港澳台_香港大埔宏福苑-特别重大火灾事故调查报告(梁炳基结案陈词)

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Independent Committee in relation to the fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po

Written Closing Address of Mr Leung Ping Kay

[A/1/ §2]

= Bundle A/Page 1/Paragraph 2

[T(C)/D1/2/3] = Chinese Transcript / Day 1 / Page 2 / Line 3

A. Introduction

At the outset, Mr. Leung wishes to express his deepest condolences to the

families of those who lost their lives, and his deepest sympathy to all those

who suffered injury, loss and distress as a result of this tragic incident.

Of his own volition, Mr. Leung has been willing throughout to assist the

Independent Committee (“Committee”) in its search for the truth. It is for that

reason that he testified personally before the Committee, and has provided all

relevant documents and information within his possession.

By this written closing submission, Mr. Leung seeks to clarify certain matters

arising from the live and documentary evidence, as well as to make some

observations to hopefully assist the Committee in its fact-finding exercise.

B. Overview

This Committee was established by the Chief Executive to inquire into the

matters set out in its Terms of Reference [A1/1-4], including the causes and

circumstances of the fire at Wang Fuk Court on 26 November 2025 (the

“Fire”), the reasons for its rapid spread, the resulting casualties and property

damage, and to make recommendations arising therefrom. Issues concerning

the legal liabilities of any person fall outside the Committee’s remit.

Mr. Leung participated in this inquiry in his personal capacity as an involved

party. Although he is one of the directors of China Status Development and

Engineering Company Limited (“China Status”), he does not represent China

Status in these proceedings, nor does he purport to represent any other person

who has not participated in this inquiry.

To assist the Committee’s inquiry, Mr. Leung provided three witness

statements:

(a) 1st Witness Statement dated 2 March 2026 [WS2/1509-1517]

(“First Statement”);

(b) 2nd Witness Statement dated 2 April 2026 [WS7/1875-1890]

(“Second Statement”); and

(“Third Statement”).

He also attended the evidential hearing and gave oral evidence before the

Committee on 8 April 2026 [T(C)/D9].

Various experts have provided statements, reports and oral evidence to assist

the Committee. Among them, the following are relevant to the issues relating

to Mr. Leung. In particular:

(a) The Inter-Departmental Fire Investigation Task Force’s (“IFITF”) Expert Report (“IFITF’s Report”) published in May 2026 [ER1]; and

(b) the Expert Report dated 15 June 2026 (“IC’s Report”) by Prof. Asif Sohail Usmani and Prof. Jiang Liming (collectively the “IC Experts”), who were appointed by the Committee as experts [ER3]; and

C. Issues relating to Mr. Leung

As reflected in the Committee’s oral opening [T(C)/D2/13-14], the issues

relating to Mr. Leung may be summarised as follows:

(a) Whether China Status assumed any supervisory role in relation to the relevant fire service works, or merely assisted in the submission of the relevant documents to the Fire Services Department (“FSD”) (“Issue (a)”);

(b) Whether, under the applicable statutory and regulatory regime, the shutdown of the relevant fire service installations could properly be effected by a person other than the Registered Fire Service Installation Contractor (“RFSIC”) responsible for the shutdown applications (“Issue (b)”); and

(c) Whether China Status properly assessed the necessity for each application to extend the shutdown of the relevant fire service installations, particularly where the shutdown continued for a prolonged period (“Issue (c)”).

During Mr. Leung’s oral testimony, Counsel for the Committee further

questioned Mr. Leung regarding his responsibility for the failure of the fire

alarm system on the day of the incident [T(C)/D9/97]. Accordingly, these

submissions also address:

(d) The role of the fire alarm system in the Fire (“Issue (d)”).

By this written closing submission, Mr. Leung wishes to set out his

observations on the above four issues, with a view to assisting the

Committee’s fact-finding exercise.

