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I. Overview of 2007 Korea Fire Experience

分类：08_火灾统计与专题分析 / 2008 年份：2008 大小：48.9 KB 知识库创建：2026-08-05 09:06:13 抓取时间：2026-10-22 09:01:12

8 CONTENTS

2007 Fire Report -------------------------------------------- 1

. Summary of Fire Incidents in 2007 ----------------- 3

. Fires for the 10-Year Period (1998-2007) ---------- 7

Fire Investigation Reports ------------------------------- 27

❍ Fire at a cold warehouse -------------------------------- 29

❍ Fire at Soongremoon ------------------------------------- 39

Source : Fire Statistics Yearbook 2007

by the National Emergency Management Agency of

the Republic of Korea

2007 FIRE REPORT

I. Overview of 2007 Korea Fire Experience

1. Fire Loss Summary

Category20072006Change in numberChange in percentage
No. of Fires47,88231,77816,10450.68
Deaths424446-22-4.93
Injuries2,0351,73430117.36
Property Loss (¥ million)248,417150,79297,62564.74

※ Note : 1. 1,350 KRW is worth 1 USD(as of Dec 31, 2008) approximately, the same shall apply hereinafter.

  1. The Property loss values in this report are not adjusted for inflation hereinafter.

2. 2007 Fires by Causes

CategoryNo. of Fires(Percentage %)Fire Casualties(Deaths/Injuries)Property Loss(¥ million)
Total47,882100%4242,035248,417
Electrical10,56422.03027263,381
Mechanical3,3907.066318,202
Gas(explosion)2440.5152012,741
Chemical2680.613632,496
Car accident6821.421315,062
Human error22,54847.18559838,696
By nature2650.6011,634
Arson4430.9361081,916
Arson(suspicion)3,6557.68722814,996
Others1,3772.9141135,670
Unknown4,4469.311735793,619

2007 Fires by causes

〔图〕插图

3. 2007 Fires by Property Types

CategoryNo. of Fires(Percentage %)Fire Casualties(Deaths/Injuries)Property Loss(¥ million)
Total47,882100%4242,035248,417
Residential11,4312423383345,062
Educational47810331,836
Stores and Offices2,13043016314,360
Complex, public assembly49513796,652
Hospital, Care39713221,766
Industry5,4571129270108,535
Logistics21200201,865
Cultural asset6000300
Small $business^{1}$4,798102620825,088
Other structures2,616513859,390
Vehicle, Train6,220135010419,677
Explosive facility4301181,496
Ship, Aircraft12903104,323
Grass, brush, or forest4,128919741,733
Others9,34220141166,327

$^{1}$ Includes convenience store, grocery shop, hair salon. etc.

2007 Fires by Property Types

〔图〕插图

4.2007 Fires by Months

No. of FiresDeathsInjuriesProperty Loss(‡ million)
Total47,8824242,035248,417
Jan4,8785918819,720
Feb5,1726317319,722
Mar4,9205516220,437
Apr5,1033422023,822
May3,8963113818,662
Jun3,9782515420,182
Jul3,0071616019,594
Aug2,9741916015,638
Sep2,6992112225,195
Oct3,3302811916,415
Nov4,0234016521,339
Dec3,9023327427,686

Death, Injuries, Propert loss by month

〔图〕插图

5. 2007 Fires by Major Cities and Provinces

Cities or ProvincesPopulation (thousand)No. of FiresDeathsInjuriesProperty Loss (¥ million)
Total48,60047,8824242,035248,417
Seoul10,4186,6986734917,886
Pusan3,6422,787281245,151
Daegu2,5202,371127510,972
Inchon2,7162,157159810,838
Gwangju1,4461,3867273,849
Daejun1,5081,5105595,270
Ulsan1,1101,46911493,945
Gyunggi-Do11,29210,7847750170,642
Gangwon-Do1,5002,457218311,215
Chungbuk-Do1,5051,474239515,019
Chungnam-Do1,9892,698208318,842
Jeonbuk-Do1,8541,855188111,065
Jeonnam-Do1,9212,3374511010,600
Gyeongbuk-Do2,6782,9862210816,690
Gyeongnam-Do3,1944,2384314728,935
Jeju-Do56367510467,489

6. Catastrophic Fires for the Last 5 Year Period (2003 - 2007)

YearNo. of FiresDeathsInjuriesProperty Loss (ⓘ million)
$2003^{1}$1023020215,163
20041506
2005567425,078
20062132492
200711371068,317
Average658819,731

$^{1}$ Including no. of death and injuries of Daegu catastrophic subway fires

Fires in Korea during 2007

47,882 fires were reported in Korea during 2007.

