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I. Overview of 2008 Korea Fire Experience

分类:08_火灾统计与专题分析 / 2009 年份:2009 大小:33.8 KB 知识库创建:2026-08-05 09:06:07 抓取时间:2026-10-22 09:01:16

8 Source : Fire Statistics Yearbook 2008

by the National Emergency Management Agency of

the Republic of Korea

2008 FIRE REPORT

I. Overview of 2008 Korea Fire Experience

1. Fire Loss Summary

Category20082007Change in numberChange in percentage
No. of Fires49,63147,8821,7493.7
Deaths4684244410.4
Injuries2,2482,03521310.5
Property Loss (¥ million)383,142248,424134,71854.2

※ Note : 1. 1,200 KRW is worth 1 USD(as of Nov 30, 2009) approximately, the same shall apply hereinafter.

  1. The Property loss values in this report are not adjusted for inflation hereinafter.

2. 2008 Fires by Causes

CategoryNo. of Fires(Percentage %)Fire Casualties(Deaths/Injuries)Property Loss(₹ million)
Total49,631100%4682,248383,142
Electrical11,31122.844342107,476
Mechanical3,5547.2910525,272
Gas(explosion)2360.5131422,045
Chemical2540.55361,798
Car accident6471.335484,939
Human error24,04848.5103832114,422
By nature2200.400998
Arson8001.63314813,467
Arson(suspicion)3,4416.96016112,331
Others8191.711375,432
Unknown4,3018.715539794,962

2008 Fires by causes

〔图〕插图

3. 2008 Fires by Property Types

CategoryNo. of Fires(Percentage %)Fire Casualties(Deaths/Injuries)Property Loss(¥ million)
Total49,631100%4682,248383,142
Residential12,28224.722091650,029
Educational5341.13263,192
Stores and Offices2,5405.11416715,089
Complex, public assembly4360.91165,194
Hospital, Care4580.93352,387
Industry5,63011.366313192,873
Logistics3230.70192,740
Cultural asset100.00110,473
Small $business^{1}$5,08610.24429124,770
Other structures2,6275.312827,659
Vehicle, Train6,44913.06618020,850
Explosive facility470.1117203
Ship, Aircraft1270.331041,197
Grass, brush, or forest4,0248.124832,088
Others9,05818.311924,398

$^{1}$ Includes convenience store, grocery shop, hair salon. etc.

2008 Fires by Property Types

〔图〕Cultural asset10Explosive facility47Ship, Aircraft127Logistic323Complex, public assembl436Hospital, Care458Educational53

4. 2008 Fires by Months

No. of FiresDeathsInjuriesProperty Loss (₹ million)
Total49,6314682,248383,142
Jan4,0478818030,500
Feb5,9475119238,051
Mar5,3245226925,581
Apr4,6713217623,854
May4,3051918819,055
Jun3,1762118018,929
Jul3,1743018155,490
Aug3,2512012617,195
Sep3,2874219018,798
Oct3,8223115216,438
Nov4,0983717524,169
Dec4,5294523995,082

Deaths, Injuries, Property loss by month

〔图〕插图

5. 2008 Fires by Major Cities and Provinces

Cities or ProvincesPopulation (thousand)No. of FiresDeathsInjuriesProperty Loss (₹ million)
Total49,54049,6314682,248383,142
Seoul10,2016,7315428626,352
Pusan3,5643,072191264,861
Daegu2,4932,47920806,992
Inchon2,6932,1391710011,241
Daejun1,4811,55010816,072
Gwangju1,4231,7115633,862
Ulsan1,1121,49512614,326
Gyunggi-Do11,29210,920151598196,641
Gangwon-Do1,5082,556178211,501
Chungbuk-Do1,5201,5182011614,597
Chungnam-Do2,0182,899328920,257
Jeonbuk-Do1,8561,9161710911,645
Jeonnam-Do1,9192,4573410311,989
Gyeongbuk-Do2,6743,1442414023,414
Gyeongnam-Do3,2254,3892618026,768
Jeju-Do56165510342,624

6. Catastrophic Fires for the Last 5 Year Period (2004 - 2008)

YearNo. of FiresDeathsInjuriesProperty Loss (₹ million)
20041506
2005567425,078
20062132492
200711371068,317
2008116859136,714
Average6265334,041

Fires in Korea during 2008

49,631 fires were reported in Korea during 2008.

