because the Safety Board had taken over the investigation.

In a January 27, 1997, letter of explanation to the Safety Board, FedEx stated that the vice president's actions were consistent with company policy, which dictates that once the Safety Board has taken control of an aircraft accident investigation, all information pertaining to that investigation is to be forwarded to the Board. The FedEx letter also stated that at the time of the ANG request, the senior DEC law enforcement officer, the NYSP, and other appropriate state officials already had copies of documents listing the hazardous materials on board.

1.15.2.1.1 Other FedEx Accidents Involving Dissemination of Hazardous Materials Information

In the July 31, 1997, postcrash fire involving a FedEx MD-11 operating as flight 14 at Newark International Airport, Newark, New Jersey (still under investigation), the shipping papers were destroyed. The flight had originated in Narita, Japan, and copies of the shipping documentation for the hazardous materials had been retained there. Approximately 1½ to 2 hours after the accident, FedEx provided the incident commander with information about the quantity and identification numbers for the hazardous materials on board, including a notation that there were “maybe 36 pounds of an unknown haz.mat.”

On March 5, 1998, a Cessna 208B owned by FedEx and operated by Baron Aviation Services, Inc., crashed near Clarksville, Tennessee. Information from the ongoing investigation indicates that the Part B hazardous materials shipping papers on board the airplane and on file at FedEx's Memphis hub did not accurately reflect what was on board the airplane $^{54}$ and include an emergency response telephone number.

On April 7, 1998, another Cessna 208 operated by FedEx crashed near Bismarck, North Dakota. Preliminary information indicates that, although no declared hazardous materials were on board that flight, it took 2 hours and 49 minutes from the time the information was requested for FedEx to answer the question about whether hazardous materials were on board. (The accident is still under investigation.)

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1.15.2.1.2 Postaccident Actions by FedEx

Safety Board investigators surveyed seven other operators who carry cargo $^{55}$ to determine whether they had the ability to quickly retrieve and produce complete information about hazardous materials carried on board a particular flight. They found that only one carrier (SwissAir) had a computerized capability to provide information about the declared hazardous materials on board its airplane. The remaining carriers, like FedEx, keep track of this information only by retaining at the departing station paper copies of the hazardous materials shipping documentation carried on board the airplane.

During an April 1998 meeting with the Chairman of the Safety Board, FedEx officials indicated that FedEx intended to develop and implement an improved system for tracking and retrieving information about hazardous materials being carried on board FedEx flights. In a May 5, 1998, letter, the President and Chief Executive Officer confirmed that FedEx was committed to developing “systems and procedures which will reduce substantially the length of time required to provide firefighters and other emergency responders with detailed information concerning [hazardous materials] shipments aboard FedEx aircraft.” He indicated that FedEx planned to phase in the new system, first creating an “intermediate solution” consisting of an “electronic notification system upon which basic [hazardous materials] information of interest to fire fighters will be entered by a DG [dangerous goods] specialist at airport ramps at departure of FedEx aircraft.” This system would include information on hazard class, quantity, and location of all hazardous materials on the airplane, excluding dry ice. This information would be available on computer terminals at FedEx facilities worldwide.

The May 5 letter indicated that the “permanent solution” envisioned by FedEx would “allow the tracking, by container and aircraft, of [hazardous materials] shipments throughout the shipping cycle. Completed [hazardous materials] information, including inbound and outbound [hazardous materials] manifests, will be available on an immediate basis at the FedEx GOCC, which is manned 24 hours-a-day, 7 days a week, and all FedEx facilities.” A FedEx dangerous goods technical advisor explained during the deposition proceeding that FedEx hoped that the development of this new system would prompt a regulatory reexamination of information that needs to be immediately available to emergency responders. Specifically, he indicated that the proper shipping names of a hazardous material would not be relevant to emergency responders.

The letter further indicated that “[t]his solution will require extensive system development efforts, along with scanning technologies which are currently under development. This effort is estimated to be at least 18 months away from testing.” Finally, the letter indicated that the current regulatory scheme, which requires that detailed shipping documents be maintained by the operator and carried on board the aircraft, would need to be adjusted to permit electronic documentation of this information in place of the currently required paper records.

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1.16 Tests and Research

1.16.1 Chemical Analysis of Substances Found in Container 6R

On December 16 and 17, 1996, at the NASA Kennedy Space Center, investigators documented and analyzed the fluids and debris recovered from the DNA synthesizer; fluid removed from the industrial valves; green, red, and cream-colored material found on the inboard side of the container floor; and burned debris that had been removed from cargo container 6R.

Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) was used to analyze the residues left in the bottles on the accident synthesizer. Specifically, investigators looked for the presence of the 15 chemicals used in the DNA synthesizer and for the presence of aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF), a firefighting agent that was sprayed on the accident airplane. Calibration information was collected through the GC/MS analysis of standard solutions containing known concentrations of AFFF and the other 15 chemicals. Three concentrations (1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent) of a mixture of each of the 15 chemicals were prepared by dilution for calibration of the GC/MS system.

Visual inspection of each of the bottles from the accident synthesizer showed that some bottles had liquid in the bottoms. These liquids were poured into glass vials and sealed with Teflon-lined (airtight) caps with septums. The bottles from the accident synthesizer that did not show evidence of liquid in the bottoms were rinsed with methanol, and the methanol rinse was transferred into glass vials and sealed for injection into the gas chromatograph. The NASA laboratory provided clean, clear glass bottles for the methanol rinse. The amount of methanol rinse used differed depending on the conditions of the sample. The rinse procedure and the quantities of fluid rinsed from each bottle are detailed in appendix G.

Each of the samples were analyzed by injecting 0.1 (microliter) µl of each fluid into the GC/MS system. The following table shows, for each bottle identification, the estimated quantity of fluid in each bottle and the identity and amount of each chemical identified in that sample. The vials containing the methanol/residue solutions were retained for later use. More definitive quantitative results of some of the chemicals were determined in a reanalysis discussed in section 1.16.3. (See appendix H.)

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The results of the analysis of other fluids found in cargo container 6R were as follows:

57 DEGMBE (Diethylene glycol monobutyl ether) is the principal ingredient in the firefighting agent AFFF.

$^{58}$ It is generally accepted that 50 µl (or 0.050 mL) is equal to one drop. (1 µl = 0.001 mL.)

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Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) spectroscopy was used to identify the solid materials found in cargo container 6R.$^{59}$ The red, green, and cream-colored materials were separated under a microscope. Each of the materials was prepared in a diamond cell $^{60}$ and transferred to the microscope of the FTIR apparatus for the infrared spectrum. The infrared spectrum of the red, green, and cream-colored material was consistent with a substance used for packing material.

1.16.2 Procedures Used to Prepare the Synthesizer for Shipment

According to the PerSeptive field engineer who prepared the instrument for shipment, a few days before he came to Chiron to prepare the instrument, he called the Chiron research scientist and asked that the reagent bottles be emptied and filled with acetonitrile before he arrived, and the research scientist agreed to do so. According to a laboratory technician who helped prepare the synthesizer for shipping, the research scientist directed her to empty old reagents from all the reagent bottles for the synthesizer. In a September 16, 1996, interview, the technician stated that on the morning of August 28, 1996, she emptied all of the internal reagent bottles of the synthesizer and filled them about one quarter full with clean acetonitrile. However, in a document submitted to the Safety Board on October 31, 1996, Chiron indicated that "[a]ll reagent bottles, except DBLK 8 and AUX 3$^{61}$ were emptied, rinsed, and refilled partially with acetonitrile on August 28, 1996, before [the PerSeptive field engineer] arrived." That document, which also listed the chemicals Chiron believed were contained in each of the reagent bottle positions after the unit was last used for synthesis and on the morning of August 28, 1996, characterized the status of the AUX 3 bottle at the time of the PerSeptive field engineer's visit as "inconclusive." During the deposition proceeding, the Chiron research scientist and laboratory technician and Chiron's Director of Environmental Health and Safety indicated, when asked

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about the meaning of the “inconclusive” characterization, that the AUX 3 bottle was either empty or contained acetonitrile.

The PerSeptive field engineer arrived at the Chiron laboratory on the afternoon of August 28. According to the research scientist, he told the field engineer that the bottles had been emptied of old reagents and partially filled with acetonitrile. The research scientist then left the field engineer alone to decontaminate and package the unit for shipment. In a postaccident interview, the field engineer said that he determined that all of the internal bottles (which are brown-colored glass) had acetonitrile in them by using smell and visual examination, but also stated “it depends on the customer’s word.” However, he acknowledged that he would not be able to determine by his sense of smell whether the acetonitrile had been contaminated with other chemicals. The field engineer said that he noted one of the two external reagent bottles, DBLK 8, (which was made of clear glass) had some old reagent in it. The field engineer removed this bottle and replaced it with a bottle partially filled with acetonitrile.

In a September 16, 1996, interview 11 days after the accident, the field engineer described the next steps he took to prepare the machine for shipment as follows. He ran the “prime all” function $^{62}$ three times on each column position, and then emptied all of the bottles by turning them upside down until they stopped dripping. He then replaced the bottles so that the filter at the bottom of the tubes came into contact with the outer edge of the bottom of the bottle.$^{63}$ He then ran the “prime all” function again three times on each column position to dry the instrument. (When the “prime all” function runs without liquid in the bottles, a dry, inert gas is pumped through the flow paths and bottles.) He said that he did not remove the internal reagent bottles after these drying cycles, but that he visually inspected them and they appeared dry. He said that he then depressurized the synthesizer by disconnecting the inert gas supply and loosening each internal reagent bottle to relieve the internal pressure.

On April 4, 1997, Chiron forwarded to the Safety Board a computer disk containing a data file named “history.log” that contained a record of manual inputs to the synthesizer made at the time of the field engineer’s visit and other operating data.$^{64}$ A printout of this file showed a total of 59 entries between 1603 and 1708 on August 28, 1996. The first

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and second entries indicated “power restored” and “instrument diagnostic run.” The remaining 57 entries indicated “manual function invoked.”

A followup interview with the PerSeptive field engineer was conducted on August 28, 1997. He acknowledged that the “history.log” file was a record of the functions and operations he performed on August 28, 1996. The field engineer stated that before he began flushing the synthesizer, he ran a test to confirm that the inert gas used to pressurize the system was not leaking. The field engineer further explained that the first $7^{65}$ and the last 6 of the 37 “manual function invoked” entries represented the “prime all” functions that he ran on each column position to flush and dry the instrument. (The “history.log” times indicated that the amount of time that elapsed after each of these entries before the next entry was recorded ranged from $2\sqrt{2}$ minutes to 7 minutes.)

The field engineer explained that the remaining 44 “manual function invoked” entries in the “history.log” file (those recorded between the first 7 and the last 6 entries) were the result of his having invoked the “prime individual”$^{66}$ function a number of times for each reagent position on each of the two columns. (The “history.log” files file indicated that the amount of time that elapsed after each of these entries before the next entry was recorded ranged from 4 seconds to 17 seconds.) He acknowledged that these additional functions were not prescribed by PerSeptive as part of the normal purging procedure, but indicated that he took these additional steps to ensure that fluid from each reagent position was being properly delivered. (He stated that he did not have written guidance with him when he purged the accident synthesizer, but that he based the purging on Service Note 89-006, “Preparing An Expedite System For Storage Or Transport” (see appendix I.) The field engineer stated that he saw liquid coming out of the waste line during the “prime individual” functions, indicating to him that the fluid was flowing properly. The field engineer indicated that it was his standard practice to take these additional “prime individual” steps when purging instruments not in his normal service territory.

The field engineer again stated (as he had at his earlier interview) that before running the last 6 “prime all” functions (to dry the machine), he emptied all of the reagent bottles and held them upside down until they stopped dripping. At the conclusion of his August 28, 1997, interview, the field engineer stated that he was “100 percent certain” that no visible fluids remained in the instrument when he completed the purging procedure. The field engineer stated that he saw no leakage, malfunction, or operational problems and that he did not observe anything unusual about the instrument during the purging and drying process.

During both his September 1996 and August 1997 interviews, the field engineer described the remainder of the steps he took to prepare the instrument for shipment as follows.

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He placed the plastic flow lines for the two external reagent bottles and the two waste lines in a plastic zip-lock bag that was sealed with a clear, plastic shipping tape, and then taped it to the outside of the synthesizer. He stated that the reagent bottles that were external to the unit, WSH A 7 and DBLK 8, were not shipped with the synthesizer or in an accompanying package. The field engineer stated that he left the two external reagent bottles and the two waste bottles in Chiron's lab on a laboratory bench under a ventilation hood. After the accident, Chiron located the two external reagent bottles in its lab and accounted for the two waste bottles. The field engineer stated that he packaged the unit for shipment using a PerSeptive-supplied wooden pallet with a foam support, cardboard container, and other shipping materials that were provided previously to Chiron. He placed the synthesizer on the pallet, positioned the foam supports at the bottom and top of the synthesizer, used an empty box to fill in space, and then slid the outer cardboard container over the top of the synthesizer. He said that he left the packaged synthesizer in the laboratory and departed from Chiron about an hour and a half after he had arrived.

The Chiron research scientist completed and signed an internal Chiron form titled, “Outgoing Procedure Checklist,” which was dated August 30, 1996. The form provides information to Chiron’s shipping department about the contents of the package and other shipping information, such as the recipient’s address and telephone number. The entry to indicate if the package contained hazardous materials was marked “N” (for “No”) and had a handwritten entry reading, “Instrument was thoroughly decontaminated of all chemicals.” The research scientist acknowledged that he did not verbally confirm with the PerSeptive field engineer that the synthesizer had been decontaminated. The checklist was left on top of the packaged synthesizer.

Personnel from Chiron's shipping department transferred the packaged synthesizer from the laboratory to the shipping department and loading dock, where two synthetic straps were placed around the boxed unit. The shipping department employee who handled the synthesizer reviewed the information on the internal checklist, including the entry about hazardous materials and decontamination, but stated that he had no reason to suspect that anything was amiss. Shipping department personnel did not have a written record of when the synthesizer was picked up from the laboratory and could not recall the date. The shipping manager at Chiron indicated that he was aware of only one synthesizer that had been shipped (the accident synthesizer).

Chiron's shipping manager acknowledged that 20 to 30 infectious substance shipments are made each day from Chiron. The shipping manager further stated that research personnel do receive awareness training on the handling and transportation of hazardous materials. Excerpts from Chiron's Chemical Safety Manual instruct employees to consult with the shipping department before preparing any hazardous materials for shipment or transporting hazardous materials off site. According to the shipping manager, shipping department personnel complete hazardous materials training required under the DOT hazardous materials regulations. Training courses taken by Chiron shipping personnel were conducted by FedEx.

A FedEx courier who picked up the synthesizer from Chiron's loading dock on September 4 stated that he did not ask any Chiron shipping department personnel whether any of

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the packages he picked up from Chiron contained any hazardous materials, nor did the Chiron employees comment on the contents of the packages. The courier delivered the packaged synthesizer to the FedEx Oakland terminal for air transport to Memphis on flight 1200. (Flight 1200 departed at 1921 on September 4 and arrived at 0107 on September 5.) On September 5, it was loaded on flight 1406 to Boston.

1.16.3 Reanalysis of Fluids Found in DNA Synthesizer

Demonstrations of PerSeptive's purging and drying procedures were conducted on February 18, 1997, at PerSeptive's manufacturing facility,$^{67}$ and on June 17, 1997, at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP). The residues left in the bottles after the AFIP demonstration were then analyzed to determine the concentrations of any chemicals in the residues. The results of the analysis were compared with the results of the analysis of the concentrations of chemicals in the residues found in the accident synthesizer.

Investigators convened at NASA on July 23, 1997, to reanalyze the concentrations of liquids found in the accident synthesizer and to compare the results with the concentrations of liquids left in the synthesizer that were purged at AFIP in accordance with PerSeptive's procedures. A reanalysis of the residues of selected bottles was undertaken with increased dilution to prevent instrument saturation (the concentration of relevant chemicals had exceeded the calibration during the November 1996 tests). The bottles reanalyzed were taken from positions AUX 3, CAP A5, CAP B6, and OX 2. These bottles were chosen for reanalysis because the first analysis found that they contained residues of THF (a chemical used in the synthesis process), which was the most volatile of the chemicals found in the accident synthesizer. Table 1 shows the amount of chemical residue left after the purging at AFIP, and table 2 shows the amount of chemical residue left in bottles from the accident synthesizer as determined in the reanalysis.

Table 1. Quantitative GC/MS Analysis of Bottles from the DNA Synthesizer Purged at AFIP (Percent of Total Liquid Removed)

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Table 2. Quantitative GC/MS Analysis of Bottles from the DNA Synthesizer on the Accident Flight

(Percent of Total Liquid Removed)

Safety Board investigators met with the Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety, Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), regarding the applicability of the DOT hazardous materials regulations to small quantities of hazardous materials. The Associate Administrator is the senior DOT official responsible for the development, implementation, and interpretation of the hazardous materials regulations for all modes.

According to the Associate Administrator, the DOT hazardous materials regulations are generally consistent with internationally developed standards. They are based on a system that first requires the identification and classification of hazardous materials and then compliance with applicable regulatory standards for packaging, marking, labeling, and shipping documentation. If a material is listed in the hazardous materials regulations or classified (i.e., it meets defining criteria) as a DOT-regulated hazardous material, the transportation of that material in any quantity is subject to the hazardous materials regulations. Once a material has been identified and classified as a hazardous material, the quantity and form of that hazardous material will then determine how it is regulated in transportation.