○ up 50.6% from 2006

○ 424 fire deaths

○ 2,035 fire injuries

○ ¥248 billion in property damage, up 65% from 2006

28,020 fires were reported in Structure.

○ 338 fire deaths

○ 1,731 fire injuries

○ ¥216 billion in property damage

6,349 fires were reported in transportation(vehicle, train, ship, aircraft)

○ 53 fire deaths

○ 114 fire injuries

○ ¥24 billion in property damage

13,470 outside and other fires were reported in Korea.

○ 33 fire deaths

○ 190 fire injuries

○ ¥8 billion in property damage

2007 Korea Fire Loss Clock

● One fire was reported every 11 Minutes.

● One civilian fire death occurred every 20 hours and 38 minutes.

〔图〕插图 ● One fire injury was occurred every 4 hours.

● One fire occurred by human error every 23 minutes.

● One fire occurred by intentional fire(arson and suspicious as arson) every 2 hours.

● One home structure fire was occurred every 1 hour and 18 min.

● One industry structure fire was occurred every 1 hour and 36 min.

II. Fires for the 10-Year Period (1998-2007)

1. Number of Fires for 1998-2007

〔图〕插图

Year1998199920002001200220032004200520062007IR (%)
TF32,66433,85634,84436,16932,96631,37232,73732,34031,77847,8825.4
S27,16828,25328,84630,07827,10225,23526,62026,37025,77341,5336.3
VH5,4965,6035,9986,0915,8646,1376,1175,9706,0056,3491.7

The number of fires for the last 10-year period has shown an average 5.4% increase rate per year since 1998. In 2007, total 47,882 fires occurred to be up by 46.6% from 1998. Fires in Structures marked an average 6.3% increase rate per year, and resulted in a 52.9% rise from 27,168 fires in 1998 to 41,533 fires in 2007. Vehicle (vehicles, train, ships, aircraft) fires have risen with an average 1.7% rate per year to mark a 15.5% increase rate in 2007 compared to 1998.

2. Fire Casualties for 1998-2007

〔图〕插图

O Trend in fire deaths

O Trend in fire injuries

3. Property Loss for 1998-2007

〔图〕插图

○ Trend in property loss

○ Property loss order by places

○ Property loss order by causes

4. Fires by Cause for the 5-Year Period 2003-2007

4-1. Electrical Fires

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-2. Smoking materials

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-3. Arson

〔图〕插图 *: including fires by suspicion of arson

O Fire trend

O Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-4. Oils

〔图〕插图

O Fire trend

O Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-5. Gases

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5. Fires by Property Type for the 5-Year Period 2003-2007

5-1. Residential (Houses & Condominiums)

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-2. Factories

〔图〕插图 $^{1}$ including manufacturing facilities(mining, mechanical, fiber, petrochemical, printing, electrical, pulp, chemical and others)

O Fire trend

O Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-3. Vehicles

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-4. Restaurants

〔图〕插图

O Fire trend

O Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-5. Warehouses

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-6. Lodging(hotel, motel, guest house, etc)

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-7. Schools

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Fire at a cold storage

Fire of Cold Storage Warehouse

  1. General Information

Location : Icheon-si, Gyeonggi-do

Date and time : January 7, 2008 (Monday), 10:45

Fire Origin : the 13th freezing room at in the underground cold storage warehouse

Cause of the accident: accidental fire(assumed)

Human Casualties : 40 dead, 10 injured

Property Loss : Underground floor of 22,000 and ground floor of 60

were destroyed by fire.