○ up 3.7% from 2007

○ 468 fire deaths

○ 2,248 fire injuries

○ ¥ 383 billion in property damage, up 54.2% from 2007

29,925 fires were reported in Structure.

○ 363 fire deaths

○ 1,866 fire injuries

○ ¥ 315 billion in property damage

6,623 fires were reported in transportation(vehicle, train, ship, aircraft)

○ 70 fire deaths

○ 207 fire injuries

○ ¥ 62 billion in property damage

13,082 outside and other fires were reported in Korea.

○ 35 fire deaths

○ 175 fire injuries

○ ₩6 billion in property damage

II. Fires for the 10-Year Period (1999-2008)

1. Number of Fires for 1999-2008

〔图〕插图

Year1999200020012002200320042005200620072008IR (%)
TF33,85634,84436,16932,96631,37232,73732,34031,77847,88249,6315.2
S28,25328,84630,07827,10225,23526,62026,37025,77341,53343,0085.8
VH5,6035,9986,0915,8646,1376,1175,9706,0056,3496,6232.0

The number of fires for the last 10-year period has shown an average 5.2 % increase rate per year since 1999. In 2008, total 49,631 fires occurred to be up by 46.6 % from 1999. Fires in Structures marked an average 5.8 % increase rate per year, and resulted in a 52.2 % rise from 28,253 fires in 1999 to 43,008 fires in 2008. Vehicle(vehicles, train, ships, aircraft) fires have risen with an average 2.0 % rate per year to mark a 18.2 % increase rate in 2008 compared to 1999.

2. Fire Casualties for 1999-2008

〔图〕插图

○ Trend in fire deaths

○ Trend in fire injuries

  1. Property Loss for 1999-2008

〔图〕插图

○ Trend in property loss

○ Property loss order by places

○ Property loss order by causes

4. Fires by Cause for the 5-Year Period 2004-2008

4-1. Electrical Fires

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-2. Smoking materials

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-3. Arson

〔图〕插图 *: including fires by suspicion of arson

O Fire trend

O Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-4. Gases

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5. Fires by Property Type for the 5-Year Period 2004-2008

5-1. Residential (Houses & apartment)

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-2. Factories $^{1}$

〔图〕插图 $^{1}$ including manufacturing facilities(mining, mechanical, fiber, petrochemical, printing, electrical, pulp, chemical and others)

○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-3. Vehicles

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-4. Restaurants

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-5. Warehouses

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-6. Lodging(hotel, motel, guest house, etc)

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-7. Schools

〔图〕插图

O Fire trend

O Fire casualties

○ Property loss

FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Case Study of

a Fat-Processing Factory Fire

Case Study of a Fat-Processing Factory Fire

Ⅰ. Preface

Act for the Safety Management of Hazardous Materials [Appendix 1] defines certain amount of hazardous materials so that if the amount of raw material or products used in a fat-processing factory exceeds that amount, that factory will be classified as a Factory of Hazardous Materials. In that case the factory is required to meet legal conditions regarding the location of buildings and facilities, their structures and equipments.

This factory was a fat-processing factory that produced stearic acid and oleic acid from suet. And It was classified as a Factory of Hazardous Materials.

Materials used in this factory include suet, soybean oil, and stearic acid which are classified as Class 4 Hazardous Materials (Inflammable Liquid). Generally, Class 4 Hazardous Materials are animal and plant oils with higher flash point. The material involved with the fire in the factory was stearic acid, an ester with glycerol, and a fatty acid included in oil and phosphatide of plants and animals, an abundant natural oil. Stearic acid is used as a PVC sedative, a tire elasticity reinforcer, a grease additive and a textile softener, and has a flash point of 350℃.