The Associate Administrator further stated that the transportation of any type of equipment that contains a hazardous material, even in minute quantities, is also subject to the hazardous materials regulations in the same manner as the transportation of that material in more typical containers such as drums, cylinders, jars, and tanks. He also noted that although there are special regulatory exceptions for small quantity, limited quantity, and consumer commodity shipments, very few exceptions apply to the transportation of hazardous materials aboard aircraft.

The Associate Administrator explained that RSPA has on infrequent occasions issued de minimus rulings exempting a specific form and quantity of specific hazardous materials

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from the DOT hazardous materials regulations when it does not pose a risk to life and property when transported in commerce (e.g., the lithium batteries in wrist watches). In such cases, the person requesting such a ruling must demonstrate to RSPA that the quantity and form of a hazardous material does not pose a risk in transportation. The Associate Administrator emphasized that RSPA alone has the discretionary authority to issue a de minimus ruling, and that permitting thousands of shippers nationwide to exercise their own discretion in such cases would erode the consistent application and interpretation of the hazardous materials regulations.

As provided by law, RSPA is authorized to issue exemptions that recognize alternative means for compliance with the hazardous materials regulations, usually based on selection of alternative safety control measures that will provide an equivalent level of safety. According to the Associate Administrator, the exemptions do not signify that the materials are not subject to the hazardous materials regulations.

1.17 FedEx Organizational and Management Information

FedEx began operations on April 17, 1973. In fiscal year 1996, FedEx reported revenues of $10.3 billion. Approximately 2.5 million packages were handled daily by 122,000 employees, of which approximately 3,200 were flightcrew members. The airline served 325 airports worldwide in 211 countries with its fleet of 559 airplanes. Of the 2.5 million packages, only about 6,000 (less than 0.25 percent) are declared shipments of hazardous materials.

FedEx received its first DC-10 in March 1980. At the time of the accident, FedEx had 13 DC-10-10 and 22 DC-10-30 airplanes.

1.18 Additional Information

1.18.1 Postaccident Actions by FedEx

After the accident, FedEx revised its “Fire & Smoke” checklist by renaming it “Fire, Smoke & Fumes” and adding a step titled, “Land at Nearest Suitable Airport (if required),” and noting under that step that a new “Quick Evacuation” checklist is to be used for emergencies that require immediate evacuation. This step also instructs the crew to consider stopping on the runway to allow emergency equipment access to the aircraft.

FedEx also revised its “Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated” checklist to include an introductory paragraph indicating that the procedures are intended to depressurize the aircraft, ventilate the cockpit, and deprive the cargo section of oxygen for fire suppression, and emphasizing the importance of depressurizing. It also has a reminder to ensure that the “Fire & Smoke” checklist is completed before beginning the checklist. Step No. 6, to “PULL” the “Cabin Air Shutoff Handle,” has been moved to step No. 2, with the direction to “PULL DOWN AND FORWARD.” Step No. 4 (formerly step No. 3), “Courier Masks and Goggles,” now has information about the oxygen mask settings. Under step No. 5, “Cab/Press Man/Auto Handle,” (formerly step No. 4, “Airplane Altitude”) the directions have been expanded to include specific instructions on how to manually raise the cabin altitude and maintain the 0.5 pressure

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differential, and to incorporate former steps No. 5 and No. 7. Step No. 7 (formerly step No. 9), "If It Is Necessary To Leave The Cockpit To Fight A Fire [DON/ACTIVATE Protective Breathing Equipment]," has been revised to include donning and activating a walk-around oxygen bottle and donning leather gloves. Two new steps have been added to the end of the checklist. After step No. 8 (formerly step No. 10), "Land at the Nearest Suitable Airport," are step No. 9, "Manual CAB ALT Control Wheel......OUTFLOW VALVE/FULL OPEN," which directs crews to "Accomplish immediately after landing to ensure clearview windows and/or doors will open," and step No. 10, "Accomplish the EMER EVAC [emergency evacuation] Checklist, Chapter 2-13, as required." Both the revised "Emergency Evacuation (Land)" and "Fire, Smoke & Fumes" checklists direct crews to "Evacuate with a copy of DG [dangerous goods] Form Part A and all Part Bs, if possible."

FedEx also added to its “Emergency Evacuation (Land)” checklist a step to manually open the cabin outflow valve once the airplane has landed and stopped. It has also created a new one-page “Quick Evacuation” checklist, which is designed to be used in emergencies that require immediate evacuation of the aircraft and when time and conditions do not permit the use of the longer checklist.

1.18.2 Marijuana Shipments on the Accident Airplane

According to a November 1996 NYSP Investigation Report, a total of 91.55 pounds of green material, later positively identified as marijuana, were removed from the wreckage. This total amount comprised four separate items that were given to the police during the inspection of the cargo debris.

According to the police report, the first item was turned over to the police on September 16, 1996, after it was found by a “FedEx Inspector” in the debris from cargo container 4L. It consisted of a box containing 38.35 pounds of marijuana. According to the police report, the box “was partially burned along with its attached packing/routing slip leaving no positive leads or suspects relative to ownership.” The second item, found on September 19, 1996, by another FedEx employee identified as a “security supervisor” consisted of “a clear plastic bag (extensive fire damage) containing approx. 13.90 lbs. of green veg. matter,” later identified as marijuana. The police report provided no information about the location of this package other than that it was found “in a large pile of debris.” The report also noted that no airbill or identification was found with this item. The third item, turned over on September 21, 1996, by the same FedEx security supervisor who turned over the second item, consisted of “two plastic bags containing approx. 11.30 lbs. of green veg. matter (marijuana).” The police report indicated that this item was found “in the general area of” cargo container 7L, but noted that it could not be determined “if the item was in fact from that container due to the extensive amount of debris from numerous containers present as [the item] was secured.” The fourth item, turned over by another FedEx security employee to police on September 23, 1996, consisted of “a clear plastic bag containing green veg. matter (marijuana),” weighing approximately 28 pounds.

The NYSP investigator who prepared the report testified during the Safety Board's deposition proceeding that each of the four packages was damaged by fire and water. He

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also stated that the packages were all wrapped differently and appeared to him to have been prepared by different shippers.

The police report stated that “no leads were developed...due to the fact that no airbill slip was recovered with [any of the items,] along with the fact that the original exact weights of the items could not be established.” On September 25 and 26, 1996, a K-9 dog search of the remaining debris was conducted. According to the report, “no additional contraband was detected.” The police report further stated that on November 7, 1996, the marijuana was destroyed.

During the deposition proceeding, the police investigator stated that the specially trained dogs used by police to search for such contraband are highly sensitive to the smell of marijuana. He stated that the dog brought into the accident airplane would have detected the presence of additional marijuana, if any had been on board, even if it had been totally consumed in the fire. In response to questioning during his deposition, he stated that during his 20 years as a police investigator, he had never heard of a fire being caused by heat generation inside a package of marijuana, nor was he aware of any information or research regarding the spontaneous combustion of marijuana.

1.18.3 Programs to Deter Undeclared Hazardous Materials Shipments

The number of hidden and undeclared shipments of hazardous materials is unknown; however, statistics compiled by the Air Transport Association (ATA) and the DOT indicate an increase in the air transportation of cargo. According to the ATA, the volume of cargo transported by air increased from 8.26 billion freight/express ton-miles in 1987 to 17.96 billion freight/express ton-miles in 1997, an increase of 117 percent.$^{68}$ An official of the ATA estimated that industry-wide, declared shipments of hazardous materials represent less than ½ of 1 percent of the total cargo volume.

The number of hazardous material releases for aviation, as reported to the DOT Hazardous Materials Information System (HMIS), increased from 163 incidents in 1987 to 1,015 incidents in 1997, an increase of 523 percent. Following changes in the HMIS incident reporting format in 1990, the number of incidents caused by declared versus undeclared shipments could also be distinguished. Of the 297 total aviation incidents reported for 1990, 234 incidents (79 percent) were attributed to declared shipments and 63 incidents (21 percent) to undeclared shipments. In comparison, of the 1,015 incidents reported in 1997 (an increase of 242 percent from 1990), 666 incidents (65 percent for 1997) were attributed to declared shipments and 349 incidents (35 percent for 1997) to undeclared shipments. Thus, between 1990 and 1997, the number of hazardous material releases attributed to declared shipments increased by 185 percent, and the number of hazardous material releases attributed to undeclared shipments increased by 454 percent. Further, in the 2-year period from 1996 through 1997, the number of incidents

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resulting from undeclared shipments rose 82 percent, from 192 incidents in 1996 to 349 incidents in 1997.

The manager of the dangerous goods program for FedEx testified during the deposition proceeding that hidden and undeclared shipments of hazardous materials are typically discovered when the package leaks, emits odors, or results in a release after the package is in the FedEx system. He also stated that FedEx employees receive hazardous materials awareness training and are trained to report any instance that indicates a package may contain an undeclared hazardous material. FedEx does not ask customers to identify the contents of a package when it is presented for shipment. The FedEx manager stated that although it would be beneficial to have customers identify the contents of their packages, such a practice would be so burdensome as to drive express carriers out of business. The manager also stated that FedEx has a revised airbill that asks the customer to indicate whether the package being presented for shipment contains dangerous goods or hazardous materials. However, older versions of the airbill (which do not include this question) are still in use and can be used until their supply is depleted. He stated that other measures employed by FedEx to screen and detect hidden shipments include the use of posters at receiving stations about the shipment of hazardous materials and enhancement of its education and outreach programs for FedEx customers.

During the deposition proceeding, the manager of the FAA's Dangerous Goods and Cargo Security Division described FAA initiatives within the past 12 months to reduce the incidence of hidden shipments of hazardous materials. He stated that subsequent to the crash of ValuJet 592 in May 1996, the FAA hired 118 new agents dedicated to the dangerous goods and cargo security enforcement program. (Before the ValuJet crash, the FAA had 14 dedicated agents for its hazardous materials enforcement program. Agents from other specialties were also used periodically.) All of the newly hired agents had experience in hazardous materials safety. In conjunction with hiring the new agents, the FAA lengthened its hazardous materials training course and developed and implemented a new training course for cargo security. The FAA dangerous goods manager estimated that after the new programs are established, these agents will spend 60 percent of their time on the hazardous materials enforcement program and 40 percent on the cargo security program.$^{69}$

The FAA has also initiated an inspection program known as “Haz Strikes.” Under this program, agents from the FAA and other Federal and State agencies, such as RSPA, U.S. Customs, the U.S. Postal Service, Federal Highway Administration, and State police, conduct intensive inspections to check the movement of hazardous materials on all carriers serving a particular airport. The inspections have not only included carrier freight operations, but also the operations of shippers and freight forwarders (companies that consolidate shipments from multiple shippers into containers) who are typically located off the airport property. The

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inspections are conducted over several days at all hours of the day. Haz Strike inspections to date have been conducted in major cities including Chicago, Miami, Los Angeles, and at New York's Kennedy airport where large volumes of freight are handled.

The FAA is also publicizing dangerous goods enforcement actions in which civil penalty fines of $50,000 or more have been levied. According to the FAA dangerous goods manager, this negative publicity serves as an incentive for shippers and carriers to strengthen their compliance efforts. The FAA manager estimated that of the 36 press releases announcing fines of $50,000 or more, nearly all were for undeclared shipments of hazardous materials.

The FAA is also promoting an outreach program with all major associations involved with air transportation, including the Air Transport Association, Airline Pilots Association, International Federation of Airlines, Council on Safe Transportation of Hazardous Articles, Chemical Manufacturers Association, Repair Station Association, and paint manufacturers. Through presentations, speeches, and attendance at meetings and conferences of these associations, the FAA has emphasized the need for training to ensure that company employees are knowledgeable about the shipment and transportation of dangerous goods. The FAA manager stated that the vast majority of undeclared shipments by air occur because of a lack of understanding of the regulations. To address this, the FAA has developed and distributed brochures, posters, videos, and compact discs to increase understanding of requirements that apply to the shipment of dangerous goods by air and to heighten the awareness of the types of materials that are regulated for air transportation. The FAA is also meeting monthly with the U.S. Postal Service and providing guidance on general awareness training for postal employees.

According to the FAA manager, the FAA has also established a database that will be used to conduct trend analyses of the sources and causes of dangerous goods releases in air transportation. The FAA will utilize the hazardous materials incident system maintained by RSPA and supplemental data obtained through reports made directly to the FAA. Based on its analysis of this data, the FAA will adjust its outreach program to address identified trends.

The FAA dangerous goods manager also stated that the FAA is continuing its evaluation and oversight of carrier programs for accepting dangerous goods shipments and screening for hidden shipments in response to urgent Safety Recommendations A-96-25 and -26, issued following the crash of ValuJet 592 in May 1996.$^{70}$ The FAA conducted an initial survey

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of more than 300 carriers and is now concentrating on those carriers that do not accept dangerous goods. The FAA manager estimated that 1,200 inspections of air carriers would be conducted this year. (A given air carrier may be inspected in different cities and thereby have multiple inspections.) Because the FAA manager considered these inspections to be continuous and ongoing, he did not specify a completion date for conducting these evaluations and requiring changes as may be needed.

The FedEx and FAA managers both questioned the practicality of requiring customers to identify the contents of their shipments, developing and using enhanced technology such as x-raying packages, or seeking the authority to open suspicious packages. Both of them also indicated that they knew of no efforts within the aviation or shipping community to consider or evaluate such measures. They expressed the opinion that public education, awareness, and carrier training were the most effective methods to reduce the number of hidden and undeclared shipments of hazardous materials.

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2. ANALYSIS

2.1 General

The flightcrew was properly certified and qualified in accordance with the applicable regulations and company requirements. Evidence from crew duty time, flight time, rest time, and off-duty activity patterns did not indicate that behavioral or psychological factors related to fatigue affected the flightcrew on the day of the accident.

The smoke detection system installed on the airplane functioned as intended and provided the crewmembers with sufficient advance warning of the in-flight fire to enable them to land the airplane safely.

The ATC personnel involved with the flight were all properly certified and qualified. The Boston Center ARTCC and New York TRACON controllers responded appropriately once they were aware of the emergency and provided appropriate and needed information to assist the crew in the emergency descent and landing.

The airplane was properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with applicable regulations. No evidence of systems, mechanical, or structural failures was found.

2.2 Flightcrew Performance

2.2.1 Crew Coordination

Although the airplane was landed successfully, several required items were not accomplished during the descent and landing. The flight engineer failed to perform step No. 6 of the “Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated” checklist (pulling the cabin air shutoff T-handle).$^{71}$ If he had done so, airflow would have been shut off to the main cargo deck area while being maintained to the cockpit. The Safety Board concludes that the flight engineer’s failure to pull the cabin air shutoff T-handle, as required by the “Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated” checklist, allowed the normal circulation of air to continue to enter the main cargo area, thereby providing the fire with a continuing source of oxygen and contributing to its rapid growth. However, the Safety Board could not determine the degree to which it might have contributed to the severity of the fire.

The flight engineer also failed to complete step No. 7 of the “Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated” checklist (to maintain a 0.5 psi differential cabin pressure). As a result, the occupants were unable to immediately open and exit from the primary evacuation exits (the L1

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and R1 doors) because the airplane was still pressurized. The flight engineer acknowledged that instead of manually maintaining the appropriate pressure differential, after he had placed the outflow valve control in the manual position, he only “cranked it open a couple of times [turns].” Because they were at 33,000 feet and operating on only one pressurization pack, the outflow valve would have been almost completely closed before the flight engineer cranked it. As demonstrated in the Safety Board’s test on a similar DC-10, manually cranking the outflow valve control two times will not perceptibly open the outflow valve from fully closed on a static airplane. The Safety Board concludes that the evacuation was delayed because the flightcrew failed to ensure that the airplane was properly depressurized.

The CVR transcript reveals that the flight engineer was overloaded and distracted from his attempts to accomplish the “Fire & Smoke” and “Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated” emergency checklists (in addition to his normal descent and before-landing checklist duties) by his repeatedly asking for the three-letter identifier for Stewart so that he could obtain runway data for that airport.

After the accident, the captain said that he had allowed the first officer to continue flying the airplane during the emergency so that he could coordinate with ATC and work with the flight engineer on completing the checklists. This should have resulted in an effective apportionment of the workload among the three crewmembers, in that the flying pilot would not have been overly distracted from flying the airplane, the flight engineer would have received needed assistance with his duties,$^{72}$ and the captain would have had the opportunity to oversee the actions of both. However, the Safety Board is concerned that, despite the captain's stated intention to serve in a monitoring and coordinating role, he failed to provide sufficient oversight and assistance to ensure completion of all necessary tasks.

The captain did not call for any checklists to address the smoke emergency, which was contrary to FedEx procedures.$^{73}$ (The flight engineer initiated the "Fire & Smoke" and "Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated" checklists.) Nor did he explicitly assign specific duties to each of the crewmembers. The captain also did not recognize the flight engineer's failure to accomplish required checklist items, provide the flight engineer with effective assistance, or intervene to adjust or prioritize his workload. In fact, the captain repeatedly interrupted the flight engineer during his attempts to complete the "Fire & Smoke" checklist,$^{74}$ thereby distracting him further from those duties.