Total damage : 7.88 billion KRW1)

  1. Building Status
  1. 1 Building Overview

There were 6 other logistics warehouses in the complex that held the cold storage warehouse in which the fire broke out. As construction was permitted on June 29, 2007 and use of the building was approved on November 5 of the same year, the cold storage warehouse was to be in operation on January 12, 2008.

Composed of 2 floors above ground and 1 underground floor, the building has a total area of 29,519.83 . The structure, purpose and area of each floor are specified in Table 1. The size of the underground floor in which the fire broke out was 187m(L)X121m(W)X 5.7~7.5m(H). Its main purpose was cold storage, and included a cold room, office, machine room, electrical room, etc. Since the building was constructed on a slope, the part on a high altitude was an underground floor, while the other part on a low altitude was a ground floor, with an exit to the outside.

Table 1. Building Status

FloorStructurePurposeArea(m²)Remark
UGP.C structureFreezing/cold storage warehouse, office, electrical room, machine room22,338Outer wall and roof materials: Sandwich panel (inside: urethane foam)
1stP.E.B s/tNormal temperature warehouse, office5,636Outer wall and roof materials: Sandwich panel (inside: urethane foam)
2ndP.E.B s/tOffice1,545Outer wall and roof materials: Sandwich panel (inside: urethane foam)

※ PC(Precast Concrete), PEB(Pre-Engineered Building System)

〔图〕2nd floor1st floorGroundUnderground floorfloor\n

Figure 1. Elevation of the warehouse

〔图〕5\n

Figure 2. Plot plan of the warehouse

〔图〕插图

Figure 3. Whole scene before outbreak of fire

3. Fire Protection System and Administrative system

3.1 Interior finishing materials

Since cold storage warehouses are not subject to the requirement of fire-retardant materials for interior finishing, as per the construction law fire-retardant materials were not applied. The ceiling of the underground floor was coated with polyurethane foam to a thickness of 15cm for use of the freezing and cold warehouse. On the day of the accident, 57 workers were connecting electric wire, cleaning and supplying Freon gas to the freezing equipment as finishing work for the opening of the warehouse on January 12, 2008.

3.2 Fire Compartmentation

Based on the construction law, space in this building must be compartmentalized for every 1000 m $^{2}$ of floor to prevent the spread of fire. However, all underground floors were constructed without compartmentation, as warehouses are excluded from the requirement of compartmentation, in consideration of mobile logistics equipment, such as fork lifts.

3.3 Travel distance to and from the stairwells for evacuation

According to the construction law, more than 2 stairwells are required for each room on the underground floor over 200 m $^{2}$, and travel distance from each part of the room to the stairwells must be less than 50 m. However, as the underground floor of this cold storage warehouse was combined with the ground floor, there was only 1 exit and 1 stairwell, despite the

Table 2. Chronology of events of the fire

fact that these were required to service an area over 20,000 . Furthermore, the travel distance from every part of the room to the stairwell exceeded 50m.

  1. 4 Fire protection system

Sprinklers were not installed in the freezing room and cold room of the underground cold storage warehouse, but were installed only in the interior passage connecting to the unloading place, office and machine room. As fire broke out in the 13th freezing room, it was thus impossible to extinguish the fire early with protection equipment.

An indoor fire hydrant was installed only in the passage, and no smoke control equipment was installed in the entire underground space. Thus, the casualties of laborers increased, due to a technical defect that failed to delay the outbreak of flashover.

  1. 5 Safety Control

After the fire, police investigated and found that the safety control manager had in fact disabled the fire door, sprinkler and emergency bell to prevent their automatic operation, saying "The malfunction of the fire fighting system caused inconvenience" while the workers were doing finishing work for the opening. As a result, tremendous casualties were incurred, because the fire door, emergency bell and sprinkler did not operate when the fire broke out.

  1. Situation of the fire

It was found that the fire broke out in the 13th freezing room, which was farthest from the cargo unloading place, which faced outdoors. Extending to the cold room through the front exit of freezing room, the fire promptly spread to the cargo work site, where external air was supplied.