The fire allegedly broke out by an overheated electro-motor. The whole processing equipment was completely burned down, resulting in 3.7 billion won in damage. This factory was covered by insurance amounting to 51 billion won in total, allowing adequate compensation to be made.

This report will review the problems that led to the fat-processing factory fire, and introduce appropriate countermeasures.

Ⅱ. The Fire

A. General Information

(1) When: Around 4:50 am on June 12th(Thu),2008

(2) Where: Sihwa Industrial Complex in Jeongwang-dong, Siheung

(3) Cause: Overheated electro-motor

(4) Damage: No death toll, loss of 3 billion won in facilities and 700 million won in property, as a $2,510m^2$-manufacturing building was consumed by fire

B. About the Factory

○ Building Capacity: Total floor area of 10,842㎡, 1 building with 3 floors aboveground, 1 building with 4 floors aboveground, and other attached buildings

○ Products: PVC sedative, minimum, and stearic acid (raw material for tire and soap)

○ Damage to the Building

○ Process Description

〔图〕插图

〔图〕Bead Tower(22m in height, 2min diameter)HeaExchangerIgnitionFat TankPumpLatticed HopperHopper(Motor set up onthe hopper

C. Details of the Fire

The fire origin was the Hopper$^{1}$) on the 2$^{nd}$ floor of the Bead Tower$^{2}$). Ignition time was at about 4:50 am. A worker on the 3$^{rd}$ floor smelled something burning, and went down to the 2$^{nd}$ floor, where he noticed flames around the hopper. He tried to put out the fire but failed, and reported it to the fire station.

The fire is estimated to have originated from a motor in the hopper at the lower end of Bead Tower. It was overheated because of imperfect contact between electrical connections. A spark discharge made dust ignition, then fire expanded to the whole building through its pipeline.

〔图〕< Locations of Factories, and Damaged Buildings>officeOutdoorSoftened-oxde ProductsTankFactoryBio-DieseFactorySoybean Oi As the factory was a Factory of Hazardous Materials, special vehicles such as chemical vehicles that can discharge fire extinguishing agent were brought in immediately and a fire-fighting helicopter were dispatched to discharge water cannons after the fire broke out.

Fire broke out again because continuous leakage of hazardous materials such as suet and stearic acid. The collapsed steel frame made it difficult to discharge the fire water to fire point. Therefore it took a long time to put out the fire since the steel structure had to be disassembled and removed at the same time.

The absorbent, sand, and sawdust were spread out to prevent the leaking harmful material from running into a nearby stream, which was one of the positive activities carried out for environment contamination protection and emergency recovery.

D. Damages in Detail

No one died in this fire, but a manufacturing building of 2,510㎡ was completely burned and collapsed, nearby factories and a suet tank were

heated, and the damage to the property was 3 billion won to factory facilities, and 700 million won to contents.

〔图〕插图

(Fig.1) Fatty Acid Building collapsing and Suet Trailers burning

〔图〕插图

(Fig.2) Bead Tower after collapse (22m in height, 2m in diameter)

〔图〕插图

(Fig.3) Scene of the fire, as seen from the road

Ⅲ. Problems and Countermeasures

A. Fire resistive Structure

The building was a steel frame structue without fire resistive protection, and it was open to outside air on its 4 sides of wall. There was no firestoppings in the openings between floors, therefore the fire could easily propagate through those openings. Finally the building was collapsed by strong heat.

There are no legal requirements on outdoor structures, but a fire resistive protection must be considered at the building design stage, to ensure that the frame can survive a fire.

B. Disassembly of Structure

After the building collapsed, it was impossible for the fire fighting water to reach the fire point, which made the work of the firefighters difficult.

Therfore heavy equipment had to be mobilized instantly to disassemble and remove the collapsed building.

In the case of a fire at a Factory of Hazardous Materials, a plan to operate heavy equipment to disassemble and remove the facilities is necessary, in addition to fire extinguishing devices.