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Further, the captain did not initiate the “Emergency Evacuation” checklist, which was required to be initiated during the preparation for landing. The “Emergency Evacuation” checklist includes depressurizing the airplane before landing. If this checklist had been initiated, it would have provided another opportunity for the crew to accomplish the necessary depressurization that was missed on the “Fire & Smoke” checklist. In addition, the captain told investigators that he did not initiate the emergency descent checklist, but said that he thought he had accomplished the items on that checklist by memory. Although the emergency descent checklist (titled “Rapid Depressurization/Emergency Descent”) was probably not applicable to this situation, the captain’s statement is troubling because it suggests a belief that checklist items can be adequately accomplished from memory alone. Finally, the CVR transcript indicates that the captain did not call for an emergency evacuation. (After the captain said “we need to get...out of here,” the flight engineer said “emergency ground egress.”)

The Safety Board concludes that the captain did not adequately manage his crew resources when he failed to call for checklists or to monitor and facilitate the accomplishment of required checklist items. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should require the principal operations inspector (POI) for FedEx to review the crew's actions on the accident flight and evaluate those actions in the context of FedEx emergency procedures and training (including procedures and training in crew resource management) to determine whether any changes are required in FedEx procedures and training.

2.2.2 Crew's Use of Emergency Equipment

Within 48 seconds after the first indication of a problem, the crew donned oxygen masks, as required by the “Fire & Smoke” checklist. The captain elected not to don his smoke goggles because they did not fit over his eyeglasses and they were dirty and scratched. The first officer elected not to wear his smoke goggles because he felt that they unduly restricted his peripheral vision. The flight engineer put his smoke goggles on but subsequently removed them because there was no smoke in the cockpit.

The Safety Board is concerned that cockpit smoke may affect crewmembers' vision, imperiling their ability to operate the airplane or properly address the emergency. Evidence in this accident indicates that smoke did not enter the cockpit in significant amounts until after the crew landed and stopped the airplane. However, the Safety Board is concerned that under different circumstances, the failure of crewmembers to don smoke goggles or to keep the goggles on during an emergency could adversely affect the outcome.

In connection with its investigation of the May 11, 1996, accident involving ValuJet flight 592,75 the Safety Board concluded that there is inadequate guidance for air carrier pilots about the need to don oxygen masks and smoke goggles immediately in the event of a smoke emergency. In Safety Recommendation A-97-58, the Safety Board asked the FAA to

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issue guidance on this point to air carrier pilots. In a November 17, 1997, response, the FAA indicated it would issue a flight standards handbook bulletin in November 1997 containing guidance on procedures to don PBE for smoke and fume protection. The FAA did not issue the bulletin. Recently, it has been learned that the bulletin will not be issued until after the FAA reviews the results of a special emphasis inspection of smoke goggles during en route and ramp inspections. On March 20, 1998, the FAA called for this special survey of smoke goggles as part of its response to Safety Recommendation A-97-60 (also from the ValuJet report), which sought a requirement that smoke goggles currently approved for use by the flightcrews of transport-category aircraft be packaged in such a way that they can be easily opened by the flightcrew. The survey has been completed, and the FAA is reviewing the results. The Board has been assured that the FAA is still in agreement with the intent of the recommendations addressing flightcrew smoke goggles and that action on Safety Recommendations A-97-58, -59, and -60 will follow the results of the survey. The Board is very concerned that the issuance of the guidance bulletin regarding the need for flightcrews to don smoke goggles at the first indication of a possible in-flight smoke or fire emergency has been delayed until after the completion and review of the special survey. Based on this delay, the Board classifies Safety Recommendation A-97-58 "Open—Unacceptable Response."

In the ValuJet report, the Safety Board also concluded that the smoke gogle equipment currently provided on most air carrier transport aircraft requires excessive time, effort, attention, and coordination by the flightcrew to don and, in Safety Recommendation A-97-59, asked the FAA to establish a performance standard for the rapid donning of smoke goggles and ensure that all air carriers meet this standard through improved smoke gogle equipment, improved flightcrew training, or both. In response, the FAA indicated that it believed the intent of this recommendation is addressed in 14 CFR 121.337, which establishes standards for PBE for smoke and fume protection and requires that the equipment be conveniently located on the flight deck and easily accessible for immediate use. However, there is no standard for the optimum equipment location that will facilitate quick donning of such equipment or for the time required to don the equipment. The FAA also stated that it would issue a flight standards handbook bulletin to provide additional guidance on the location and donning of this equipment and procedural guidance on flightcrew training requirements. However, it did not address the recommendation to establish a standard to ensure that, through equipment design, equipment installation, or flightcrew training, a specific performance standard is achieved for donning smoke goggles. The FAA has indicated that it will await the results of the special emphasis inspection before it takes further action. The Safety Board classifies Safety Recommendation A-97-59 “Open—Unacceptable Response.”

This accident again demonstrates that crews may not use the equipment currently available and that some characteristics of the current equipment may interfere with the flightcrew's performance of its duties. Accordingly, the Safety Board reiterates Safety Recommendations A-97-58 and -59.

During the evacuation, the flight engineer stated that before he entered the foyer area to evacuate via the R1 door, he filled his lungs with oxygen from his oxygen mask. He did not use the PBE, which would have provided him with protection from the smoke while he

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attempted to open the foyer doors. In postaccident interviews, he stated that he was anxious to open the exit doors quickly, and he forgot that the PBE was available. The Safety Board concludes that crewmembers who do not use PBE during a smoke or fire emergency may place themselves at unnecessary risk in attempting to address or escape from the situation. Although most carriers' emergency evacuation checklists instruct crewmembers to don PBE when circumstances warrant, there is no reference to the PBE in the FedEx “Emergency Evacuation” checklist. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should require FedEx to modify its evacuation checklist and training to emphasize the availability of PBE during evacuations in an environment containing smoke, fire, or toxic fumes.

The L-1 door was not available as an emergency exit because it only opened partially as a result of the flight engineer's attempt to open the door while the airplane was still pressurized. As discussed in section 1.6.4, when there is no electric power to the airplane the motor that operates the door is powered by a charged air bottle. If an attempt is made to open the door when the cabin pressure differential is above 0.5 psi, the bottle pressure will bleed off and the door will not open. Although the lack of the L-1 door as an escape route was not a significant factor in this accident, the Safety Board is concerned that under other circumstances the loss of a passenger exit door could have serious safety consequences. The Safety Board concludes that crewmembers may not be adequately aware that attempting to open a passenger exit door when the airplane is still pressurized may result in the door not opening. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should require all Part 121 operators of airplanes that rely on air pressure to operate exit doors to make crewmembers aware of the circumstances of this accident and remind them of the need to ensure that the airplane is depressurized before attempting to open the passenger exit doors in an emergency.

2.3 Fire Initiation

2.3.1 Location from Which the Fire Might Have Initiated

Because the fire burned for about 4 hours after smoke was first detected in the cabin cargo compartment, under changing conditions, much of the potentially helpful evidence was destroyed by the fire.$^{76}$ The growth of the fire was likely affected by the failure to pull the cabin air shutoff T-handle and the opening of doors L1 and R1 about 0556, which (even though L1 did not open completely) would have provided additional ventilation (oxygen), and thus increased the rate of fire growth. An even greater addition of oxygen occurred about 0650 when the cargo door was opened. (Witnesses reported that flames first broke through the fuselage shortly after the cargo door was opened. The airport operations log recorded that flames breached the crown of the fuselage about 0655, which was 1 hour after the airplane landed and about 1 hour and 19 minutes after the illuminated smoke detector lights were first noted by the flightcrew.) Despite the length of time the fire burned and the resulting destruction of potentially

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helpful evidence, the postfire condition of the airplane and its contents were nonetheless examined for clues as to the location from which the fire might have initiated.

One factor that investigators considered was the "V" burn pattern that originated at container 6R. It is a basic premise of fire science that such a "V" pattern often points to the origin of a fire. However, as explained in the National Fire Protection Association's Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, NFPA 921, "each time another fuel package is ignited or the ventilation to the fire changes, the rate of energy production and heat distribution will change. Any burning item can produce a plume and, thus a 'V' pattern. Determining which pattern was produced at the point of origin by the first material ignited becomes more and more difficult as the size and duration of the fire increases." [Par. 3-7]$^{77}$

Several areas in the main cabin cargo compartment exhibited extensive fire damage; however, the deepest and most severe heat and fire damage was found in and around container 6R.$^{78}$ More of 6R's structure was consumed than of any other container, and it was the only container that exhibited severe floor damage, which was likely caused by burning/melting Lexan wall material that fell inward onto the unprotected container floor. (Container 6R was one of the more sparsely loaded containers, enabling fire to reach the floor level without having to consume much cargo in the process.) Further, 6R was the only container to exhibit heat damage on its bottom surface, and the area below container 6R showed the most extensive evidence of scorching of the composite flooring material. In addition, the overall burn damage pattern to the cargo containers in the main cargo cabin showed that the deepest burned-out area centered over container 6R and that the cargo containers surrounding 6R and the contents in these containers were all burned to a greater depth along the sides common to container 6R.

There was heat damage to the cabin floor just aft of container 9L, but there was no cargo container in this area on the accident flight. This damage to the floor was consistent with burning material falling from the burning fuselage crown or contents from cargo container 9L falling into this empty space. Two aerosol cans found in this area showed evidence that they had been heated by fire on the outside of the cans, and that they had overpressurized and ruptured.

If the fire had not burned so long, the "V" burn damage pattern and the extensiveness of the fire damage to 6R would have been stronger evidence of a fire originating inside 6R. Further, the deep burn and severe damage found in container 6R could also be accounted for by the fact that it was relatively empty and therefore largely unprotected by cargo. Thus, the Lexan side walls and nylon curtain could have fallen directly onto the floor of 6R and burned there, resulting in the severe damage to the floor of 6R and the exterior surfaces of the synthesizer. When Lexan is heated, it typically burns, melts, and puddles, producing heat that would be sufficient to cause the damage to container 6R and its contents. Thus, a fire that

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originated outside of 6R but eventually spread to that area could have resulted in a similar damage pattern.

Comments on the CVR suggest that the smoke detector activation sequence might have begun with detector number 9 and initially moved forward; this suggests that the fire might have started aft of row 6. Further, some of the first flames to have breached the crown were observed approximately above the area occupied by cargo container rows 8 and 9.$^{79}$ Although the smoke detector activation sequence and location of the early breakthrough of flames cannot be considered reliable indicators of a fire's initial location,$^{80}$ a possible connection between these factors and the location of the fire's origin could not be discounted. Therefore, the Safety Board also considered the possibility that the fire originated aft of container row 6.

Although there was some significant burn damage to the containers in rows 8 and 9, their contents, and the surrounding area of the aircraft, this damage appeared to have been less than the damage in the area of container 6R. For example, container 8L's aluminum roof and two of its three Lexan walls were consumed by fire, as was the upper two-thirds of the third Lexan wall; its inboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 5 feet 10 inches and 5 feet 2 inches, respectively, and its outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 1 foot 4.5 inches and 3 feet 6.5 inches, respectively. Container 9R's aluminum roof and two of its three Lexan walls were consumed by fire, as was the upper portion of the third Lexan wall; its inboard cornerposts were intact, but its outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 1 foot 3.5 inches and 1 foot 5 inches, respectively. However, 9L contained a significant quantity of undamaged materials $^{81}$ with a low melting point (polyurethane, polystyrene, and polyethylene), and the cornerposts of

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that container sustained fire damage only to the forward outboard post. Similarly, containers 9R and 8R contained significant amounts of unburned combustibles (such as paper items) after the fire.

In analyzing the significance of the unburned materials in rows 8 and 9, the Safety Board recognized that when material towards the top of the containers in those rows burned, it could have formed an insulating layer of charred debris that would have slowed the downward progress of the fire.$^{82}$ Postaccident examination revealed a significant amount of burned material (as well as unburned material) in that area. However, the high-pressure water streams from the firefighting efforts would have disrupted the arrangement of the burned and unburned materials, thus erasing any obvious signs of an insulating layer.

Finally, investigators also noted that there was a "V" soot pattern on the interior of the fuselage originating at the floor level of the junction between 8L and 9L, but this is consistent with the exposure of that area when the fuselage separated and the fire vented at that point and is probably not related to the location of the fire's origin.

Thus, in comparing the fire damage in 6R with that in rows 8 and 9, it is possible that the fire in those rows was as significant as that in the area of 6R, but it might have started at or near the top of a container and was unable to progress very far into the volume of cargo loaded into those containers.

In sum, there was insufficient reliable evidence to reach a conclusion as to where the fire originated.

2.3.2 Ignition Source of the Fire

Because of an initial recognition among the fire investigators participating in the investigation that “V” burn patterns are generally highly significant, investigators examined the contents of 6R to try to identify a possible source of the fire. All items found in, or known to have been shipped in, container 6R were examined in detail (see section 1.14.2.1.1). In particular, the Safety Board examined the DNA synthesizer as a potential source of ignition because of the chemical smell noticed inside the unit and because the other items in that container were ruled not likely to have provided a source of ignition. The nature and degree of the fire damage to the synthesizer, particularly the heavy damage to the internal circuitry of the synthesizer’s controller panel (which is made of a low-flammability material), was thought to be suggestive of a source of fuel inside the synthesizer. (However, given the presence of volatile chemicals, and possibly vapors, inside the synthesizer, it is possible that a fire ignited external to the synthesizer could have produced a damage pattern similar to that resulting from an internal ignition source.)

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Tests of the liquids from the accident synthesizer showed that flammable chemicals (THF and acetonitrile) were still present in the bottles on the machine after the fire. The quantity of chemicals remaining in the synthesizer's bottles after the fire was insufficient to have caused the extensive internal fire damage to the synthesizer and the cargo container. However, it is likely that significant amounts of the chemicals were consumed in the prolonged and intense fire and thus the synthesizer probably contained much larger quantities of these flammable chemicals before the fire. (The presence of firefighting agent inside most of the bottles and the damage to many of the tubes that entered the bottles indicates that the bottles had been open to the atmosphere during at least part of the fire sequence.)

These volatile chemicals—particularly the THF—could ignite a fire. THF, which is highly flammable under any circumstances, can also form unstable peroxides that can explode on contact with certain other materials or autoignite (spontaneously explode) in sufficient concentrations. Although the investigation examined this as a possible ignition scenario, it could not be determined whether the chemicals in the synthesizer played any role in igniting the fire. The investigation could not develop a viable and convincing scenario to explain how the synthesizer could have started a fire.

Further, although the cargo debris from all of the cargo containers that had been carrying general cargo was also examined for possible ignition sources, it was not initially examined in as much detail as the items known to have been loaded into 6R because of the volume and condition of the debris. When a more detailed examination of that cargo debris was conducted later in the investigation, no ignition sources were identified in that cargo debris. However, because of the deteriorated condition of the cargo debris and the possibility that some cargo had been completely destroyed in the fire, the Safety Board could not rule out that on the accident flight, an ignition source was present in one of those cargo containers.

In light of the discovery of several shipments of marijuana on board the accident flight and the suggestion of one of the parties that marijuana is subject to spontaneous combustion, investigators considered this as a possible ignition source. The Safety Board recognizes that some organic matter, such as hay, can generate a biological/organic reaction producing heat and combustion if it is both wet and sufficiently compressed yet still exposed to oxygen. However, all of the marijuana shipments on board the airplane had been vacuum packed. (The police investigator who documented the marijuana seizures testified that the specially trained dog would have detected the presence of additional packages of marijuana, if any had been on board, even if the packages were completely consumed in the fire.) The police investigator who documented the marijuana seizures explained that shippers of contraband such as marijuana attempt to reduce the size of the package by “using a vacuum to vacuum out all the air and get it as compact as possible.” Thus, although the marijuana would have been compressed, there would have been little or no oxygen available to permit or support the biological reaction needed to lead to spontaneous combustion. Further, neither the police investigator nor any of the fire experts or consultants questioned during the course of the Safety Board’s investigation were aware of a fire being initiated by spontaneous combustion of a marijuana shipment. Therefore, spontaneous combustion of a marijuana shipment was ruled out as a possible ignition source.

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Finally, all of the airplane systems were examined for possible ignition sources; the electrical system showed no evidence of arcing, and none of the other aircraft systems showed any evidence of malfunction. Further, neither the crew interviews nor the FDR or CVR data indicated any failures or malfunctions in the airplane's systems that might have played a part in initiating the fire. Therefore, aircraft systems were ruled out as a possible ignition source for the fire.

In sum, the Safety Board could not conclusively identify an ignition source for the fire.

2.4 Undeclared Hazardous Materials on Airplanes

2.4.1 The Synthesizer

As noted above, the DNA synthesizer in container 6R was found to contain flammable liquids after the fire. The largest liquid sample in the accident synthesizer (approximately 5 mL in the AUX 3 reagent bottle) had a concentration of 4.3 percent of acetonitrile and .01 percent of THF. This is equivalent to about 200 µl of acetonitrile and 0.5 µl of THF. In comparison, the AUX 3 bottle from the synthesizer that was purged at AFIP, according to the procedures in Perseptive's manual, contained only 66 µl of acetonitrile and 0.2 µl of THF. Thus, after the accident, the AUX 3 bottle from the accident synthesizer contained about two and a half times the amount of acetonitrile and THF as did the AUX 3 bottle from the synthesizer purged at AFIP using the prescribed PerSeptive procedures. Further, the OX 2 bottle from the accident synthesizer contained about 5 µl of THF, which is about five times as much as the most THF that was left in any of the bottles from the synthesizer purged at AFIP. (The most THF in the synthesizer purged at AFIP was found in the CAP A5 bottle, which contained approximately 0.966 µl of THF. The CAP A5 bottle from the accident synthesizer contained approximately 4 µl of THF.)