D. Mr. Leung’s Case

Mr. Leung’s evidence is straightforward. He accepts that neither he nor, to his

knowledge, any employee of China Status attended Wang Fuk Court to inspect

the relevant fire service installations before the relevant SDN (“Shut Down

Notice”) applications were submitted [WS2/1517/48]. However, that was not

because he intended to circumvent, or assist any other person to circumvent,

the applicable legal requirements.

Mr. Leung’s evidence is that he acted throughout in the honest belief that

Prestige Construction & Engineering Co. Limited (宏業建築工程有限公司)

(“PC&E”) was itself an RFSIC and that the necessary site inspections would

be carried out by PC&E or those acting on its behalf before China Status

submitted the relevant SDN applications [WS7/1884-1885/§§53-55].

E. Factual Background

Before addressing the four issues identified in Section C above, it would be

beneficial to first consider the relevant factual background. In particular, it is

necessary to understand the relationship between Mr. Leung and China Status,

and between China Status and PC&E, in order to place the relevant events in

their proper context.

Mr. Leung joined China Status in or around September 2014. China Status is

an RFSIC registered under both Class 1 and Class 2 [WS7/1876/§7]. Mr.

Leung is one of its directors and his duties include responsibility for the

company’s administrative matters, including the preparation and submission

of tenders and quotations, planning works under the Fire Safety (Buildings)

Ordinance (Cap. 572), applying for SDNs, liaising with government

departments and attending site inspections for quotation purposes

[WS7/1877/§§11-12]. He is also an authorised signatory of China Status

[WS7/1878/§13].

Mr. Leung first became acquainted with PC&E whilst employed by his

previous employer, Marvel Fire Engineering Co. Ltd., in the course of a largescale project where PC&E was responsible for the building works and Marvel

Fire Engineering Co. Ltd. was responsible for the fire service installations

[WS7/1881/§33]. From around 2017 onwards, Mr. Leung continued to have

regular dealings with Gordon Ho, director of PC&E, in connection with

projects requiring fire service installation works [WS7/1881/§§34-35]. Over

the years, Mr. Leung and PC&E had established a good working relationship.

On a number of occasions, Mr. Leung attended tender interviews together with

Gordon Ho. During those meetings, Mr. Leung understood PC&E to be

undertaking projects involving fire service installation works, and Gordon

always represented “Prestige” (“宏業”) as an RFSIC [WS7/1882/§39].

In relation to the project at Wang Fuk Court, China Status’s involvement

included the provision of additional fire extinguishers [WS2/1509/§4] and the

submission of the relevant SDN applications in connection with the repair of

the fire service water tanks [WS7/1883/§§43-46]. China Status, in its line of

business, did not itself carry out the concrete water tank repair works.

F. Analysis: Issues (a) - (c)

The first three issues identified in Section C overlap substantially and may

conveniently be considered together. In substance, they give rise to two

principal questions.

First, what was the legal and practical position concerning the division of

responsibilities in relation to fire service installation works?

Secondly, what was China Status’s supervisory role, based on Mr. Leung’s

knowledge, at the Wang Fuk Court project?

F1. Division of Responsibilities in Fire Service Installation Works

At the outset, it is important to clarify Mr. Leung’s position. Mr. Leung has

never suggested that fire service installation works may be carried out without

the involvement of an RFSIC. His evidence is that such works must either be

carried out or supervised by an RFSIC [WS2/1515/§36; T(C)/D9/94/17-23].

He does not suggest that an RFSIC who signs and submits the relevant

documents thereby becomes completely immune from liability merely

because part of the works was carried out by another RFSIC

[T(C)/D9/94/3-6].

During his oral evidence, when asked by the Chairman whether China Status,

as the RFSIC which submitted the SDN, would remain responsible if

something went wrong, notwithstanding that PC&E had been at fault in

turning off the main power switch, Mr. Leung answered in the affirmative

[T(C)/D9/90/30-36].