TimeSituation
08:0057 workers began to work in the warehouse
10:45Fire broke out with an explosion on the $1^{st}$ floor underground, and 17 workers who were near the exit were evacuated
10:50$2^{nd}$ explosions occurred in several places
10:55A fire engine arrived at the site
12:10$3^{rd}$ and $4^{th}$ explosion stook place
12:30$5^{th}$ explosion took place, which was large in scale, black smoke was observed for the first time
13:00Firefighters attempted to exhaust air, sprinkle water and enter the underground floor by perforating 10 points on the asphalt road above underground warehouse
15:11First corpse found, on the $1^{st}$ floor underground
15:253 additional corpses found
17:00Rescue team temporarily retreated due to the risk of building collapse
20:00Rescue team stationed again
23:18All 40 corpses treated

〔图〕First flooron the groundWatering6Freezing52 MechineDDmroom3OfficeWork roomFirst floorExitunderground\n

Figure 4. Outline of the fire

〔图〕插图

Figure 5. Situation of the fire at 10:55

At the time of the fire, equipment and electricity were constructed to install internal partition, insulations, cooling systems, lighting system and so on. The outbreak of fire was witnessed at 10:45 a.m. in the 13th freezing room, which was located at the end of the corner in the underground cold storage warehouse (Statement of a wounded person, who was working at the point of origin of the fire.) Fire rapidly extended to the cold room (which has the form of an aisle) located in the front through the exit of the 13th freezing room, and spread to the entire underground floor. Subsequently, flame ejected to the cargo work site

which was composed of walls. There were 57 workers in the cold storage warehouse, which included 34 who were in charge of the freezing equipment, 17 in charge of the electrical equipment, 3 in charge of the air conditioner, and 3 managers. Only some of the workers in the cold room who first witnessed the fire and 17 workers that were working at the exit of the cargo work site were evacuated or rescued. The 40 workers who worked in the cold room for the insulation pipe work that provides Freon gas, the electrical room or the machine room failed to escape and died, being suffocated by flames and toxic gas that spread instantly.

Gyeonggi-do Fire Headquarters tried to extinguish the fire by mobilizing 103 fire engines and 440 firemen from 8 neighboring fire stations and 2 police stations. However, they could not actively rescue the victims, because flames were being ejected with consecutive explosions and the building was covered with toxic smoke. In particular, firefighters suffered serious difficulty in entering the building, because the freezing room in which the fire broke out was underground. As they were unable to enter, firefighters perforated holes with a diameter of 5m in the asphalt parking lot above the underground warehouse, and sprinkled water mixed with an extinguishing agent into the holes. As the flames weakened, firefighters began to perform rescue activities at around 3:00 p.m. - 4hours after the fire had broken out.

It took 8 hours to completely subdue the fire. Unlike most typical warehouse fires, the fire expanded to flashover in all spaces very rapidly, impeding the efforts of the fire brigade.

〔图〕插图

Figure 6. Scene after extinguishing the fire

5. Cause of the fire

(1) Result of the investigation of the cause of accident

It is estimated that the explosion was triggered by a spark, which occurred when the 13th freezing room was filled with a flammable vapor. The outbreak of fire was witnessed at 10:45 a.m. in the 13th freezing room, which was at the end of the corner in the underground cold storage warehouse. In the initial phase of the fire, oil vapor exploded in the machine room. Many corpses were found in this room. Subsequently, there were 3 consecutive explosions at 10-second intervals at the place that was judged to be the origin of the fire. However, the National Scientific Investigation Headquarters announced that the fire was assumed to have broken out in the 13th freezing room instead of in the machine room, on the basis of their investigation and the statements of eyewitness. According to the investigation on the site, it was confirmed that 15 drums of urethane foam fuel with a capacity of 200 liters each had been left in the 13th freezing room. Though freezing equipment work was mainly done in the machine room, where many corpses were found, it was ultimately confirmed that welding work had not been done, according to the work log of the day. However, it is evaluated that a spark or flame caused by

friction or shock during the electrical work was the cause of the fire, rather than the welding work.