To determine why acetonitrile and THF were present in the accident synthesizer in quantities greater than those of a properly purged unit, investigators reviewed the operating and maintenance history of the synthesizer and the procedures used to prepare the instrument for shipment. The instrument had sat idle for more than 6 months without being flushed or cleaned before the PerSeptive field engineer prepared it for shipment on August 28, 1996. Although the field engineer stated that he noted no malfunctions or problems, and that the synthesizer functioned properly during the purging procedure, the output log that recorded his actions during the purging procedure showed 44 “manual function invoked” entries that could not be accounted for by the steps prescribed in PerSeptive’s Service Note 89-006. When questioned about these entries, the field engineer explained that they represented multiple “prime individual” functions that he had invoked for each of the individual reagent positions on both column positions. (The priming function pumps a small, fixed amount of liquid from each individual reagent position through the flowpath.)

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Although the field engineer asserted that there were no problems with the purging of the machine, he also indicated that he performed the additional individual priming functions as an additional measure to ensure that liquid was flowing through the machine. This suggests that he wanted to ensure that liquid was flowing properly. These additional manual priming functions could be consistent with his having made repeated attempts to isolate or correct a perceived problem. Further, the existence of a breach in the system might also explain how chemicals found their way to enclosed areas of the machine that later exhibited severe fire damage.

Although the Safety Board could not positively determine the specific deficiency in the purging process, the purging and drying procedures performed at PerSeptive's corporate offices and at AFIP demonstrated that if the procedures in Service Note 89-006 were properly carried out, it would result in the synthesizer bottles containing trace amounts of chemicals less than those found in the accident synthesizer.$^{83}$ Thus, based on the results of the Safety Board's tests at NASA, it is clear that this process was not followed correctly and that chemicals in amounts greater than should have existed were left in at least some of the bottles.

The most reasonable explanation for the presence of excessive quantities of chemicals in the synthesizer is that one or more of the bottles containing chemical reagents used in the DNA synthesis process (at least one of which contained THF) was not sufficiently emptied before the purging process began.

This error alone (failure to sufficiently empty one or more of the bottles before the flushing cycle) might not have resulted in chemical residues being left in the synthesizer if the bottles had been replaced with new, dry, empty bottles before the drying cycle. However, it is unclear from Perseptive's procedures whether this was expected. In any event, the quantities of chemicals found in some bottles (for example, AUX 3, OX 2, CAP A5, and CP B6) indicate that the field engineer probably failed to sufficiently empty one or more of the internal reagent bottles after the flushing process and before the drying cycle, and that some of the chemicals left in those bottles remained in the synthesizer even after the drying cycle was complete. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the DNA synthesizer was not completely purged of volatile chemicals (including acetonitrile and THF) before it was transported on board flight 1406.

The RSPA Associate Administrator for Hazardous Material Safety indicated that the shipment of any amount of material classified by the DOT hazardous materials regulations as hazardous materials (as are acetonitrile and THF) is subject to DOT requirements for packaging, labeling, and shipping documentation to accurately identify the hazardous nature of a shipment. He also indicated that the transportation of any type of equipment that contains hazardous materials, even in minute quantities, is also subject to the hazardous materials regulations just as it would be if it were shipped in more typical containers. Because the synthesizer was not intended to be shipped with any hazardous materials, it was shipped as general freight and was not packaged or labeled in accordance with DOT requirements and was not accompanied by the required paperwork.

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Because the presence of flammable chemicals in the DNA synthesizer was wholly unintended and unknown to the preparer of the package (PerSeptive) and the shipper (Chiron), it is unlikely that the shipment of those chemicals on board flight 1406 would have been prevented by better hazardous materials education or improved screening of packages offered for transportation. However, it does demonstrate the safety threat posed by undeclared and improperly packaged hazardous materials.

2.4.2 Other Prohibited Items

Several other items discovered on board the accident airplane might also have constituted shipments of undeclared hazardous materials. As discussed in section 1.14.2.1.1, seven aerosol cans and several plastic bottles containing acidic or alkaline liquids that could be corrosive, and two samples containing potentially flammable or combustible liquids were found in the cargo debris.$^{84}$ Although the original contents of the aerosol cans recovered from the accident aircraft could not be determined, aerosol cans, as pressurized containers with compressed gases, are regulated hazardous materials. The acidic and alkaline liquids in the plastic bottles were also likely subject to the DOT hazardous materials regulations as corrosive materials. Although the DOT hazardous materials regulations allow exceptions to packaging, marking, labeling, or shipping paper requirements, depending on the quantity and form of the material being shipped, these exceptions generally are not applicable when the item is being transported by air. Consequently, the aerosol cans and the containers of acidic liquid likely constituted undeclared shipments of hazardous materials. Although these items were ruled out as possible ignition sources, they again raise concerns about the prevalence of unknown hazardous materials being carried on board airplanes.

The ease with which prohibited materials can find their way onto commercial airplane flights was further highlighted by the discovery of several illegal shipments of marijuana on board the accident flight. Marijuana is not classified as a hazardous material for purposes of air transportation, and the marijuana found on board flight 1406 was not a factor in the accident. Further, the Safety Board notes that most undeclared shipments of hazardous materials are unintentional, although the shipment of marijuana is clearly a deliberate attempt to ship contraband material. Nonetheless, the Safety Board concludes that the presence of the aerosol cans, the containers of acidic liquid, as well as several packages of marijuana on board the accident flight illustrates that common carriers can be unaware of the true content of many of the packages they carry.

2.4.3 Federal and Industry Oversight

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The shipment of undeclared and improperly packaged hazardous materials on board airplanes and the oversight by the FAA and air carriers to detect and identify such shipments was most recently addressed by the Safety Board in its report of the May 11, 1996, accident involving ValuJet Airlines. The Safety Board determined that the in-flight fire was initiated by the actuation of one or more chemical oxygen generators being improperly carried as cargo. These generators had not been identified as hazardous materials and were not properly packaged for transportation.

The Safety Board stated in the ValuJet report that the practices, procedures, and training of the personnel involved in the identification and handling of undeclared hazardous materials have remained inadequate. The Safety Board further noted that the ValuJet accident and incidents that occurred after that accident clearly demonstrate that the shipment of undeclared hazardous materials in air transportation is a serious problem that has not been adequately addressed. In the ValuJet report, the Safety Board further stated the following:

[T]he FAA has initiated the evaluation requested by the Safety Board in Safety Recommendations A-96-25 and -26 of the practices and training provided by all air carriers for accepting passenger baggage and freight shipment (including COMAT [company materials]) and for identifying undeclared or unauthorized hazardous materials that are offered for transport and, based on this evaluation, to require air carriers to revise as necessary their practices and training in this area.

Further, the FAA is developing a hazardous materials education and enforcement program that will focus on air freight forwarders. Also, shortly after August 1996, the FAA issued, under 14 CFR Part 109 (Indirect Air Carrier Security), shipper endorsement requirements that require all shippers, and freight forwarders to certify that all packages being shipped do not contain unauthorized explosives, destructive devices, or hazardous materials. Signing the endorsement also gives permission to search the shipment. Because the transport of oxygen generators has continued since the accident, despite the regulations, the Safety Board will closely monitor the FAA's progress in fulfilling these proposed improvements.

The FAA initiatives that have been undertaken since the ValuJet accident (e.g., hiring new agents, comprehensive inspections of carriers' and shippers' facilities, increased penalties for violations, a renewed outreach program, and the establishment of a database for trend analysis) are positive measures to reduce the number of hidden or undeclared shipments of hazardous materials. However, although the Safety Board supports these efforts, this accident illustrates that there is continued cause for concern. The Safety Board is especially concerned that, except in the case of properly packaged and declared shipments of hazardous materials, carriers generally do not inquire about the content of packages being shipped domestically, nor are they required to do so. The Safety Board also notes that the dangerous goods managers for FedEx and the FAA questioned the practicality and usefulness of carriers questioning a shipper about the contents of packages offered for shipment. Although air carriers and the FAA

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apparently agree on the seriousness of the problem, consideration is not being given to innovative measures, such as identifying package contents on the airbills or using technologies like x-ray machines to detect undeclared hazardous materials.

The Safety Board concludes that transportation of undeclared hazardous materials on airplanes remains a significant problem and more aggressive measures to address it are needed. Thus, the Safety Board believes that, in addition to the efforts already underway by the FAA, the DOT should require, within 2 years, that a person offering any shipment for air transportation provide written responses, on shipping papers, to inquiries about hazardous characteristics of the shipment, and develop other procedures and technologies to improve the detection of undeclared hazardous materials offered for transportation. The inquiries may include answering individual and specific questions about whether a package contains a substance that might be classified hazardous, (e.g., “does this package contain a substance that might be corrosive [or flammable, a poison, an oxidizer, etc.)”)

2.5 Dissemination of Hazardous Materials Information

After the occupants had successfully evacuated the airplane, the most immediate problem for the firefighters and other emergency responders was to prevent the fire from spreading and involving the fuel that remained on the airplane. In this case, the unavailability to the incident commander of specific information about the declared hazardous materials on board did not affect the firefighting strategy of the NY ANG. (For more information see Section 1.15.2, Emergency Response.) Nevertheless, in accidents that involve hazardous materials, it is critical that firefighters and other emergency responders receive timely information regarding the identity, quantity, number of packages, and location of declared hazardous materials. Such information can influence the type and level of response and may be necessary to adequately protect emergency response personnel, the environment, and the surrounding communities.

Neither the assistant fire chief who served as the initial incident commander nor the ANG fire chief received specific information during the firefighting phase of the emergency (before 0925) about the identity of the hazardous materials, their quantities, or the number of packages on the airplane. By 0700, about 1 hour after the airplane had landed, the only information about the hazardous materials on board the airplane that had been provided to the initial incident commander came from the Part A form and a handwritten list provided by the FedEx station at the airport. This information indicated only the hazard classes of the hazardous materials on board the airplane and their location in the airplane by cargo container position. Emergency guidance about specific chemicals was available through the Orange County HMRT and its communications link to CHEMTREC; however, this information was of little use until the specific identity and quantities of the declared hazardous materials on board the airplane were known. About 0915, approximately 10 minutes before the fire was extinguished, the fire chief received from the Orange County HMRT coordinator a copy of the weight and load plan and a handwritten list identifying some of the chemicals on board.

The NY ANG and other participating emergency response agencies, including airport operations at Stewart, repeatedly requested specific information about the hazardous

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materials on board the airplane. Throughout the morning (beginning at 0635) and into the early afternoon, FedEx, primarily through its GOCC in Memphis, faxed as many as 12 transmissions of various hazardous materials shipping documents to the EOC at the airport operations building and the NYSP barracks at Stewart, although many of the faxes were illegible. However, none of these reached the incident commander. (The lack of coordination among the involved agencies is addressed in section 2.6.)

Another problem was that FedEx did not have the capability to generate, in a timely manner, a single list indicating the shipping name, identification number, hazard class, quantity, number of packages, and the location of each declared shipment of hazardous materials on the airplane. To prepare such a list, FedEx would have had to compile information from copies of all of the individual Part Bs for each individual shipment of hazardous materials on the airplane. Because FedEx did not have the capability to quickly consolidate that information, it relied on faxing copies of the individual Part Bs for the approximately 85 hazardous materials packages on board, which proved to be burdensome, time consuming and, in this case, ineffective. Also, because of the poor quality and legibility of many of the handwritten Part Bs, much of the information was unusable.

In contrast, railroads operating freight trains can generate a computerized list of all of the freight cars in the train that identifies which freight cars are transporting hazardous materials and provides the shipping name, hazard class, identification number, and type of packaging, quantity, and emergency response guidance for each hazardous material transported. Such a printed, comprehensive list can be generated quickly and thus the information can be provided in a timely fashion to the appropriate emergency responders and in a more useful format than numerous faxed copies of partially legible Part B forms.

In both this accident and the crash of the FedEx MD-11 at Newark, the on-board Part B hazardous materials shipping papers were not available to emergency responders,$^{85}$ and FedEx was unable to provide complete information to emergency responders in a timely manner. Further, in two subsequent accidents near Clarksville, Tennessee, and Bismarck, North Dakota, the effectiveness of FedEx's hazardous materials recordkeeping system was again called into question. In the Clarksville accident, the shipping papers on board the airplane and on file at FedEx's Memphis Operations Center were found to be inaccurate. And in the Bismarck accident, FedEx was unable to confirm whether there were hazardous materials on board the airplane until 2 hours and 49 minutes after receiving the request for this information.

Safety Board investigators surveyed the capability of other carriers to provide this information in similar circumstances and found that only one carrier had an on-line capability to provide detailed information about the hazardous materials on board its airplane. The remaining

72

carriers, like FedEx, rely on paper copies of the hazardous material shipping documentation retained at the departing station if the on-board documentation is destroyed. The Safety Board is pleased that FedEx has committed to developing and implementing an electronic system for tracking and retrieving information about hazardous materials being carried on board FedEx flights. As discussed in section 1.15.2.1.2, FedEx plans to implement intermediate and long-term plans that would make computerized information about hazardous materials information available from all FedEx facilities. However, the Safety Board does not agree with FedEx's position that the proper shipping name is not relevant to emergency responders. Although this information may not always be required, in many cases it may be vital that emergency responders know exactly what substances are on board an aircraft so that appropriate measures can be taken to address potential risks.

Compared to the other modes of transportation, it is less likely that shipping papers on board an accident aircraft will survive or be accessible because of the greater likelihood of fire and destruction of the airplane. Because of the danger of fire, a flightcrew is also less likely to have time to retrieve the shipping papers after a crash. The Safety Board concludes that the DOT hazardous materials regulations do not adequately address the need for hazardous materials information on file at a carrier to be quickly retrievable in a format useful to emergency responders. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA and the RSPA should require, within 2 years, that air carriers transporting hazardous materials have the means, 24 hours per day, to quickly retrieve and provide consolidated, specific information about the identity (including proper shipping name), hazard class, quantity, number of packages, and location of all hazardous materials on an airplane in a timely manner to emergency responders.

Another obstacle in this case to emergency responders receiving hazardous materials information was FedEx's inappropriate statement to the ANG command post (at about 1300) that copies of the hazardous materials shipping documentation could not be provided to them because the Safety Board had taken over the investigation. This created the false impression that such information could not be released without the Safety Board's approval. FedEx later stated that this was consistent with company policy that once the Safety Board has taken control of an aircraft accident investigation, all information pertaining to that investigation should be forwarded to the Safety Board. Although the Safety Board appreciates FedEx's efforts to recognize the Board's primacy in aircraft accident investigations, the Safety Board has not promoted, nor does it support, a policy that would interfere with a carrier's ability to assist emergency responders in transportation emergencies, especially when hazardous materials are involved. The Safety Board concludes that FedEx's policy of providing information only to the Safety Board after the Safety Board initiates an investigation is inconsistent with the need to quickly provide emergency responders with essential information to assess the threat to themselves and the local community. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should require the POI for FedEx to ensure that all FedEx employees who may communicate with emergency responders about a transportation accident involving hazardous materials understand that they should provide those emergency responders with any available information about hazardous materials that may be involved.

2.6

Emergency Response

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Postaccident evaluations by airport personnel and representatives of the participating agencies indicated that many believed that communication and coordination among the agencies were lacking during the emergency response. Although all participating agencies recognized the ANG fire chief as the incident $commander,^{86}$ representatives from these agencies had differing opinions about who was to be present at the EOC, who was in charge at the EOC, the role of other agencies (including the Safety Board), and which emergency plan had been implemented in this accident. Although each of the participating agencies has conducted drills and exercises under their respective emergency plans for transportation and nontransportation hazardous materials incidents, joint exercises had not been conducted at Stewart for a simulated hazardous materials incident. The failure of the incident commander to receive the hazardous materials information that was being provided to other emergency responders indicates that communication and coordination among the participating agencies were not effective. Further, inadequate emergency preplanning and coordination among the responding emergency response agencies resulted in confusion about the responsibilities of the participating agencies and contributed to the failure of information about the hazardous materials on the airplane to reach the incident commander.

The Safety Board concludes that more effective preparation for emergencies involving hazardous materials and a system for coordination among the ANG, Stewart International Airport management, and all local and State emergency response agencies are needed. The Safety Board recognizes that after this accident Stewart revised its emergency plan, and that airport operations personnel at Stewart have acknowledged the need to address those deficiencies in the airport's emergency plan. However, the Safety Board is concerned that FAA requirements$^{87}$ do not specifically address the need to prepare for hazardous materials emergencies, and that other airports may be similarly unprepared for hazardous materials emergencies. The Safety Board concludes that airport emergency plans should specifically address hazardous materials emergencies. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should require all certified airports to coordinate with appropriate fire departments, and all State and local agencies that might become involved in responding to an aviation accident involving hazardous materials, to develop and implement a hazardous materials response plan for the airport that specifies the responsibility of each participating local, regional, and State agency, and addresses the dissemination of information about the hazardous materials involved. Such plans should take into consideration the types of hazardous materials incidents that could occur at the airport based on the potential types and sources of hazardous materials passing through the airport. The Safety Board also believes that the FAA should require airports to coordinate the scheduling of joint exercises to test these hazardous materials emergency plans.