Mr. Leung’s stance is that the applicable legal framework permits one RFSIC

to arrange for another RFSIC to undertake part of the relevant fire service

installation works on its behalf.

That position is expressly reflected in Regulation 6A(3) of the Fire Service

(Installation Contractors) Regulations (Cap. 95A) [B2/153-154], which

provides:

“6A. Illness or absence from Hong Kong

…

(3) Nothing in paragraph (2) shall prohibit any work being undertaken on behalf of a registered contractor registered in class 1 or 2 by another registered contractor registered in the same class.”

Regulation 6A(3) therefore contemplates situations where work is undertaken

on behalf of one RFSIC by another RFSIC. R.6A(3) is not relied upon for the

illness-or-absence situation in paragraph (2). Its significance lies in what it

presupposes: the legislature would not have expressly provided that such

delegation is not prohibited unless it were already an accepted and common

practice. It follows that the FSD would have appreciated that the RFSIC

signing an FS251 or SDN may not necessarily be the same entity carrying out

every aspect of the physical works.

Reference was made during Mr. Leung’s oral evidence to FSD Circular Letter

No. 1/2021 [B2/1302-1311] (“Circular Letter”) [T(C)/D9/56-61]. However,

it is submitted that, at most, the Circular Letter provides that the RFSIC which

has inspected the relevant fire service installations is the most appropriate

party to notify the FSD. It does not purport to address the situation where

more than one RFSIC is involved in the same project or where part of the

relevant works is undertaken by another RFSIC, such as the situation

contemplated in R.6A(3). Accordingly, the Circular Letter does not detract

from the statutory framework discussed above.

The same understanding is also reflected in the evidence of Mr. Keung of the

FSD:

「關有禮大律師：所以你同唔同意其實消防處其實都認同即係個維修個水缸，其實就個註冊承辦商未必真係要親自嚟做嗰個維修，不過要監住嗰個維修工程？

姜世明先生：因為承辦商係公司，所以公司佢都係要有佢嘅認可人士，佢要做好個監督嘅責任，一般要監督好自己嘅員工去做呢啲嘢，唔該。

關有禮大律師：咁未必係自己嘅員工，即係可能係另外一個承辦商，不過佢要監督住？

姜世明先生：同意，係。」（粗體後加，以資強調）

[T(C)/D10/87/25-30]

On this basis, it is submitted that the FSD accepts in practice that the RFSIC

submitting an FS251 and SDN may not necessarily be the same entity

carrying out the physical repair works. The mere fact that China Status did not

itself carry out the repair works is therefore not inconsistent with the

applicable legal framework and practice.

F2. China Status and its Supervisory Role

It is submitted that the question of whether China Status assumed any

supervisory role has to be considered against the circumstances of the present

case. The nature and extent of supervision required necessarily varies

depending on various factors such as the nature and complexity of the works,

the experience and expertise of the person undertaking them, and the

relationship between the parties. As such, supervisory role assumed by China

Status in the Wang Fuk Court project should be assessed by reference to the

circumstances known to Mr. Leung at the material time.

The level of supervision required in the present case

In the present case, several features are material in determining the level of

supervision required.

First, at the material time, Mr. Leung genuinely believed that PC&E was itself

an RFSIC, although that belief turned out to be mistaken. Mr. Leung explained

the basis for such a belief in his Second Statement [WS7/1882/§39]:

(a) First, Gordon Ho had consistently represented to him that “Prestige” was an RFSIC;

(b) Secondly, during tender interviews attended by Mr. Leung together with Gordon, “Prestige” was introduced as an RFSIC and documents used during those interviews likewise described “Prestige” as an RFSIC; and

(c) Thirdly, Mr. Leung recalled checking the List of Registered Fire Service Installation Contractors and believed that “Prestige” appeared on that list. (Although, during the preparation of the Second Statement, he noted that PC&E did not in fact appear on the list, another company with a highly similar name did [WS7/1882/§40].)