As the fire site was severely damaged and most of workers on the site died, it is virtually impossible to clarify the cause of fire.

(2) Cause of the severe casualties

A. A considerable quantity of polyurethane foam and styrofoam was applied to all surfaces (ceiling, wall, etc.) other than the floor, in order to maximize the preservation of refrigeration and heat shield in this cold storage warehouse. Once one such part is ignited, such flammables promptly extend the burning by combining with the oxygen in the warehouse. As flashover occurred in this situation, the victims had no time to take refuge.

B. As there was no fire compartmentation on the ground floor, fire promptly expanded to the entire space.

C. Since the travel distance was 150m long and there was only stairwell and exit for egress, the workers could not promptly take refuge to a safe place.

  1. Details of Damage

Among 57 workers at the site, 40 died and 10 were injured. The dead included 26 Koreans and 14 foreign workers.

As nearly the entire underground floor (22,000 ) and part of the ground floor (60 ) were destroyed by the fire, the total damages amounted to

  1. 88 billion KRW.
  1. Analysis

It is judged that this large-scale disaster was caused by numerous factors, including the short construction period, the disregard of laws related to fire safety, the loose control and supervision of the authorities concerned, the absence of safety awareness, etc.

(1) Fire compartmentation

Fire expanded rapidly due to a lack of fire compartmentation. This also substantially increased the resulting damage. (Warehouses are exempted from installing fire compartmentation).

(2) Flammable materials

As flammable materials were inside the sandwich panel of the exterior wall, which was collapsed at the beginning of the fire, the interior flames vehemently expanded outward and the fire brigade could not extinguish the fire.

(3) Means of Escape

The stairwells or exits necessary to escape to the outside were insufficient in number, and the travel distance far exceeded the legal requirements. It is judged that the builders interpreted the provision (stairwell should be installed within 50m of travel distance, as per the construction law) at their own will, considering the entire underground floor as a refuge floor, because part of the underground floor was a refuge floor, thereby excluding the installation of stairs.

(4) Fire fighting equipment

The current fire safety standard exempts cold storage warehouses from the installation of fire fighting equipment (automatic sprinklers), judging that ignition may be difficult at temperatures below zero. For this reason, if ignition occurs in a freezing room with many heat insulation materials such as urethane foam, it is impossible to extinguish a fire in its initial stage.

FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Fire of Soongremoon

Fire of Soongremoon

  1. General Information

Location : Jung-gu, Seoul

Date and time : February 10, 2008 (Sun), 20:48

Fire Origin : near the 3rd central pillar on the 2nd floor2) of the building

Cause : arson

Human Casualties: none

Property Loss : 1st floor-10%of floor space damaged, 2nd floor - 80% of floor space destroyed by fire.

Estimation of property loss: 10 billion won3) (restoration cost)

  1. Historical/Constructional Background of Soongremoon

Soongremoon, one of the oldest wooden buildings currently existing in Seoul, was constructed in the 4th year of Taejo (1395) and completed in the 7th year of Taejo (1398). Remodeled in the 29th year of Sejong (1447) and again in the 10th year of Sungjong (1479), it was disassembled and

repaired in 1961~1963. The tiles4) were replaced in 1997, and it was designated as national treasure no. 1 on December 20th,1962.

Roof Structure

The roof of Soongremoon is in the form of Woojingak5), in which the

2) High building built like attic without door and wall to view in all directions 3) $ 1

1,350

4) Construction materials made by baking soil or cement to cover the roof

protruding corners of the eaves $^{6}$) of 4 corners of the roof ascend in a slope from the end of the eaves $^{7}$) to join at the ridge $^{8}$) or the central peak (point) of the roof. The internal structure of roof is composed in layers, which proceed as follows: $Tile \Rightarrow$ Boto (補土)$^{9}$) ·Ganghwe Layer $\Rightarrow$ $Jucksim^{10}$(pine) $\Rightarrow$ Gaepan $^{11}$ $\Rightarrow$ rafters $^{12}$.