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Firefighters were positioned on scene before the airplane landed and began firefighting efforts immediately. Although the firefighters initially attempted to conduct an interior attack on the fire from the foyer area, the location of the cargo containers prevented them from approaching the seat of the fire. After the cargo door was opened, firefighters observed orange flames and heavy smoke in the airplane, and the incident commander evacuated them from the airplane. The initial incident commander's decision to evacuate the firefighters from the interior of the airplane was appropriate given the danger posed by the smoke and fire-filled airplane. However, the initial incident commander acknowledged that use of the SPAAT tool to penetrate the fuselage was delayed while he attempted to accommodate the flight engineer's request that damage to the airplane be minimized.$^{88}$ Although it is not clear whether an earlier entry would have improved the effectiveness of the firefighting efforts in this case, the Safety Board is concerned that more aggressive measures to enter the airplane, such as use of a fuselage penetrating tool, were not taken sooner. The Safety Board notes that the ANG fire chief testified that based on “lessons learned” from this accident, if a similar situation were to occur, he would immediately “get right in there with a hand line and deploy some type of penetrating tool on the outer skin of the aircraft.”

The Safety Board has long been concerned about the lack of success of airport fire departments in extinguishing interior fires.$^{89}$ On June 4, 1996, the FAA published “Airport Rescue and Firefighting Mission Response Study,” in the Federal Register and invited comments from interested parties. According to the Federal Register notice, the study was undertaken to compare the mission and requirements for civil airport fire services to those of the Department of Defense. On August 1, 1996, the Safety Board commented:

[T]he current mission set forth in 14 CFR Part 139 to “provide an escape path from a burning airplane” no longer suffices. The Safety Board supports a full study of the mission statement by the FAA with a view towards providing adequate [ARFF] resources to rapidly extinguish aircraft interior fires and to extricate aircraft occupants from such interior fires. All aspects of this issue, including staffing, extinguishing agents, firefighter training, and response times, should be evaluated and compared with DOD standards to develop a broader mission statement that includes interior cabin fire suppression and extrication of aircraft occupants.

75

Accident history suggests that the environment inside a burning airplane's interior may be beyond the current technological capabilities of fire departments to extinguish within adequate time frames to successfully evacuate occupants or protect cargo. The Safety Board is aware that the FAA has researched fire extinguishing systems for airplane interiors, including testing of a water spray system that would discharge water into a particular area of the airplane when triggered by sensors in that area. Because the system would discharge water only to a focused area of potential fire, it would minimize the total amount of water that would need to be carried on board, thereby reducing the weight penalty of such a system. FAA tests showed that when this system was used to fight a fire, it delayed the onset of flashover, reduced cabin air temperatures, improved visibility, and increased potential survival time.

The Safety Board is concerned about the number of losses that have occurred and concludes that currently, inadequate means exist for extinguishing on-board aircraft fires. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should reexamine the feasibility of on-board airplane cabin interior fire extinguishing systems for airplanes operating under 14 CFR Part 121 and, if found feasible, require the use of such systems.

The Safety Board realizes that requiring on-board extinguishing systems may not entirely resolve these safety concerns because they may become disabled by crash impacts. Further, the Safety Board realizes that the full implementation of such technology will require a number of years. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that in addition to the safety benefits provided by on-board extinguishing systems, ARFF capabilities must also be improved so that firefighters are able to extinguish aircraft interior fires in a more timely and effective manner. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should review the aircraft cabin interior firefighting policies, tactics, and procedures currently in use, and take action to develop and implement improvements in firefighter training and equipment to enable firefighters to extinguish aircraft interior fires more rapidly.

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3. CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Findings

1. The flightcrew was properly certified and qualified in accordance with the applicable regulations and company requirements. Evidence from crew duty time, flight time, rest time, and off-duty activity patterns did not indicate that behavioral or psychological factors related to fatigue affected the flightcrew on the day of the accident.

1. The smoke detection system installed on the airplane functioned as intended and provided the crewmembers with sufficient advance warning of the inflight fire to enable them to land the airplane safely.

1. The Boston Center air route traffic control center and New York terminal radar approach control controllers responded appropriately once they were aware of the emergency and provided appropriate and needed information to assist the crew in the emergency descent and landing.

1. The airplane was properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with applicable regulations. No evidence of systems, mechanical, or structural failures was found.

1. The flight engineer's failure to pull the cabin air shutoff T-handle, as required by the “Cabin Cargo Smoke Light Illuminated” checklist, allowed the normal circulation of air to continue to enter the main cargo area, thereby providing the fire with a continuing source of oxygen and contributing to its rapid growth. However, the Safety Board could not determine the degree to which it might have contributed to the severity of the fire.

1. The evacuation was delayed because the flightcrew failed to ensure that the airplane was properly depressurized.

1. The captain did not adequately manage his crew resources when he failed to call for checklists or to monitor and facilitate the accomplishment of required checklist items.

1. Crewmembers who do not use protective breathing equipment during a smoke or fire emergency may place themselves at unnecessary risk in attempting to address or escape from the situation.

1. Crewmembers may not be adequately aware that attempting to open a passenger exit door when the airplane is still pressurized may result in the door not opening.

77

1. The DNA synthesizer was not completely purged of volatile chemicals (including acetonitrile and tetrahydrofuran) before it was transported on board flight 1406.

1. The presence of the aerosol cans, the containers of acidic liquid, as well as several packages of marijuana on board the accident flight illustrates that common carriers can be unaware of the true content of many of the packages they carry.

1. The transportation of undeclared hazardous materials on airplanes remains a significant problem and more aggressive measures to address it are needed.

1. The Department of Transportation hazardous materials regulations do not adequately address the need for hazardous materials information on file at a carrier to be quickly retrievable in a format useful to emergency responders.

1. FedEx's policy of providing information only to the Safety Board after the Safety Board initiates an investigation is inconsistent with the need to quickly provide emergency responders with essential information to assess the threat to themselves and the local community.

1. More effective preparation for emergencies involving hazardous materials and a system for coordination among the Air National Guard, Stewart International Airport management, and all local and State emergency response agencies are needed.

1. Airport emergency plans should specifically address hazardous materials emergencies.

1. Currently, inadequate means exist for extinguishing on-board aircraft fires.

1. In addition to the safety benefits provided by on-board extinguishing systems, aircraft rescue and firefighting capabilities must also be improved so that firefighters are able to extinguish aircraft interior fires in a more timely and effective manner.

3.2 Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was an in-flight cargo fire of undetermined origin.

78

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of the investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations:

To the Department of Transportation:

Require, within 2 years, that a person offering any shipment for air transportation provide written responses, on shipping papers, to inquiries about hazardous characteristics of the shipment, and develop other procedures and technologies to improve the detection of undeclared hazardous materials offered for transportation. (A-98-71)

To the Federal Aviation Administration:

Require the principal operations inspector for Federal Express (FedEx) to review the crew's actions on the accident flight and evaluate those actions in the context of FedEx emergency procedures and training (including procedures and training in crew resource management) to determine whether any changes are required in FedEx procedures and training. (A-98-72)

Require Federal Express to modify its evacuation checklist and training to emphasize the availability of protective breathing equipment during evacuations in an environment containing smoke, fire, or toxic fumes. (A-98-73)

Require all Part 121 operators of airplanes that rely on air pressure to open exit doors to make crewmembers aware of the circumstances of this accident and remind them of the need to ensure that the airplane is depressurized before attempting to open the passenger exit doors in an emergency. (A-98-74)

Require, within 2 years, that air carriers transporting hazardous materials have the means, 24 hours per day, to quickly retrieve and provide consolidated, specific information about the identity (including proper shipping name), hazard class, quantity, number of packages, and location of all hazardous materials on an airplane in a timely manner to emergency responders. (A-98-75)

Require the principal operations inspector for Federal Express (FedEx) to ensure that all FedEx employees who may communicate with emergency responders about a transportation accident involving hazardous materials understand that they should provide those emergency responders with any

79

available information about hazardous materials that may be involved. (A-98-76)

Require all certified airports to coordinate with appropriate fire departments, and all State and local agencies that might become involved in responding to an aviation accident involving hazardous materials, to develop and implement a hazardous materials response plan for the airport that specifies the responsibility of each participating local, regional, and State agency, and addresses the dissemination of information about the hazardous materials involved. Such plans should take into consideration the types of hazardous materials incidents that could occur at the airport based on the potential types and sources of hazardous materials passing through the airport. Airports should also be required to coordinate the scheduling of joint exercises to test these hazardous materials emergency plans. (A-98-77)

Reexamine the feasibility of on-board airplane cabin interior fire extinguishing systems for airplanes operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and, if found feasible, require the use of such systems. (A-98-78)

Review the aircraft cabin interior firefighting policies, tactics, and procedures currently in use, and take action to develop and implement improvements in firefighter training and equipment to enable firefighters to extinguish aircraft interior fires more rapidly. (A-98-79)

To the Research and Special Programs Administration:

Require, within 2 years, that air carriers transporting hazardous materials have the means, 24 hours per day, to quickly retrieve and provide consolidated specific information about the identity (including proper shipping name), hazard class, quantity, number of packages, and location of all hazardous materials on an airplane in a timely manner to emergency responders. (A-98-80)

Additionally, the Safety Board reiterates the following recommendations to the FAA:

Issue guidance to air carrier pilots about the need to don oxygen mask and smoke goggles at the first indication of a possible in-flight smoke or fire emergency. (A-97-58)

Establish a performance standard for the rapid donning of smoke goggles; then ensure that all air carriers meet this standard through improved smoke gogle equipment, improved training, or both. (A-97-59)

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BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL Chairman

ROBERT T. FRANCIS Vice Chairman

JOHN HAMMERSCHMIDT Member

JOHN J. GOGLIA Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR. Member

July 22, 1998

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5. APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A—INVESTIGATION AND HEARING

1. Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board was initially notified of this accident about 0700 on September 5, 1996, by the FAA communications center. Two investigators from the Safety Board's Northeast Regional Office were immediately dispatched to the scene and arrived about 1200. A partial go-team, comprising the investigator-in-charge and five specialists, arrived about 1500. Washington-based specialists provided assistance in the areas of airworthiness, fire, hazardous materials, operations, and air traffic control/weather.

Parties to the investigation were the Federal Aviation Administration; Federal Express; Boeing, Douglas Products Division; PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc.; and Chiron Corporation.

2. Public Hearing

No public hearing was held in connection with this accident investigation. Depositions were conducted from May 18 through 20, 1998, in Memphis, Tennessee, and on May 29, in Washington, D.C. A total of 27 witnesses were questioned during those deposition proceedings.

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APPENDIX B-CVR TRANSCRIPT

RDO Radio transmission from accident aircraft

CAM Cockpit Area Microphone sound or source

-1 Voice identified as Captain

-2 Voice identified as First Officer

-3 Voice identified as Second Officer

-4 Voice identified as male ground personnel

-? Voice unidentified

TWR Miami Local Controller (tower)

GND Miami Ground Controller

CLR Miami Clearance Controller

HOU Houston HF radio

UNK Unknown source

• Unintelligible word

@ Nonpertinent word

Expletive deleted

Break in continuity

() QuestionAle text

(()) Editorial insertion

Pause

Notes : All times are expressed in eastern daylight savings time. only radio transmissions involving the accident aircraft were transcribed.

INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION

AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE

CONTENT

INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION

AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION

AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

0536:49 BCNTR that's correct .. I have company traffic about twenty-five north of ya at thirty-three also going into boston .. he's an airbus.

0536:59 BCNTR I didn't figure I'd have to vector this early in the morning.

INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION

AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION

AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE

CONTENT

INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION

AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE

CONTENT

INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE

CONTENT

0540:07 INT-1 we've definitely got smoke guys ... we need to get down right now let's go.

AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE

CONTENT

0540:18

RDO-1 okay what's the closest field I wonder .. here let me talk to them here.

0540:22

RDO-1 center fedex fourteen zero six.

0540:24

BCNTR - saying something about the closest field I'll get back to that in a second but one hundred heading seven thousand expect straight in runway six.

0540:30

RDO-1 let's run it, let's get this thing depressurized .. let's get it down.

0540:34

RDO-1 center fedex fourteen zero six.

0540:38

RDO-1 center fedex fourteen zero six.

0540:40

BCNTR fedex fourteen zero six go ahead..you have a problem?

0540:43

RDO-1 yes sir we do .. we have smoke in the cabin at this time .. we're at three three zero .. we'd like to proceed direct and we need to descend at this time.

INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE

CONTENT

AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE

CONTENT

0540:53 BCNTR

fedex fourteen zero six roger descend and maintain one one thousand .. stewart altimeter three zero one five and if you want to go to albany it's in your eleven o'clock and about fifty miles .. stewart is probably the closest airport it'll be at ah hundred and eighty degree turn and about twenty-five miles.

0541:11

RDO-1 | 11

okay stewart field ah and a right turn to ah a hundred and eighty degrees now?

0541:17

BCNTR

you'd make a left hand turn to a heading of two four zero and it is uhm let's see now twenty-five miles .. left turn heading two four zero.

0541:27

RDO-1

left turn two four zero .. say the weather at stewart.

0541:32

CAM-1 (go ahead turn).

0541:35

INT-3 okay ready to run when you are.

0541:38

INT-1 okay run the checklist.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

91

0 5 4 1:4 1

I N T-3 o k a y c o u r i e r m a s k a n d g o g g l e s v e r i f y o n o n e h u n d r e d

p e r c e n t.

.

c o c k p i t a i r o u t l e t s o p e n.

.

.

t h e y a r e o p e n.

.

.

i t s a y s

a h l a n d a s s o o n a s p o s s i b l e.

.

.

a n d w e a r e d e s c e n d i n g n o w

.

.

.

i f u n a b l e t o e x t i n g u i s h f i r e a n d s m o k e m a n u a l l y r a i s e

c a b i n a l t i t u d e t o t w e n t y-f i v e t h o u s a n d.

.

w h i l e y o u'r e i n a

d e s c e n t t o e l e v e n?

0 5 4 2:0 3

I N T-1 r o g e r,g o a h e a d a n d s t a r t r a i s i n g i t.

0 5 4 2:0 7

I N T-3 o k a y c o n t i n u e t h e d e s c e n t.

0 5 4 2:2 1

I N T-3 a n d w e n o w h a v e j u s t d e t e c t o r s e i g h t,n i n e a n d t e n.

.

w e'v e

l o s t d e t e c t o r s e v e n.

.

i t's g o n e o u t.

0 5 4 2:2 8

I N T-1 r o g e r.

0 5 4 2:3 0

I N T-3 o k a y w h a t's t h a t a h.

.

s t a n d b y.

0 5 4 2:3 6

B C N T R f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x I'v e g o t a l b a n y i f y o u w a n t t o g o u p

t o s t e w a r t y o u c a n d o t h a t.

.

I'v e g o t a l b a n y i n y o u r e l e v e n

o'c l o c k a n d a b o u t f o r t y-f i v e m i l e s o r s t e w a r t i n y o u r

s o u t h w e s t e r l y p o s i t i o n a n d a h f o r t y m i l e s.

.

y o u r c h o i c e.

0 5 4 2:4 9

R D O-1 o k a y w e n e e d t o g e t i t o n t h e g r o u n d.

.

w e n e e d t o g e t t o

s t e w a r t.

.

g i v e u s v e c t o r s.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

92

0 5 4 2:5 3

B C N T R o k a y f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x r o g e r t u r n l e f t h e a d i n g t w o f o u r

z e r o.

.

y o u c a n r e m a i n i n a l e f t h a n d t u r n a n d s t e w a r t's w i d e

o p e n f o r y a.

0 5 4 3:0 0

R D O-1 r o g e r.

0 5 4 3:0 2

I N T-3 a n d I'm m a n u a l l y r a i s i n g t h e c a b i n a l t i t u d e.

.

t h e r e i s s m o k e

i n t h e a h c a b i n a r e a.

0 5 4 3:0 3

C A M [s o u n d o f o v e r s p e e d w a r n i n g a l e r t]

0 5 4 3:0 6

I N T-1 r o g e r.

0 5 4 3:1 2

I N T-2 o k a y.

.

o k a y y o u h a v e a n a p p r o a c h p l a t e f o r u s?

0 5 4 3:2 5

C A M-? *.

0 5 4 3:2 2

I N T-3 w h a t's t h e t h r e e l e t t e r i d e n t i f i e r f o r s t e w a r t.

0 5 4 3:3 0

R D O-1 g i v e m e a p l a t e f o r-

0 5 4 3:3 8

B C N T R f e d e x c a l l i n g b o s t o n s a y a g a i n p l e a s e.

0 5 4 3:4 3

R D O-1 c e n t e r.

.

s t e w a r t f i e l d.

.

w h a t's t h a t l i s t e d u n d e r?

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

93

0 5 4 3:4 7

B C N T R s i e r r a w h i s k e y f o x t r o t n e w b u r g h n e w y o r k.

0 5 4 3:4 9

C A M-? n e w b u r g h n e w y o r k.

0 5 4 3:5 1

R D O-1 o k a y.

0 5 4 4:0 4

B C N T R f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x i f y o u c o u l d w h e n y o u g e t a c h a n c e

t h e u h m f u e l o n b o a r d a n d s o u l s p l e a s e.

0 5 4 4:1 2

I N T-3 t h i r t y-t h r e e t h o u s a n d p o u n d s.

0 5 4 4:1 4

R D O-1 t h i r t y-t h r e e t h o u s a n d p o u n d s.

.

f i v e s o u l s o n b o a r d.

0 5 4 4:1 8

B C N T R c o u l d y o u s a y t h a t o n e m o r e t i m e p l e a s e?

0 5 4 4:1 9

R D O-1 t h i r t y-t h r e e t h o u s a n d p o u n d s.

.

f i v e s o u l s o n b o a r d.