During Mr. Leung’s oral evidence, both Counsel for the Committee and ISS

East Point Properties Ltd. challenged Mr. Leung’s assertion that he genuinely

believed PC&E to be an RFSIC. Notwithstanding that questioning, Mr.

Leung’s evidence remained consistent and unshaken [Exchange with

Counsel for the Committee: T(C)/D9/88/25-33 & T(C)/D9/90/9-11, 26-29]

[Exchange with Counsel for ISS East Point Properties Ltd.:

T(C)/D9/100/13-25]. He maintained that he had checked the relevant list and

genuinely believed that PC&E was an RFSIC [T(C)/D9/89/21-34].

Second, it should also be emphasised that, prior to the Wang Fuk Court project,

the two companies had cooperated on a number of previous projects over

several years, including projects at Mayland Court in Causeway Bay and

Chung Sing Building in Tai Kok Tsui [WS7/1882-1883/§§41-42]. Those

projects proceeded without issue. China Status and PC&E had established a

good working relationship. It is submitted that this provided a good foundation,

albeit mistaken, for Mr. Leung to proceed on the basis that the representations

made by PC&E could be relied upon.

It is also submitted that, in those circumstances, the degree of supervision

required from China Status was different from a case where the underlying

works were carried out by an unfamiliar contractor or a non-RFSIC.

The supervisory role of China Status

Mr. Leung readily accepted that, regarding the Wang Fuk Court project, he did

not attend the site to inspect the fire service water tanks before the relevant

SDN applications were submitted [WS2/1517/§48; T(C)/D9/63-64]. His

evidence is that he proceeded in that manner because he genuinely, albeit

mistakenly, believed that PC&E was itself an RFSIC. Mr. Leung was also

explicitly told by Mr. Cheung, the foreman of PC&E, that the physical

shutdown would be arranged, and that China Status’s personnel would not be

permitted to attend the premises [WS2/1515/§37].

Upon that understanding, together with the parties’ previous course of

dealings, Mr. Leung proceeded on the assumption that the necessary site

inspection and arrangements for the shutdown of the relevant fire service

installations would be undertaken or supervised by an RFSIC.

It is nonetheless submitted that the question of whether China Status assumed

a supervisory role should be assessed with regard to the steps taken by Mr.

Leung and the circumstances known to him at the material time.

As stated in his Second Statement, before each renewal application, Mr. Leung

contacted Mr. Cheung to enquire about the progress of the repair works and

requested that he be notified immediately once the works had been completed

[WS7/1885/§§60-61]. According to the telephone records, between midMarch 2025 and November 2025, Mr. Leung made 85 telephone calls to Mr.

Cheung [WS21/2360-2361/§§9-10]. Despite his numerous and repeated

enquiries regarding the progress of the repair works, Mr. Leung was never

informed by PC&E that the works had been completed [WS7/1888/§74].

It is accepted that some of the SDNs remained in force for several months.

However, that fact alone gave Mr. Leung no reason to suspect that the

information provided by PC&E was inaccurate. Mr. Keung of FSD accepted

that it is not unusual for repair works to fire service water tanks to take several

months to complete [T(C)/D10/69/5-8]. It is submitted that there was nothing

inherently unusual, from Mr. Leung’s perspective, in being informed that the

repair works were still ongoing.

The witness statements of the workers of Red Sun Construct (Asia)

Engineering Limited and Tin Hung Engineering Co. show that the repair

works to the fire service water tanks in various blocks were completed

between September and November 2025 [C1-2/1191/§8; C1-2/1179/§6].

However, Mr. Leung’s evidence, which has not been contradicted, is that

PC&E never informed him that those works had been completed,

notwithstanding his repeated requests that he be notified immediately upon

completion [WS7/1885/§61]. Likewise, Mr. Leung was never informed that

certain repaired fire service water tanks had been converted for temporary

fresh water use [WS7/1887/§72].