〔图〕Tle 2.2~2.6cmGanghwe Layer (boto+masato)12-15cm→Jucksim Layer over 30cm>Gaopan 3~4cmRafter 20cm→\n

Figure 28. Drawing of the building

Figure 29. Drawing of roof of Soongremoon

〔图〕Vertical cross-sectionof SungryemunJucksimBotoGanghweTileRafterProtrudingcorhters ofPurline12.266meevePlane figure ofSun

3. Fire Protection system and Administrative system

3.1 Fire Protection System

A. Fire fighting systems: 8 fire extinguishers (4 units each, on the $1^{st}$ & $2^{nd}$ floors), 7 systems connected to nearby water supply for fire fighting.

B. Special fire inspection: Soongremoon is subject to an annual fire

inspection as a traditional temple and wooden cultural property

C. Fire fighting training: enforced 2 times in 2007 (4 vehicles, 26 persons)

  1. 2 Administrative system

Soongremoon is administered by Jung-gu District Office of Seoul. In detail, 3 Jung-gu employees were on duty during the day (10:00~20:00) and a security company was on duty under contract during night time (8:00PM~10:00AM). The security company monitored the site remotely from their office, using 4 CCTV and 6 infra-red detectors.

  1. Situation of the fire
  1. 1 Development of the incident

As the day of the fire was a holiday, only 1 Jung-gu employee was on duty. After this employee got off and turned on the security system at 20:05, the infra-red detector which was installed on the west wall for the 5th area detected movement 3 times at 20h 47m 09s, 12s and 21s. A motion was detected again in the 5th area at 20h 50m 01s. Another motion was detected in the 3rd area, which was in front of the left gate at 20h 50m 16s.

An eyewitness made the following report of what he noticed before the fire: “I was on a bus when I was passing by Soongremoon. At that time, I saw a man who was climbing Namdaemun using an aluminum ladder. I did not pay much attention to him since he looked like he was homeless. However, after the announcement of the fire at Soongremoon, I reported what I had seen.” The first reporter, a taxi driver, noticed smoke on the 2nd floor at 20:50 and called 119. On the day of the crime, the arsonist got on a bus, holding a yellow sack (which contained a ladder) on his right and a bag containing arson tools such as thinner on his left; this was recorded by a CCTV. Of the 4 CCTV installed at Soongremoon, the 3rd

one captured the arsonist descending from the west wall and moving to the gate at 18:50. He was also caught on the west wall of Soongremoon by the traffic CCTV that monitors Soongremoon road.

Only smoke could be seen at the site when the fire brigade arrived at 20:53. However, when firemen entered the 2nd floor, fierce flames at the ceiling, and there was some residual fire on the floor could be seen.

  1. 2 fire in progress

Although the fire on the 2nd floor was extinguished by the fire brigade, the inside ceiling (Jucksim Layer) smoldered continuously. Due to continuing fire, the central part of ceiling had partially collapsed. As more oxygen was provided, it burned more vehemently. The fire brigade mobilized aerial trucks and articulated ladder trucks to extinguish the fire, and attempted to prevent further burning by pouring a massive amount of water.

However, as part of the ceiling had already collapsed, the entire ceiling now caved in due to the load. The remains of the ceiling were scattered on the front and back of the building and burned on the ground and completely extinguished thereafter.

The fire spread without extinguishment was for the following reasons:

A. Burning was promptly expanded due to the high temperature heat emission caused by thinner

B. The hot air that was stagnant on the ceiling spread burning to the entire roof by convection and radiation.

C. The Jucksim Layer was ignited through pillars, Gongpo13) and the gap of Gaepan.

D. Water could not reach the Jucksim Layer since blockage by the rafters, Gaepan and tiles, . As a result, the fire spread to its maximum extent.