0 5 4 4:1 9

C A M [s o u n d o f o v e r s p e e d w a r n i n g a l e r t]

0 5 4 4:2 2

B C N T R t h i r t y-t h r e e t h o u s a n d f i v e s o u l s.

.

t h a n k y o u.

0 5 4 4:2 5

I N T-3 a n d a h c u r r e n t a l t i m e t e r.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

94

0 5 4 4:2 7

R D O-1 c u r r e n t a l t i m e t e r s e t t i n g p l e a s e?

0 5 4 4:2 8

B C N T R s t e w a r t a l t i m e t e r t h r e e z e r o o n e f i v e,s i r.

0 5 4 4:3 2

R D O-1 t h r e e z e r o o n e f i v e.

0 5 4 4:3 4

I N T-3 t h r e e z e r o o n e f i v e s e t i n t h e b a c k.

0 5 4 4:4 4

B C N T R f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x d e s c e n d a n d m a i n t a i n f o u r t h o u s a n d.

.

y o u

c a n p r o c e e d d i r e c t t o k i n g s t o n V O R.

.

t h a t's i n d i a g o l f

n o v e m b e r.

.

t h a t's f o r t h e V O R r u n w a y t w o s e v e n a t

s t e w a r t.

0 5 4 4:5 5

R D O-1 o k a y w h a t's t h a t f r e q u e n c y?

0 5 4 4:5 7

B C N T R s t a n d b y o n e s e c o n d.

.

.

.

.

f r e q u e n c y's o n e o n e s e v e n p o i n t

s i x,s i r.

0 5 4 5:1 5

I N T-3 a n d i t l o o k s l i k e w e j u s t h a v e s m o k e d e t e c t o r t e n l i t n o w.

0 5 4 5:1 9

R D O-1 o k a y,s i r,w e d o n't h a v e t h e V O R a p p r o a c h t o t w o s e v e n o n

f i l e h e r e o n t h e a i r p l a n e.

0 5 4 5:3 4

B C N T R f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x r o g e r.

.

w o u l d y o u l i k e a v i s u a l t o t h e

a i r p o r t?

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

95

0 5 4 5:3 6

R D O-1 r o g e r,g e t u s d o w n t o t h e a i r p o r t a n d w e'l l t a k e t h e v i s u a l.

.

.

t h e o n l y t h i n g w e h a v e o n b o a r d i s f o r t h e I L S t o n i n e.

0 5 4 5:4 4

B C N T R a l r i g h t I L S t o n i n e i s t h e o n l y t h i n g y o u c a n h a n d l e o k a y.

.

i t's a t w o o n e z e r o h e a d i n g n o w f o r t h e a i r p o r t a n d i t's

t w e n t y-e i g h t p o i n t t w o m i l e s f r o m y o u r p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n a n d

y o u c a n e x p e c t a v i s u a l.

0 5 4 5:5 5

R D O-1 r o g e r t w o o n e z e r o.

0 5 4 5:5 7

I N T-3 o k a y w h a t i s t h e t h r e e l e t t e r i d e n t i f i e r f o r-

0 5 4 5:5 8

B C N T R a n d f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x m a i n t a i n f o u r t h o u s a n d.

0 5 4 6:0 8

R D O-1 i t's c l e a r e d t o f o u r t h o u s a n d n o w f o r f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o

s i x?

0 5 4 6:1 0

B C N T R f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x a f f i r m a t i v e m a i n t a i n f o u r t h o u s a n d.

0 5 4 6:1 4

I N T-3 t h r e e l e t t e r i d e n t i f i e r a g a i n f o r t h a t a i r p o r t?

0 5 4 6:1 9

R D O-1 a h s t e w a r t?

0 5 4 6:2 1

I N T-3 y e a h.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

96

0 5 4 6:2 1

R D O-1 S-T-W.

0 5 4 6:2 6

B C N T R s i e r r a w h i s k e y f o x t r o t i s s t e w a r t.

0 5 4 6:3 1

I N T-3 o k a y w e a r e d e p r e s s u r i z e d.

0 5 4 6:3 4

I N T-1 a l r i g h t.

0 5 4 6:4 1

R D O-1 a n d c e n t e r,I d o n't k n o w i f I d i d i t b e f o r e b u t f o u r t e e n z e r o

s i x i s d e c l a r i n g a n e m e r g e n c y a n d w e d o n e e d e q u i p m e n t

s t a n d i n g b y.

0 5 4 6:4 4

B C N T R f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x,t h a t's a l r e a d y b e e n t a k e n c a r e o f.

.

t h e

e q u i p m e n t w i l l b e s t a n d i n g b y.

0 5 4 6:5 1

R D O-1 r o g e r.

0 5 4 6:5 2

I N T-3 o k a y,i t s a y s f i r e.

.

c h e c k e x t i n g u i s h e d.

.

t h e l i g h t s a r e o f f.

.

i t's s t i l l s m o k y o u t t h e r e.

0 5 4 6:5 6

B C N T R f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x f l y y o u r p r e s e n t h e a d i n g.

.

.

e x p e c t a v i s u a l

a p p r o a c h t o t h e s t e w a r t a i r p o r t f r o m n e w y o r k a p p r o a c h

c o n t r o l.

.

c o n t a c t n e w y o r k a p p r o a c h o n e t h r e e t w o p o i n t

s e v e n f i v e.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

97

0 5 4 7:0 5

R D O-1 t h r e e t w o s e v e n f i v e,r o g e r.

0 5 4 7:0 8

I N T-3 c a u t i o n.

.

n o c r e w m e m b e r s h o u l d l e a v e t h e c o c k p i t t o f i g h t

a f i r e.

.

.

w e'r e n o t g o n n a d o t h a t.

0 5 4 7:1 4

R D O-1 a p p r o a c h,f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x.

0 5 4 7:1 7

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x n e w y o r k a p p r o a c h.

.

s t e w a r t

a l t i m e t e r i s t h r e e z e r o o n e e i g h t.

.

d e s c e n d a n d m a i n t a i n

f o u r t h o u s a n d.

.

.

d i d y o u f i g u r e o u t w h a t a p p r o a c h y o u n e e d

y e t?

0 5 4 7:2 4

R D O-1 t h r e e z e r o o n e e i g h t d o w n t o f o u r t h o u s a n d.

0 5 4 7:2 7

R D O-1 k e e p t h e s p e e d u p m a n,d o n't s l o w t o t w o f i f t y.

.

w e'r e i n a n

e m e r g e n c y s i t u a t i o n h e r e.

0 5 4 7:3 1

N Y A P P a m e r i c a n f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x s p e e d's y o u r d i s c r e t i o n.

.

s p e e d's n o t a p r o b l e m.

.

I j u s t n e e d t o k n o w w h a t a p p r o a c h

y o u w a n t?

0 5 4 7:3 6

R D O-1 r o g e r w e d o n o t h a v e a t w o s e v e n a p p r o a c h p l a t e.

.

a l l w e

h a v e i s r u n w a y n i n e.

.

i f w e c a n g e t i t w e'd l i k e t o g e t i n

t h e r e v i s u a l l y i f y o u c a n l i n e u s u p.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

98

0 5 4 7:4 3

N Y A P P r o g e r f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x.

.

d o y o u w a n t m e t o r u n l i n e u p f o r

r u n w a y n i n e r o r r u n w a y t w o s e v e n?

0 5 4 7:4 7

R D O-1 t w o s e v e n.

0 5 4 7:4 9

N Y A P P a m e r i c a n f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x r o g e r.

.

f l y h e a d i n g t w o o n e z e r o

.

.

c o r r e c t i o n f l y h e a d i n g o n e n i n e r z e r o.

0 5 4 7:5 4

R D O-1 o n e n i n e z e r o.

0 5 4 8:0 7

I N T-3 I n e e d t h e t h r e e l e t t e r i d e n t i f i e r f o r t h a t a i r p o r t s o I c a n c a l l i t

u p.

0 5 4 8:1 1

R D O-? S-W-F.

0 5 4 8:1 3

N Y A P P a m e r i c a n f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x b e a d v i s e d s t e w a r t w e a t h e r a s

o f z e r o n i n e f o u r f i v e z u l u w i n d s a r e c a l m.

.

t h r e e m i l e s

v i s i b i l i t y.

.

f o g a n d a b r o k e n l a y e r a t s e v e n t h o u s a n d f e e t.

.

s t e w a r t a l t i m e t e r's t h r e e z e r o o n e e i g h t.

0 5 4 8:2 6

R D O-1 t h r e e z e r o o n e e i g h t,r o g e r.

0 5 4 8:2 7

C A M-2 s l a t s e x t e n d.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

99

0 5 4 8:2 9

I N T-3 o k a y,l a n d a t n e a r e s t s u i t a b l e a i r p o r t.

.

c a b i n c a r g o s m o k e

l i g h t i l l u m i n a t e d c h e c k l i s t c o m p l e t e.

0 5 4 8:3 6

R D O-1 o k a y,t h e y'r e o u t,a r e n't t h e y?

0 5 4 8:3 8

C A M [s o u n d o f o v e r s p e e d w a r n i n g a l e r t]

0 5 4 8:3 8

R D O-1 g e t r i d o f i t.

.

b u t w e s t i l l n e e d t o g e t t h i s t h i n g o n t h e

g r o u n d.

0 5 4 8:4 1

C A M-2 w h a t's t h e f i e l d e l e v a t i o n?

0 5 4 8:4 1

N Y A P P a m e r i c a n f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x r o g e r.

.

t h e V O R r u n w a y t w o

s e v e n a p p r o a c h c o u r s e g o e s o f f t h e k i n g s t o n t w o f o u r f o u r

r a d i a l i f y o u w a n t t o t u n e t h a t i n.

0 5 4 8:5 0

C A M [s o u n d o f a l t i t u d e a l e r t a n d o v e r s p e e d w a r n i n g s]

0 5 4 8:5 4

R D O-1 r o g e r,t w o f o r t y-f o u r d e g r e e r a d i a l.

0 5 4 8:5 9

N Y A P P a m e r i c a n f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x d e s c e n d a n d m a i n t a i n t h r e e

t h o u s a n d.

0 5 4 9:0 2

R D O-1 t h r e e t h o u s a n d,f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

100

0 5 4 9:0 8

R D O-1 b o y t h i s s u c k s d o e s n't i t.

0 5 4 9:0 9

C A M [i n t e r r u p t i n C V R a u d i o f r o m t a p e s p l i c e]

0 5 4 9:0 9

I N T-3 i s t h e r e a t h r e e l e t t e r i d e n t i f i e r-

0 5 4 9:1 0

C A M-2 i s t h e r e a V O R o r s o m e t h i n g o n t h e f i e l d?

0 5 4 9:1 3

R D O-1 y e a h,t w o f o r t y-f o u r h e r e.

.

i n t e r c e p t t h a t.

.

.

t h a t's o f f t h e

k i n g s t o n V O R.

.

g o i n g i n t o t h e r u n w a y.

0 5 4 9:1 7

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x t h a t's a f f i r m a t i v e.

.

o n y o u r p r e s e n t.

.

t u r n t e n d e g r e e s r i g h t t o i n t e r c e p t t h e k i n g s t o n t w o f o u r f o u r

r a d i a l.

0 5 4 9:2 3

R D O-1 i n t e r c e p t t h e t w o f o u r f o u r r a d i a l.

.

t e n d e g r e e s r i g h t.

0 5 4 9:2 5

C A M [s o u n d o f a l t i t u d e a l e r t w a r n i n g]

0 5 4 9:2 8

I N T-3 I c a n't g i v e y o u a n y t a k e-o f f o r l a n d i n g d a t a.

0 5 4 9:3 2

I N T-1 y o u c a n't?

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

101

0 5 4 9:3 3

I N T-3 I c a n't f i n d t h e a i r p o r t i n m y d i r e c t o r y.

0 5 4 9:3 7

R D O-1 j u s t g e t a w e i g h t a n d u s e y o u r t a b l e t o p s.

0 5 4 9:4 3

R D O-1 g e t r i d o f t h e b o a r d s.

0 5 4 9:4 8

R D O-1 t h r e e h u n d r e d a n d t h i r t y t h o u s a n d p o u n d s.

0 5 4 9:5 3

R D O-1 V r e f i s o n e t h i r t y-o n e f o r f l a p s f i f t y.

.

.

o n e t h i r t y-s i x f o r t h i r t y-

f i v e.

0 5 5 0:0 3

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x t u r n r i g h t h e a d i n g t w o t w o z e r o t o

i n t e r c e p t t h e k i n g s t o n t w o f o u r f o u r r a d i a l.

.

d e s c e n d a n d

m a i n t a i n t w o t h o u s a n d f i v e h u n d r e d.

0 5 5 0:1 1

R D O-1 t w o t h o u s a n d f i v e h u n d r e d a n d t w o t w o z e r o o n t h e

h e a d i n g.

0 5 5 0:1 3

C A M [s o u n d o f a l t i t u d e a l e r t w a r n i n g]

0 5 5 0:2 0

I N T-3 i n r a n g e.

.

a i r s p e e d b u g s.

0 5 5 0:2 2

R D O-1 o k a y w e'r e w o r k i n g o n i t.

.

.

t w o s e v e n t e e n's y o u r t o p b u g.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

102

0 5 5 0:3 0

R D O-1 o n e e i g h t y-s e v e n's t h e n e x t o n e.

.

o n e f i f t y-f i v e.

.

t h e n e x t

o n e-

0 5 5 0:4 1

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x w h e n y o u g e t a s e c o n d t h e f i r e

d e p a r t m e n t n e e d s t o k n o w i f t h e r e's a n y h a z a r d o u s m a t e r i a l

o n t h e p l a n e.

0 5 5 0:4 8

I N T-1 (L a r r y)?

0 5 5 0:4 9

I N T-3 y e s.

0 5 5 0:5 0

R D O-1 y e s t h e r e i s,s i r.

0 5 5 0:5 3

I N T-1 o k a y,i t's c o m i n g a l i v e.

0 5 5 0:5 9

R D O-1 g o t o t w e n t y-f i v e h u n d r e d f e e t.

0 5 5 1:0 4

I N T-3 a n d I'v e g o t a d d i t i o n a l s m o k e d e t e c t o r s o n n o w.

0 5 5 1:0 6

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x t h e l i g h t s a r e a l l t h e w a y u p.

.

y o u

c a n e x p e c t t o s t a y o n t h i s f r e q u e n c y.

.

y o u w i l l n o t h a v e

a n o t h e r f r e q u e n c y c h a n g e.

.

y o u'l l b e c l e a r e d t o l a n d f r o m

t h i s a h o n t h i s f r e q u e n c y.

.

t h e a i r p o r t i s a t t w e l v e o'c l o c k

a n d t e n m i l e s.

.

r e p o r t i n s i g h t.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

103

0 5 5 1:1 6

R D O-1 f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x w i l c o.

0 5 5 1:2 1

R D O-1 o k a y,w h a t's y o u r d o u b l e b u g?

0 5 5 1:2 3

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x d e s c e n d a n d m a i n t a i n t w o t h o u s a n d

t h r e e h u n d r e d.

0 5 5 1:2 6

R D O-1 t w e n t y-t h r e e h u n d r e d,r o g e r.

0 5 5 1:2 7

C A M-2 f l a p s f i f t e e n.

0 5 5 1:2 8

R D O-1 t w e n t y-t h r e e h u n d r e d.

0 5 5 1:3 0

R D O-1 w h a t's t h e d o u b l e b u g i n t h e r e o n t h e t a b l e t o p.

.

f o r a h

t h r e e h u n d r e d t h i r t y t h o u s a n d?

0 5 5 1:3 2

C A M [s o u n d o f a l t i t u d e a l e r t w a r n i n g]

0 5 5 1:3 6

I N T-3 a h t h r e e t h i r t y.

.

s t a n d b y.

0 5 5 1:4 1

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x.

.

t h i s i s n o t a s t a n d a r d a p p r o a c h.

.

t h i s i s a n a n g l e d a p p r o a c h t o t h e r u n w a y.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

104

0 5 5 1:4 2

I N T-3 t w o f i f t y-e i g h t i s o p t i m u m.

0 5 4 9:3 2

R D O-1 r o g e r.

0 5 5 1:5 0

I N T-1 w h a t'd y o u g e t f o r a d o u b l e b u g?

0 5 5 1:5 2

C A M-2 h e y b r u c e,I d o n't h a v e t h e p l a t e.

.

y o u'r e g o n n a h a v e t o t a l k

m e i n t o t h i s.

0 5 5 1:5 6

R D O-1 I a m t a l k i n'y o u i n t o i t.

.

w e d o n't h a v e t h e p l a t e f o r t h i s

e i t h e r.

.

w e'r e d o i n g a v i s u a l.

0 5 5 1:5 9

I N T-3 o k a y f o r t h i r t y-f i v e a h.

.

.

.

t h i r t y-f i v e e x t e n d t h a t's a l l I'v e g o t.

0 5 5 2:0 6

C A M-2 f l a p s t w e n t y-t w o.

0 5 5 2:0 8

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x d e s c e n d a n d m a i n t a i n t w o

t h o u s a n d.

0 5 5 2:1 0

R D O-1 t w o t h o u s a n d f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x.

0 5 5 2:1 2

I N T-3 V r e f t h i r t y-f i v e e x t e n d i s o n e t h i r t y-s i x.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

105

0 5 5 2:1 3

C A M [s o u n d o f a l t i t u d e w a r n i n g a l e r t]

0 5 5 2:1 5

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x f i e l d i s t w e l v e o'c l o c k a n d s e v e n a n d

a h a l f m i l e s.