C. Foam Fire Extinguishing Equipments

The worker who noticed the fire tried to put it out early but failed. Flame expanded toward inside of the building. In addition, this building was equipped with automatic foam fire extinguishers, but these were not effective with the drastic expansion of the fire.

In this case automatic foam fire extinguishers might be slower than a speed of fire growth, or might not work properly due to wrong management. Therefore the manager in charge must check the performance of such fire extinguishers on a regular basis.

D. Emergency Countermove

Fire extinguishers are installed at most Manufactures of Hazardous Materials. However it is hard to put out such fires at an early stage since these fires are typically quite severe.

Workers must have the capability to properly cope with sudden fire situations, through education and regular training in fire-fighting.

FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Case Study on

a Logistics Warehouse Fire in Icheon

Case Study on a Logistics Warehouse Fire in Icheon

Ⅰ. Preface

Many large-scale warehouses are located in Icheon, Gyeonggido, which is an important site for inland logistics. Most of these warehouses are built by sandwich-panel structure, to save construction cost. This sandwich panel structure is vulnerable to fire, because its core uses combustible insulating foam to maintain an excellent insulation property.

Many people remember the particularly tragic conflagration that took place on January 7th in 2008, at the freeze stock of Korea Corporation located in Yusan-ri, Hobeob-myeon, Icheon, which resulted in 40 dead, 10 injured, and property loss amounting to 7.15 billion won. In December of 2008, a similar fire took place at another large-scale warehouse in Icheon.

This report reviews the fire vulnerabilities of warehouses that use the sandwich panel structure and examine the countermeasures that can be taken, by studying the fire that took place in December of 2008 in Icheon.

Ⅱ. About the Fire

A. General

(1) When: Around noon on December 5th(Fri), 2008

(2) Where: ○○ Warehouse in Majang-myeon, Icheon, Gyeonggido

(3) Factor: Inflammable sandwich panel caught fire by welding sparks

(4) Casualties: 8 dead, 4 injured

(5) Property Loss: 40,968m2 was completely burned down out of 95,968m2 occupied by 2 buildings, and land on a neighboring mountain was damaged by fire (0.2ha)

B. About the Building

○ Exterior

2 sandwich-paneled buildings, with 2 floors aboveground and 1 floor underground, were set up on an incline, while their front sides have mooring and way on the 1st basement and those on the ground floor, thus there were 2 fire escape floors. The 2 buildings were warehouses, and another warehouse belonging to『Korea 2000』was located at a 30 m

distance.

○ Interior

The basement floor was bisected, with the right side being for cold storage and the left side being a freezer, keeping meat, vegetables and fruits. The 1st and 2nd floor above ground were divided into multiple cold storages and freezers to keep meat fresh, etc.

〔图〕Building ABounday of Land2nd floorBuilding BBasement of1st flooBasementKorea FreezerBasement\n

Lengthwise Section of the Warehouse

C. Details of the Fire

Inflammable core material in the sandwich panel wall caught fire at around noon on the 5th (Fri) due to sparks during hot work for the door of the basement. The worker saw the fire ignited on the sandwich panel, and attempted to suppress it with a fire extinguisher and the standpipe system. This try failed, and a drastic spread in the fire occurred.

When the fire brigades arrived at the scene, flames were rising from the front side of the warehouse, as shown in , which then sharply enlarged to the left and right sides. Poisonous gas prevented the fire brigade from entering, and the fire was hard to be extinguished early because it started underground.

The violent fire reached the neighboring mountain (Dodeuramsan) around 13:15 on 5th, which was put out by 2 helicopters.

On the 6th (Sat), a large crane was used to rip away the panel on the exterior wall, and water was spread out from a ladder vehicle to put out the remaining fire on the floor of the 200m-wide building. As shown in , 9 holes with a diameter of 2~3m were bored on the ground on

the back of the inflamed building, to allow the heat to escape and to prevent it from expanding to the freezer, by inputting water and chemicals. It was not until the 7th (Sun) that the remaining fire was under control.