13) Wooden plank fixed on the pillar head to support the weight of eaves

According to the investigation, the arsonist intruded with three 1.5

plastic PET containers. He first poured thinner from the 1.5 containers and set a fire. Subsequently, the 2 plastic containers, which he had left standing on the floor, were melted by the heat. As the thinner that leaked from the containers was ignited, hot plumes rapidly expanded to the ceiling (rafters) by fierce flame with instant heat emission. Hot air reached the ceiling, and the wood began to be decomposed by the convection and radiation heat at 180 . As the wood was decomposed by heat, hydrocarbon gases (such as CO(33%), CH4(9%), etc.) began to be emitted. It is judged that as the temperature reached the flash point of wood (about 240~270 ) and the ignition point of wood (about 400~470 ), flammable gas was ignited, thereby creating the conditions for continual burning.

As the ceiling was burnt, sundry wood (wood shaving residals) and dust in the Jucksim Layer was ignited through the pillars, Gongpo and gap of Gaepan ,and began smauldering. It is estimated that as heat accumulated inside the ceiling and the fire became flaming fire which then rapidly spread inside the ceiling.

〔图〕23:502D:5923人|50是20人|59是DD:25D1:5D01人50是00人25是\n

Figure 30. Process of collapse of Soongremoon

a. 20:59

Soongremoon was all over with white smoke. The fire brigade tried to extinguish the fire for 1 hour, but the flames were hardly subdued.

b. 23:50

The entire area of the $2^{nd}$ floor and the right part of the $1^{st}$ floor of Soongremoon burned, with red flames producing black smoke. The fire brigade desperately tried to extinguish the fire, as the flame rekindled.

c. 00:25

As the entire area of the $2^{nd}$ floor was burned in flames, a large blaze protruded over the roof at the center.

d. 01:50

The flames spread to the entire building, and the right ceiling on the $2^{nd}$ floor began to collapse.

Table 1. Chronology of events in the Soongremoon fire

DateTimeSituation
Jan20:47infra-red detector of the security company alarmed that there was an intruder.
1020:50Fire was reported to Seoul Jungbu Fire Station (JFS).
1020:53JFS arrived at the site and began to extinguish fire - 18 vehicles (6 pumps, 12 tanks)
1020:59JFS requested Cultural Property Office (CPO) for permission of partial destruction of the building for extinguishment.
1021:40Relevant department of CPO agreed to destruction.
1021:55Mobilized firemen- 197 persons. 60 vehicles
1022:15Firemen extinguishing fire in the building were ordered to retreated due to the risk of collapse. The flames spread fiercely.
1022:25Firemen were ordered to cease operation on the tile.
1022:32360 persons on the site (330 fire fighters, 20 police, 5 KEPCO, 5 others) 95 vehicles (55 fire engines, 7 aerial trucks, 8 articulated ladder vehicles, 4 rescue vehicles, 3 ambulances, 2 illuminating vehicles, 2 commanding vehicles, Others-14)
1023:20Instead of cooling water, an oxygen suffocation agent (foam extinguishing agent) was employed for extinguishment.
1023:40Roof of the $2^{\text{nd}}$ floor began to collapse.
1101:05Roof of the building collapsed.
1101:56All parts of the $2^{\text{nd}}$ floor and most of the $1^{\text{st}}$ floor collapsed, except for the stone plat form.
1102:05Fire extinguishment complete.
  1. The cause of fire

The arsonist always had dissatisfaction with his land compensation and tried to express his feelings with arson. He intruded on the 2nd floor of Soongremoon using a ladder to climb over the west wall at 20:47. He put two 1.5 liter bottles of thinner on the floor and he poured 1 bottle on the floor and then lit a fire with a gas lighter. The arsonist was arrested 2 days after the crime when he was recognized from a CCTV recording.

The movement of the arsonist was detected at 20:47 and 20:50 on the day of incident by infra-red detectors that were installed and monitored by a security company. He was also recorded in the CCTV of the security company, as well as by a traffic camera and a bus camera. The sack that had contained the ladder he used to climb the wall was found at the south part of the wall, and the ladder he used to go over the wall was also found behind the wall where the sack was left. In addition, the National Scientific Investigation Research Institute detected pigment from Soongremoon in an analysis of the arsonist’s shoes.