0 5 5 2:1 7

R D O-1 r o g e r.

0 5 5 2:2 1

I N T-3 o n e t h i r t y-s i x f o r V r e f f l a p.

.

t h i r t y-f i v e e x t e n d.

0 5 5 2:2 6

C A M-2 g e a r d o w n.

.

.

.

b e f o r e l a n d i n g c h e c k l i s t.

0 5 5 2:3 2

R D O-1 I t h i n k I'm s t a r t i n g t o s e e t h e r u n w a y o u t t h e r e a t t w e l v e

o'c l o c k.

0 5 5 2:3 8

R D O-1 i t c o m e s i n a t a n a n g l e.

0 5 5 2:4 2

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x f i e l d i s n o w t w e l v e o'c l o c k a n d f i v e

m i l e s.

.

d o y o u n e e d l o w e r?

0 5 5 2:4 8

R D O-1 y e a h a f f i r m a t i v e.

.

h a v e t h e y g o t t h e l i g h t s a l l t h e w a y u p.

.

w e d o n't s e e t h e r u n w a y.

0 5 5 2:5 2

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x t h a t's a f f i r m a t i v e.

.

t h e l i g h t s a r e a l l

t h e w a y u p.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

106

0 5 5 2:5 7

I N T-3 l a n d i n g g e a r?

0 5 5 2:5 9

I N T-1 d o w n a n d t h r e e g r e e n.

0 5 5 3:0 0

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x d e s c e n d a n d m a i n t a i n o n e t h o u s a n d

t w o h u n d r e d.

0 5 5 3:0 1

I N T-3 t w e l v e o'c l o c k.

0 5 5 3:0 2

R D O-1 t h a t's n o t i t.

0 5 5 3:0 6

I N T-3 t h r u s t c o m p u t e r.

0 5 5 3:0 8

R D O-1 f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x.

.

.

f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x d o e s n't h a v e t h e f i e l d

h e r e,s i r.

.

.

w e'v e a h w e'r e v i s u a l c o n d i t i o n s s i r.

.

w e d o n o t

s e e t h e r u n w a y.

0 5 5 3:1 5

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x s a y a g a i n.

0 5 5 3:1 7

R D O-1 y e s s i r,w e d o n o t s e e t h e r u n w a y a h a t s t e w a r t.

.

.

n o w w e

h a v e i t i n s i g h t.

0 5 5 3:2 1

I N T-3 o v e r h e r e a t t h e l e f t.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

107

0 5 5 3:2 3

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x y o u s a i d y o u h a v e t h e f i e l d?

0 5 5 3:2 6

R D O-1 y e s s i r,I d o b e l i e v e w e h a v e t h e f i e l d a t t h i s t i m e.

0 5 5 3:2 8

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x y o u'r e c l e a r e d t o l a n d r u n w a y t w o

s e v e n.

0 5 5 3:3 1

C A M-2 f l a p s t h i r t y-f i v e.

.

g o r i g h t t o f i f t y.

0 5 5 3:3 3

R D O-1 t h a t's n o t t h e r i g h t r u n w a y I d o n't t h i n k,i s i t?.

.

y e a h i t i s.

0 5 5 3:3 7

I N T-3 t h r u s t c o m p u t e r.

0 5 5 3:3 8

R D O-1 o k a y t h a t's t h e r u n w a y r i g h t t h e r e.

0 5 5 3:4 2

C A M [G P W S o n e t h o u s a n d f o o t c a l l]

0 5 5 3:4 2

I N T-3 t h r u s t c o m p u t e r.

.

a n t i s k i d.

.

s p o i l e r.

0 5 5 3:4 5

R D O-1 t e s t a n d a r m e d.

0 5 5 3:4 9

R D O-1 w a n t s o m e f l a p s f i f t y.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

108

0 5 5 3:5 5

I N T-1 w a n t t h e a u t o t h r o t t l e s?

0 5 5 4:0 1

I N T-3 f l a p s a n d s l a t s?

0 5 5 4:0 2

R D O-1 o k a y I'v e g o t f i f t y l a n d.

0 5 5 4:0 5

I N T-3 b e f o r e l a n d i n g c h e c k l i s t c o m p l e t e.

0 5 5 4:0 6

C A M [G P W S f i v e h u n d r e d f o o t c a l l]

0 5 5 4:0 8

C A M [t w o G P W S s i n k r a t e w a r n i n g s]

0 5 5 4:1 1

R D O-1 p u l l i t o n u p.

0 5 5 4:1 6

R D O-1 e v e r y t h i n g's d o n e.

0 5 5 4:2 0

C A M [G P W S o n e h u n d r e d f o o t c a l l]

0 5 5 4:2 1

C A M [G P W S s i n k r a t e w a r n i n g]

0 5 5 4:2 3

C A M [G P W S f i f t y,f o r t y,t h i r t y,t w e n t y a n d t e n f o o t c a l l s]

0 5 5 4:2 8

C A M [s o u n d s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t o u c h d o w n]

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

109

0 5 5 4:2 9

C A M [s o u n d s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f a u t o-s p o i l e r d e p l o y m e n t]

0 5 5 4:3 7

C A M [s o u n d s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f r e v e r s e t h r u s t]

0 5 5 4:4 4

C A M [s o u n d s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f e n g i n e s p o o l i n g d o w n]

0 5 5 4:4 6

I N T-1 o k a y,I'v e g o t i t.

.

.

n i c e j o b.

0 5 5 4:5 6

N Y A P P f e d e x f o u r t e e n z e r o s i x w h e n a b l e y o u c a n g o o v e r t o t o w e r

f r e q u e n c y t w e n t y-o n e e i g h t.

0 5 5 5:0 1

R D O-2 t w e n t y-o n e w h a t?

0 5 5 5:0 2

N Y A P P o n e t w o o n e p o i n t e i g h t.

0 5 5 5:0 3

I N T-3 o k a y o n t h e l i g h t s w e'v e g o t a.

.

(f o r w a r d f i r e.

.

I'm d e p l o y i n g

a f t).

0 5 5 5:0 7

R D O-1 w e n e e d t o g e t t h e h e l l o u t o f h e r e.

0 5 5 5:1 0

C A M [s o u n d o f e n g i n e f i r e w a r n i n g a l a r m s t a r t s]

0 5 5 5:1 2

I N T-3 a g e n t a r m c y l i n d e r o n e s w i t c h.

I N T R A-C O C K P I T C O M M U N I C A T I O N A I R-G R O U N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N

T I M E a n d T I M E a n d

S O U R C E C O N T E N T S O U R C E C O N T E N T

D C A 9 6 M A 0 7 9

110

0 5 5 5:1 9

I N T-3 e m e r g e n c y g r o u n d e g r e s s.

0 5 5 5:2 3

C A M [s o u n d o f e n g i n e f i r e w a r n i n g a l a r m s t o p s]

0 5 5 5:2 4

R D O-1 b l o w b l o w t h e d o o r.

0 5 5 5:2 7

C A M [e n d o f t a p e]

113

APPENDIX D—CARGO CONTAINER EXAMINATION CHART

Each description includes the position that the container had occupied on flight 1406, the type of cargo container construction,90 and the fire damage.

Container Position Fuselage Station

Number

Description of Container Damage

1R

543-631

The AYY cargo container’s aluminum roof, outboard wall, and forward Lexan doors were consumed by fire.

The upper inboard aluminum wall of the cargo container exhibited heat damage, but the 8-inch lower side wall and cargo container were intact and undamaged by fire. The outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 1 foot 9 inches and 1 foot 6 inches, respectively. Both inboard cornerposts were intact.

2L

1. 5-757

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof and outboard side were intact. The top quarter of the aft and forward Lexan walls were melted and distorted from heat. The upper portion of the inboard and outboard cargo container wall showed no fire or heat damage, but its contents were sooted.

2R

631-757

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof and upper Lexan walls were consumed by fire, and the lower walls were heat damaged. The upper two-thirds of the nylon fabric roll-up door was consumed by the fire.

The lower aluminum side walls and cargo containers were intact. The outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 2 feet and 4 feet 1.5 inches, respectively.

Both inboard cornerposts were intact.

90 The International Air Transport Association identifies types of cargo containers using a threeletter designator. The first letter describes the general type of unit. (An “A” designation indicates that the compartment is a certified aircraft container and “P” indicates a certified aircraft pallet.) The second letter indicates base dimensions. (“G” and “M” are 96 by 125 inches, and “Y” indicates miscellaneous sizes with the largest dimension being no bigger that 96 inches.) The third position relates to the container’s contour and compatibility and indicates in what part of the aircraft the container will fit.

114

3L

757-883

Approximately two-thirds of the aft portion of the AMJ

cargo container’s aluminum roof was consumed by fire. The remainder of the forward section of roof

exhibited heat, soot, and smoke damage. The outboard Lexan wall was intact. The upper portion of the aft Lexan wall was mostly consumed by the fire, and the lower portion was heat damaged. The forward Lexan wall exhibited heat damage and the lower wall and 8-inch aluminum side wall were intact. The upper

portion of the nylon fabric roll-up door was consumed,but the lower portion was intact. The outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 3 feet 8 inches and 2 feet 3 inches, respectively. The inboard cornerposts were both intact.

4L

883-1009

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof and forward Lexan upper wall were completely consumed by fire;the lower Lexan wall and 8-inch aluminum side walls

were intact. The aft and forward Lexan wall and nylon roll-up door were consumed by the fire. The outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 7 feet 7.5 inches and 2 feet 9 inches, respectively. The inboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 6 feet 2 inches and 5 feet 6 inches, respectively.

4R

883-1009

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof and Lexan aft and outboard walls were consumed by fire. The inboard lower half of the forward wall exhibited heat damage, and the upper wall was consumed by the fire.

The aluminum floor and 8-inch aluminum side walls were intact. The outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 3 feet 11.5 and 1 foot 6 inches, respectively.

The inboard forward cornerpost was intact, and the aft cornerpost measured 5 feet 2 inches.

5L

1009-1135

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof and the aft,forward, and outboard Lexan walls were consumed by fire, but the aluminum floor and 8-inch aluminum side walls were intact. The outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 3 feet 2.5 inches and 3 feet 5 inches, respectively. The inboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 5 feet 9.5 inches and 5 feet 6 inches, respectively.

5R

1009-1135

This position was occupied by a PAG pallet that was loaded with footwear in cardboard boxes piled in stacks that were 3 feet in height. The shoes and boxes were burned along the aft side of the pallet, but the aluminum floor was intact.

115

6L

1135-1261

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof, the nylon fabric roll-up door, and all Lexan walls were consumed by fire, but the aluminum floor and 8-inch aluminum side walls were intact. Two-thirds of the upper door assembly spring cover was consumed by fire along the aft portion. The outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 2 feet 7 inches and 3 feet, respectively. The inboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 2 feet

1. 5 inches and 2 feet 10.5 inches, respectively.

6R

1135-1261

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof and the Lexan walls were consumed by fire except for a small portion of the center aft lower wall. The nylon fabric roll-up door spring assembly, including the spring cover, was melted to the floor near the inboard forward cornerpost. Melted aluminum was puddled on the floor along the inboard side of the door. There were three areas where the 8-inch aluminum side wall had melted along the edge of the cargo container: 5 feet along the outboard side, 12 inches along the inboard forward edge, and 17 inches along the center of the forward edge. The outboard forward cornerpost was completely consumed by the fire, and the outboard aft cornerpost measured 3 feet 9 inches. The inboard forward cornerpost measured 1 foot 2 inches, and the inboard aft cornerpost measured 3 feet 6 inches.

7L

1261-1387

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof and Lexan outboard, forward, and aft walls were consumed by fire. The outboard forward cornerpost measured 3 feet 1 inch, and the outboard aft cornerpost measured 1 foot

1. 5 inches. The inboard forward wall cornerpost measured 4 feet, 3 inches; the inboard aft cornerpost measured 6 feet 1.5 inches. The aluminum floor and 8-inch aluminum side wall were intact.

116

7R

1261-1387

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof and the lower outboard forward and aft walls were consumed by fire except for a small area at the lower center position of the forward wall. There was also a horizontal burn through the contents positioned along the forward outboard edge of the cargo container next to the aft contents in 6R. The nylon fabric roll-up door was consumed by fire. However, the door assembly was intact. The outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 2 feet 1 inch and 5 feet 7.5 inches,respectively. The inboard forward cornerpost measured 4 feet 6 inches, and the aft cornerpost measured 7 feet 1.5 inches.

8L

1387-1513

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof and the Lexan outboard and forward walls were consumed by fire. The lower third of the center area of the aft Lexan wall was distorted from heat, and the upper two-thirds was consumed by fire. The inboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 5 feet 10 inches and 5 feet 2 inches, respectively. The outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 1 foot 4.5 inches and 3 feet 6.5 inches, respectively.

8R

1387-1513

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof was consumed by fire. The bottom half of the forward Lexan wall was distorted from heat and the upper twothirds was consumed by fire. The upper three-quarters of the outboard Lexan wall was consumed by fire, and the bottom quarter was distorted by heat. The nylon fabric roll-up door (inboard wall) was also consumed by fire. The inboard forward cornerpost measured 5 feet 10 inches, and the inboard aft cornerpost measured 6 feet 2 inches. The outboard forward cornerpost measured 5 feet 5.5 inches, and the outboard aft cornerpost measured 1 foot 6 inches.

117

9L

1513-1639

This AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof and outboard Lexan wall were consumed by fire. The lower mid-section of the forward Lexan wall was intact, but the upper wall was consumed by fire. The Lexan aft wall was consumed. The nylon fabric roll-up door was partially consumed by fire. However, some fabric was visible at the bottom of the door. The vertical roof support remained attached to the cornerposts. The 8-inch aluminum lip that extends up from the cargo container floor was melted down to a height of approximately 3 inches along an 18 inch length in the center of the outboard edge. The underside of the container was undamaged. The outboard forward cornerpost measured 3 feet. All other cornerposts were intact.

9R

1513-1639

The AMJ cargo container’s aluminum roof was completely consumed by fire. The lower section of the forward Lexan wall was intact, but the upper wall was consumed by fire, as was the aft wall and the outboard wall. The nylon fabric roll-up door was consumed by fire, but the aluminum door assembly frame was intact.

The vertical roof support remained attached to the cornerposts. No damage was done to the floor side wall of the container. The underside of the container was undamaged. The outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 1 foot 3.5 inches and 1 foot 5 inches,respectively. The inboard cornerposts were intact.

1639-1728

Note: The space, normally occupied by two AYY cargo containers, between cargo containers 9 and 14,was vacant for the accident flight.

14L

1728-1817

The AYY (Demi) cargo container’s aluminum roof and one-third of the outboard wall were consumed by fire.

Two-thirds of the lower outboard wall was intact. The forward aluminum wall was heat damaged and distorted from excessive heat along the upper third of the wall. The upper third of the aft Lexan door was consumed by fire. The inboard and outboard cargo container walls were distorted from heat, and the lower two-thirds of the wall was intact.

14R

1728 -1817 The AYY (Demi) cargo container’s aluminum roof, the outboard, inboard, forward, and aft walls were

completely consumed by fire. The outboard forward and aft cornerposts measured 3 feet 7 inches and 2 feet

1. 5 inches, respectively. The inboard cornerposts were intact.

118

15L

1817-1906

The AYY (Demi) cargo container’s aluminum roof and one-third of the outboard wall was consumed by fire.

The remaining two-thirds of the lower outboard wall was intact. The forward aluminum wall was heat damaged and distorted from excessive heat along the upper third of the wall. The upper third of the aft Lexan door was also consumed by fire. The inboard and outboard cargo container walls were distorted from heat, and the lower two-thirds of the wall were intact.

15R

1817-1906

The AYY (Demi) cargo container’s aluminum roof and the forward and aft Lexan doors were completely consumed by fire. The outboard aluminum wall was distorted from heat, and the aft section of the aluminum inboard wall was consumed by fire. The upper twothirds of the remaining inboard wall was distorted from heat but intact.

16L

1906-1995

The AYY (Demi) cargo container’s aluminum roof and one-third of the outboard wall were consumed by fire.

Two-thirds of the lower outboard wall was intact. The forward aluminum wall was heat damaged and distorted from excessive heat along the upper third of the wall. The inboard and outboard cargo container walls were distorted from heat.

16R

1906-1995

The AYY (Demi) cargo container’s aluminum roof and Lexan outboard wall were completely consumed by fire. The forward Lexan door was consumed by fire,and the aft lower portion of the aluminum door was intact. The upper half of the inboard Lexan wall was consumed by fire, and the lower half remained intact.

119

APPENDIX E—CONTENTS OF NINE CARDBOARD BOXES LABELED “9R”

Box 66—a package of medical vials (containing unidentified liquid) in what

appeared to be a cold pack. The package was heat damaged, but the vials were intact. The box also contained paychecks and four additional airbills.

Box 67—computer cables in reasonably good condition. A laptop computer was

located. The internal components were not fire damaged, and the outer case was slightly melted.

There was also one vial identical to those located in 9L.

Box 68—a small-size crimp top empty amber vial, cold pack (silicone), and

plastic capped-centrifuge vials (melted).

Box 69—seven intact plastic bottles containing liquid. This box also contained

miscellaneous paper products (manuals, photos, etc.), two more plastic bottles containing fluid,disks, software, and plastics. Some of the items exhibited minor fire damage, others did not.

Box 70—two large boxes wrapped in bubble-type wrap. The wrap material and

the box were unburned. There was also a severely burned electronic unit that appeared to be a monitor.