〔图〕插图

Front side at the early stage of fire-fighting

〔图〕工\n

Smoke ventilation and hose stream after opening the concrete floor on the backyard of the warehouse

〔图〕插图

The front side damaged after the fire

〔图〕-\n

The flank side damaged after the fire

D. Loss

The interior space of the warehouse was divided into many parts. Thus it

delayed cognition of the fire, which led to a death toll due to the emissions of poisonous gas. 104 employees had been working at that time at Logisall Warehouse, 95 of which managed to escape before the fire brigade arrived, leaving 7 dead (including 1 missing) and 5 injured (1 severe, 4 light). The 1 severely injured worker died later, so the death toll of 8 and 4 injured.

Building A was completely burned down by 3-day's fire.

LobbyConferenceroomOfficeLobbyforworkersMachineryRoom(L/Rroom)FreezerformarineproductsFreezerformareproductsFreezerfor meatColdstoragefor foodCold storage formeatWarehouseOfficeFrontroom①②③④④⑥Freezer
LobbyConferenceroomOfficeLobbyforworkersMachineryRoom(L/Rroom)FreezerformarineproductsFreezerformareproductsFreezerfor meatColdstoragefor foodCold storage formeat⑤OfficeFrontroom①②③④④⑥Freezer
LobbyConferenceroomOfficeLobbyforworkersCold storageCold storageCold storageCold storageCold storageCold storage⑦RampFreezer
Room-temperaturewarehouseOfficeCold-temperaturewarehouseRestroom

Diagram of the basement of building A (Numbers indicate the locations of dead bodies)

III. Problems and Countermeasures

A. Problems

(1) Facilities

This building was exempted from compartmentation and fire rated structure. As a result, the exterior wall had no rated structure and the structure had no fire compartment, and inflammable sandwich panels and urethane foam were used for the whole ceiling. There was no sprinkler in the cold storage and freezer, and workers reportedly did not realize the situation despite the presence of automatic fire detection system and emergency public notification system.

(2) Safety Management

The host company was careless in the management of the hot work, and

the workers did it with no fire safe measure.

(3) Fire Fighting

Fire-fighters couldn't enter the site because the front side was covered with poisonous gas and flames emitted by the polyurethane, the core material of the sandwich panel. 610 fire engines and 3,940 fire fighters were not able to put out the fire, and were only able to prevent it from spreading to warehouse B (Korea 2000).

(4) Compensation

The building was loss-insured by 38 billion won, but the insurance claim was hard to settle as it was unclear who was responsible. In addition, the fire insurance did not include death liability, which led to insufficient compensation. Victims were reportedly paid 600 million won each by the company that owned the warehouse.

B. Countermeasures

(1) Facilities

The use of combustible foam as a material for sandwich panels should be banned for new freezer units and warehouses until solutions are made, and usage of incombustible materials must be reviewed.

In addition, the installation of fire alarms at each compartment should be considered as a means to reduce the death toll in the event of an accident, as workers were not able to recognize the fire because they generally closed the door while working.

(2) Safety Management

The hot work plan (clearly stating time and safety measures) should be clearly written, and a fire prevention manager must supervise the field work

(3) Compensation

Warehouses that are larger than a certain amount should be covered with property insurance, by designating them as specific buildings according to 『The Act of Insurance Cover and Compensation for Fire Loss』.

2008 KOREAN FIRE DATA

Published in December 2009

Edited by Research & Investigation Team

Published by Korean Fire Protection Association 35-4 Yoido-Dong, Yongdungpo-Ku Seoul 150-885, KOREA

TEL 82-2-3780-0200

FAX 82-2-3780-0329

E-Mail

kfpa@kfpa.or.kr// http://www.kfpa.or.kr

Registered No. 13-794 (1997.8.14)

Printed by

ISBN 978-89-88874-82-0 93530

This is provided under the Agreement of Cooperation between

the KFPA and the NFPA. Please feel free to contact Risk Research & Development Department of KFPA if you have any inquires. (E-Mail kfpa@kfpa.or.kr, Tel 82-2-3780-0200, Fax 82-2-3780-0329)

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