The arsonist of Soongremoon had previously set a fire inside the Munjeongjeon, Changkyunggung14) on April 26th, 2006 using paper and butane gas, which resulted in property loss amounting to 7 million KRW. He was sentenced an imprisonment lasting 1 year and 6 months, probation for 2 years and a fine of 13 million KRW and then released from jail. However, the case of the arson of Munjeongjeon, Changkyunggung case was terminated without any particular countermeasures, in terms of assessing ways in which the site could be protected from a similar incident in the future. In this case, punishing the arsonist is important, but it is necessary to prevent similar fires by closely analyzing the fire that broke out and suggesting countermeasures.

  1. Loss status

The restoration cost of Soongremoon is estimated at 10 billion KRW, but the damage remaining in the heart of nation is immeasurable since a

14) Palace of Chosun Age in Jongro-gu Seoul which was constructed in 1484

symbolic building of Seoul with history of more than 600 years was destroyed by fire.

6.1 $1^{st}$ floor of Soongremoon -10% of floor space damaged

Some 10% of the total area of the $1^{st}$ floor, including the walls and the floor, collapsed due to the impact from remains that were destroyed by fire and fell from the $2^{nd}$ floor and roof.

6.2 $2^{nd}$ floor of Soongremoon - 80% of floor space destroyed

Since most of the $2^{nd}$ floor and roof were heated from top to bottom to be severely carbonized, and only the upper part of the pillar was destroyed by fire.

6.3 Roof destruction by fire

Though most of the roof was destroyed, the damage to the $1^{st}$ floor was limited to some extent since the destroyed roof fell on the outer part of Soongremoon.

〔图〕TileArea destroyed by fireGanghweJucksimWoojingak toof inGaepantrapezoldal formMunduRafteGongpoYunchoukFront ViewVertica

Figure 31. Structure of Soongremoon and the destroyed part

7. Analysis

7.1 Fire Extinguishment

A. Considering the fact that the Soongremoon is a wooden building, it is necessary to change fire fighting tactics for rapid fire source caused by flammables, such as thinner.

B. It is necessary to consider the diverse architecture styles of ancient buildings according to the type of cultural property. Soongremoon is vulnerable to fire for the following reasons:

C. There was not sufficient opportunity to obtain the empirical knowledge required to learn the technology to fight a fire of a cultural property.

D. Standard fire extinguishing techniques cannot be efficiently applied to cultural properties, which have diverse characters.

E. There has been no fire fighting equipment developed to subdue a fire

in a wooden building by destruction (partial disassembly).

  1. 2 Fire prevention

A. Security for the restricted area of the cultural property was insufficient.

B. There was a lack of manpower for security, and areas that were not covered by the unmanned security system.

C. There was no sufficient measures for anti-fire spread and detection of fire, such as fireproof treatment, automatic fire detection equipment, etc.

D. No method had been established to install Fire fighting systems for cultural properties.

E. A partial destruction was required to fight fire inside, but the decision

was delayed because of concerns about cultural property protection.

F. Insufficient information exchange and cooperative system between department controlling cultural property and fire station.

G. There was a lack of specialized firemen to check and control important national facilities including cultural properties.

2007 KOREAN FIRE DATA

Published in March 2009

Edited by Research & Investigation Team

Published by Korean Fire Protection Association 35-4 Yoido-Dong, Yongdungpo-Ku Seoul 150-885, KOREA

TEL 82-2-3780-0200

FAX 82-2-3780-0329

E-Mail

kfpa@kfpa.or.kr// http://www.kfpa.or.kr

Registered No. 13-794 (1997.8.14)

Printed by ooooo (Tel 82-2-ooo-oooo)

ISBN 978-89-88874-82-0 93530

This is provided under the Agreement of Cooperation between

the KFPA and the NFPA. Please feel free to contact Risk Research & Development Department of KFPA if you have any inquires. (E-Mail kfpa@kfpa.or.kr, Tel 82-2-3780-0200, Fax 82-2-3780-0329)

源文件：08_火灾统计与专题分析/2008/2008_韩国_KFPA_火灾统计年报_화재조사보고서.md
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