Box 71—two 1-quart plastic bottles as well as an electronic component that

appeared to be a portable printer and exhibited minor heat damage.

Box 72—miscellaneous debris, paper, computer materials, silicone-filled bags,

metal strips, and software. Some of the items exhibited minor fire damage, others did not.

Box 73—what appeared to be a laptop computer that was extensively fire

damaged. The cells of the battery pack were exposed. This box also contained other miscellaneous, unidentified electronic equipment and numerous rings, which appeared to be costume jewelry.

Box 74—a considerable amount of burned, printed material. One printed

computer board was found with little fire damage. One small plastic bottle was found that

contained a solid material, resembling pills. A badly burned computer board and a metal

cosmetic box with some contents were also found.

120

APPENDIX F - DETAILED EXAMINATION OF FIRE DAMAGE TO DNA SYNTHESIZER

The following describes the results of an examination of the accident synthesizer

conducted by the Fire Group at PerSeptive Biosystems’ manufacturing facility in Framingham,Massachusetts from February 18 through 20, 1997.

A 3-inch piece of white, unburned crumpled paper and a 3-inch piece of unburned

cardboard were observed on the top rear of the synthesizer between the RS 422 port and the printer port. (See figure A.) The floppy drive port was severely damaged and empty. Melted aluminum was observed on the outside surface of the right side of the synthesizer. The left side of the synthesizer was blackened except for two 4- by 4-inch areas at the bottom corners consistent with the location of the Styrofoam packaging blocks and four areas consistent with the location of the packing tape used for packaging the synthesizer. The bottom two unburned areas had yellow packaging tape attached. Glass normally installed in the front door window was missing, and the column door window was intact. The outside face of the keypad assembly was severely damaged and unrecognizable. The RS 422 and option ports were not visible. The printer port and the Event Out ports were fire and heat damaged.

The back panel of the damaged synthesizer was removed. (The exterior and interior of the back panel exhibited fire, soot, and corrosion damage.) Debris, ashes, and other unidentified materials adhered to the interior side of the panel. The on/off switch for the power inlet module and the receptacle plug-in were destroyed by fire.

A paper diagram of the bottle locations and system schematic taped inside the front door of the synthesizer exhibited slight soot damage. The paint on the inside of the door below the window frame was undamaged but exhibited some sooting. The inside of the door exhibited heavier heat damage above the lower window frame than was observed below the window frame. The stainless steel bottle bracket was heavily sooted behind bottles 4, 5, and 6.

The plastic dip tubes were cut off during the on-site accident phase. The upper third of the right side of the stainless steel bottle bracket exhibited some sooting and discoloration. The left side was sooted from the base to the top of the synthesizer. The polyethylene drip tray was melted along the right rear side and was heavily sooted along the left and forward walls. An 8½- by 9½-inch rectangular soot-free area was observed approximately 1 inch from the left side of the drip tray. Pieces of broken glass and a large amount of debris were found in the bottom of the drip tray. The floor of the synthesizer was heavily sooted and also contained pieces of debris. There was some blue discoloration along the right side of the stainless steel bracket where it intersected the mounting for bottles 1, 2, and 3.

Removal of the synthesizer controller top revealed that the controller top’s interior

exhibited extensive fire damage, and all of the electrical wire insulation was destroyed. The wire conductors were intact and brittle. The inside of the top was heavily sooted. Most of the paint was charred and missing under the controller PC board and around the floppy drive at the rear of the controller top. The resin binder for the controller PC board was destroyed by fire. The

121

Waste(ORG 1)

BL

A

(6

(ORG2)\._._._._.—.- .A

Fluidics diagram.

Drive

Gas

Electrical hookup and gas lines.

Figure A.—Expedite Model 8909 DNA synthesizer instrument diagram.

122

component side of the controller PC board was discolored and charred. The surface normally covered by the battery had a thin layer of shiny black material that flaked off readily. The printed

circuits in positions U6 and U7 with the sockets were found separated from the controller PC

board. Various other smaller electrical components were found separated from the controller PC board. The controller PC board was removed and its underside was observed to be severely burned.

The three-cell battery pack was detached from the PC controller board. The

ribbon cable and header normally located next to the battery on the controller PC board was fused to the battery pack with the other end of the ribbon cable still connected. One of the battery lead sockets had separated from the circuit board and was attached to the battery lead.

When investigators later examined the batteries in more detail, no indication of internal damage was observed.

The drive port for the 3½-inch floppy disk was removed and examined. No

evidence of the 3½-inch floppy disk was found. The drive was severely fire damaged, and the ribbon cable insulation was destroyed with the wires intact and embrittled.

The display driver was burned and delaminated along the top edge, but the bottom

of the circuit board remained structurally intact. The ribbon wire insulation was destroyed, and

the wire conductors were embrittled but remained intact. The bottom right side of the board

remained intact with the word “Millipore”91 inscribed on the board. The keypad driver was

severely heat damaged except for the lower right corner. The front side of the driver board’s crystal display was a bluish color with a darkened heat-damaged area on the right side,approximately 1 inch from the edge.

The exterior metal case of the trityl monitor was heat damaged on its top and sides.

The monitor’s external wire insulation was burned, and the plastic spill tray was deformed. A

legible inspection test sticker with a test date of August 26, 1994, was found on the bottom of the monitor. A partially legible SN label was observed on the side of the unit. A third label was seen

on the top of the monitor and it was melted, shrunken, and unreadable. Disassembly of the monitor showed that all the internal components and wire insulation were intact. The circuit board inside the trityl monitor had little or no fire damage. The rear ribbon cable insulation inside the monitor had

some heat damage.

The fluid access panel, which separated the fluidics module from the upper housing

of the synthesizer, was removed. The upper surface of the fluidics access panel was sooted and showed extensive fire and heat damage. The right rear lower surface of the panel was more sooted and heat damaged than on the remaining panel surface. The plastic insulators on the wiring boards of the instrument also exhibited greater melting on the right side than on the left side. The fluidic solenoids and wire insulation were heavily sooted, and the wire insulation was not damaged.

91 PerSeptive Biosystems acquired the synthesis products business from Millipore BioScience

Division in 1994.

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The sides and top of the fluidics module were heavily sooted; however, the

pneumatics umbilical area was clean except for a lightly sooted area above the pneumatic umbilical fittings. The four vertical umbilical gas fittings along the far right side of the module were melted.

The polyethylene gas lines (located directly above the monomer bottles) for pressurizing the monomer bottles were uniformly melted. The polyethylene pressurizing tubing was melted, and holes or openings in some bottle cap assemblies (the block for screwing the bottles to the instrument) were found in positions 6, 7, and WSH 1. These openings provided direct access to the interior of the bottles that had been screwed to the damaged DNA synthesizer. The inert gas polyethylene tubing for pressurization of bottle positions 1 through 6 was melted and thermally

distorted. The fluid lines were sooted and were not melted.

The spiral wrap that bundled the caddy tube line was intact to the point where the

line exited the machine and was melted at its termination point. The spiral-wrapped bundle was intact, the gas lines within the spiral wrap were melted, and the fluid lines were intact. A portion of

the caddy line external to the machine was not recovered, and the waste tubing bundle was also missing about 2 inches from the point where it would have exited the machine. The internal

portion of the waste bundle was intact and sooted.

The pneumatic module was extensively sooted and contained debris throughout the

module’s chassis. The lower portion of the module that contained the regulator and pneumatic components was heat and soot damaged, and the lower portion of the regulator contained a name plate with a “Wilkerson” manufacturing label. Melted debris was also affixed to the bottom of the

regulator and the power wires. Insulation within the compartment was intact, and heat and soot damage was observed throughout the wiring. The connector for the power wiring transitioning out

of the compartment was intact with heat and soot damage and some melting. The wire insulation from the right isolation valve was intact, and the grommet transitioning out of the compartment was

melted. The wires and insulation from the left isolation valve were intact and had some heat and soot damage. The grommet through the chassis on the left side was displaced and brittle. The plastic tubing attached to the fittings on the isolation valves dripped downwards vertically towards

the base of the synthesizer towards the pneumatic drip tray, and melted residue was next to the melted tubing.

The two barostats had fire and heat damage, and the gas inlet fitting ring was found

adhered to the power supply. An 11- by 6-inch mass of debris was removed from the aft left side of the unit between the inside chassis wall and pneumatic module frame. This is the same side on which the unit was found resting in the airplane. The debris was similar to the burned and watersoaked cargo residue that was among the wreckage. Another mass of debris, which measured 5½by 5 inches, was removed from the inside left pneumatic frame. The adjustment knob for the

pressure regulator had fire and heat damage with wires to two isolation valves entrapped in the melted portion. The aluminum frame surfaces were intact and were heavily sooted. The plastic solenoid mufflers were melted. The pressure gauge glass window was intact, and it was covered with debris and soot.

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All four ribbon cables remained attached to the valve/solenoid driver printed circuit

board (PCB), and the insulation on the ribbon cables and their connectors were destroyed by heat and fire. All the insulation on the electrical wiring and the connectors above the regulator

adjustment knob were destroyed by heat and fire. All the electrical wires in the same area were intact and brittle. The gas inlet quick disconnect fitting was missing, and the fitting’s spring was

found fused in plastic to the power supply case.

Examination of the upper portion of the pneumatic module found that the power

wire pair connector had some melting and soot damage, the fiberglass circuit board’s resin was consumed, and the board was delaminated. The bottom side of the valve/solenoid driver PCB was charred and the pneumatic solenoid distribution PCB beneath the driver PCB was similarly damaged by extensive heat and fire. The electronic components that were mounted on the board were unrecognizable from the extensive fire damage. The wiring to the PCB had its insulation burned off and the wires were brittle. The etched copper on the circuit board remained intact.

The aluminum gas distribution block that housed the gas solenoid valves had soot damage and was not melted. The exhaust fan was dislodged from its mount, was sagging downward, and was found resting against the bottom of the fan housing. Three of the seven fan blades were partially melted and fused to the fan housing.

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APPENDIX G—RINSE PROCEDURE AND QUANTITIES RINSED FOR 1996 NASA CHEMICAL ANALYSIS

Position 8

The Pos 8 bottle contained about 10 µl of fluid and a filter. 100 µl of methanol was

rinsed through the filter into a clear glass sample vial. Another 100 µl of methanol was added. The

100 µl flushed through the filter was added and swished about to mix the remaining residue on the sides of the bottle with the methanol. The solution was then transferred to a clear sample vial and

analyzed. The final solution had a yellowish tint.

OX 2

Three droplets adhered to the side of the bottle, which contained a filter. 100 µl of

methanol was rinsed through the filter and placed into a separate clear, glass sample vial. Another 400 µl of methanol was added to the bottle to rinse it. The rinse from the OX 2 was then

transferred to the clear sample vial that contained the 100 µl of methanol from the filter rinse and

sealed. The solution appeared to have a slight yellow tint.

WSH 1

This bottle appeared to be empty. Therefore, 1 mL of methanol was added to the

WSH 1 bottle. The bottle was rinsed, and then the rinse liquid was transferred to a clear sample

vial that was sealed and labeled. The solution was clear.

Position A

This bottle appeared to be dry, so 500 µl of methanol was added to the bottle. The

bottle was rinsed, and then the liquid was transferred to a clear sample vial that was sealed and

labeled. The solution was clear.

Position G

500 µl of methanol was added to the empty bottle, rinsed around, and then

transferred to a clear sample vial that was sealed and labeled. The solution was clear.

Position 9

500 µl of methanol was added to the empty bottle, rinsed around, and then

transferred to a clear sample vial that was sealed and labeled. The solution was clear.

Position T/U

500 µl of methanol was added to the empty bottle, rinsed around, and then

transferred to a clear sample vial that was sealed and labeled. The solution appeared to have a

slight yellow tint.

Position 5 (Spacer Reagent)

500 µl of methanol was added to the empty bottle, rinsed around, and then

transferred to a clear sample vial that was sealed and labeled. The solution was clear.

CAP B6

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1 mL of methanol was added to the empty bottle, rinsed around, and then transferred to a clear sample vial that was sealed and labeled. The solution contained some small black particulate in clear liquid.

CAP A5

1 mL of methanol was added to the empty bottle, rinsed around, and then transferred to a clear sample vial that was sealed and labeled. The solution was clear.

Position C

500 µl of methanol was added to the empty bottle, rinsed around, and then

transferred to a clear sample vial that was sealed and labeled. The solution was amber colored.

Position 6

The volume of liquid in the bottle was estimated by visual inspection to be 250 µl.* 92

Therefore, the sample for injection was pulled directly from the bottle, instead of being transferred to a sample vial. The solution was clear.

Position 7

The volume of liquid in the bottle was estimated by visual inspection to be 50 to 100

µl.* Therefore, the sample for injection was pulled directly from the bottle, instead of being

transferred to a sample vial. The solution was clear.

AUX 3

This bottle contained between 4 and 5 mL.* The liquid was transferred to sterile

vial for a visual examination. The liquid had a slight yellowish tint.

ACT 4

This bottle contained a quantity of fluid estimated at 1 mL.* The liquid was

transferred to a sterile vial and a slight yellowish tint was observed.

92 The volumes marked with an asterisk (*) were estimated by viewing a side-by-side comparison

of the liquids with a hand-graduated sterile vial.

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APPENDIX H—SUMMARY CALIBRATION AND GC/MS DATA FOR 1996 NASA TESTING

CHEMICAL

PURITY % SOURCE

IDENTIFICATION EXPIRATION

Tetrahydrofuran

1. 5

Chem. Service O-574

7/90

Acetic Anhydride

95

Chem. Service O122

2/89

Acetonitrile

99

Chem. Service O-834

5/89

Pyridine

1. 2

Chem. Service O-706

3/90

Dichloroacetic acid

96

Chem. Service O-45

9/89

Trichloroacetic acid

99

Chem. Service O-46

11/89

Trichloroacetic acid

PerSeptive

t-BPA

PerSeptive

1-Methylimidazole

PerSeptive

DEGMBE

95

Chem. Service O-172

3/90

The GC/MS data could not be obtained for iodine because it does not elute from the GC column. The injection port on the GC was set at 250°C, and an injection of 0.1 µl of the

standard solutions and unknown fluids from the reagent bottles from the accident synthesizer were extracted with a 0.5 µl syringe. The syringe was flushed 10 to 20 times with methanol after each injection and was followed by a vacuum pull on the syringe at an elevated temperature. This was

done to make sure the syringe was not contaminated.

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APPENDIX J - DEMONSTRATION OF SYNTHESIZER PURGING AND DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES

On February 18, 1997, Safety Board investigators and representatives from the

parties to the investigation conducted, at PerSeptive’s manufacturing facility, a demonstration of the purging and drying processes that the PerSeptive field engineer who prepared the accident unit for shipping reported he had followed. (The field engineer was invited to attend this

demonstration but indicated he was unable to because of a schedule conflict.) The demonstration was intended to repeat, to the extent possible, the same sequence of steps taken by the field engineer who purged the accident instrument and prepared it for shipment.93 The DNA

synthesizer used in the demonstration was the same type as that involved in the accident.

For the demonstration, the 15 internal reagent bottles were filled about 25 to 50

percent full with acetonitrile. The two external reagent bottles were likewise filled about 15 to

25 percent full. A 4-liter brown glass bottle for the nonchlorinated wastes was about 65 percent full of waste. The clear glass bottle for the chlorinated wastes was empty. There were three

external connections: the vent tube, power connection, and the inert gas (helium) hookup. A 3½-inch floppy disk94 with the operating software had been inserted in the disk drive, which is

located at the top rear of the synthesizer.

During the demonstration, the “prime all” cycle was then run three times on each

of the two column positions (see figure A in appendix F). The “prime all” cycle was run a fourth

time on the column 1 position to observe the flow of liquid to the waste bottles and to note the sequence of the priming function. Liquid was observed flowing into the waste bottles during the

“prime all” cycle, and the menu (a screen on the front of the unit with computer-generated

messages) indicated that every reagent position was primed.

The internal and external reagent bottles were then removed from the synthesizer and emptied by inverting them until no drops came out. Minute amounts of liquid were observed in the reagent bottles after the bottles were emptied and shaken. The amount of liquid remaining in one of the 25 mL reagent bottles was measured in a pipette and found to be approximately

1. 005 mL.

The reagent bottles were reinstalled in the synthesizer without further attempts to

remove the minute amounts of remaining residue. The system was then charged with helium to dry it. This was accomplished by running “prime all” three times on each column position. (The

fluid injectors used for the flushing are pneumatically driven by the inert gas.) During the drying

93 During initial postaccident interviews, the field engineer initially stated that he followed

PerSeptive’s procedures, as outlined in Service Note 89-006 from memory, and thus those procedures were used as a guideline during the February 18, 1997, demonstration. However, as discussed above, he later acknowledged that he had performed 44 additional steps.

94 The disk is required for the instrument to operate and records data regarding the keystrokes and

operations performed on the synthesizer.

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process liquid was observed dripping into the waste bottles. Upon completion of the “prime all”

cycles, the helium gas (hookup) inlet line was disconnected, and all of the reagent bottles were loosened to depressurize the system.

After the drying process was complete, minute amounts of liquid were observed in

the internal reagent bottles. Four of the 25 mL reagent bottles had about 0.001 mL of liquid, and a minute amount of liquid was also observed in at least one of the large reagent bottles.

However, because the large bottles had been removed and sat uncapped for about 15 minutes to allow any remaining residue to flow to the bottom of each bottle, the residue had evaporated from the large bottles before measurements could be made.