It should also be added that Counsel for the Committee suggested that it was

implausible for PC&E, having secured a renovation project worth HK$300

million, to lack the manpower to deal with the SDN renewal paperwork every

14 days. Mr. Leung, however, was unequivocal that this was the explanation

given to him by PC&E, and he had no reason at the time to disbelieve it

[T(C)/D9/90/18-20].

In those circumstances, and having regard to the previous course of dealings

and the good working relationship between China Status and PC&E, Mr.

Leung had no reason to suspect that PC&E was withholding material

information. PC&E likewise had no apparent commercial reason to prolong

the SDNs unnecessarily, at least from Mr. Leung’s perspective.

The Quotation and the Fixed Fee

During the evidential hearing, attention was given to the quotation issued by

China Status, which referred to an anticipated duration of “1 year”. Mr. Leung

explained in both his Second Statement [WS7/1884/§49] and oral evidence

[T(C)/D9/76/5-14] that this referred only to his general understanding of the

anticipated duration of the Wang Fuk Court project as a whole, not that any

individual SDN would remain valid for one year. That explanation is

consistent with the SDN applications, which were submitted between April

and September 2025 for different buildings at different times [WS2/1511/§16].

Mr. Leung was challenged regarding his evidence that China Status charged a

fixed fee for the project regardless of the number of renewal applications

required [T(C)/D9/75/16-32]. It is respectfully submitted that fixed-fee

quotations are not uncommon in commercial practice. Whether such an

arrangement ultimately proves to be commercially advantageous or

disadvantageous depends upon how the project unfolds, and that commercial

risk is borne by China Status. The mere fact that China Status agreed to charge

a fixed fee does not render Mr. Leung’s evidence improbable, nor does it

suggest any improper motive for the renewal of the SDNs.

G. Matters arising from Mr. Leung’s Oral Evidence

Before turning to Issue (d), it is convenient to first clarify two matters arising

from Mr. Leung’s oral evidence: namely, the “rubber stamp” allegation, and

alleged inconsistency between Mr. Leung’s First and Second Statements.

G1. The “Rubber Stamp” Allegation

During his oral evidence, Mr. Leung accepted Counsel for the Committee’s

suggestion that China Status acted as a “rubber stamp” - it submitted the SDNs

and the subsequent renewal applications as requested by PC&E. However, Mr.

Leung’s acceptance must be understood in its proper context.

The relevant exchange is as follows:

「杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。所以個情況就係咁嘞，宏業叫你哋交 SDN，你哋就交，係咪？

梁秉基先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你哋冇諗過要做任何嘢，佢哋叫你做，你哋

就做，同唔同意？

梁秉基先生：同意，但係可唔可以講？

杜淦堃資深大律師：我知道你有解釋，你嘅解釋喺你第二份證人供詞裏面講咗。我一陣間會慢慢同你探討你嘅解釋。

梁秉基先生：Okay。

杜淦堃資深大律師：但係就頭先嘅講法，即係事實上嚟講你係同意嘅，係咪？

梁秉基先生：係，冇落過去嘅。

杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，只不過你係有解釋點解你咁去做，咁講公唔公道？

梁秉基先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。咁你同唔同意呀？所以其實中華發展一開始交 SDN 畀消防處去關閉有關嘅系統，到之後每一次嘅延期，其實你哋都係好似一個橡皮圖章咁，人哋叫你做你就做，同意嘛？

梁秉基先生：係。」（粗體後加，以資強調）[T(C)/D9/64/4-18]

Immediately before putting the “rubber stamp” proposition to Mr. Leung,

Counsel for the Committee invited Mr. Leung to answer the question on the

footing that his explanation was to be left out of account. It was only in that

context that Mr. Leung accepted that, viewed purely as a description of the

sequence of events and without regard to his explanation, the expression

“rubber stamp” objectively described China Status’s conduct.

The Committee is respectfully invited not to read Mr. Leung’s answer in

isolation or as an acceptance that China Status acted without any basis.

G2. The Alleged Inconsistency between the First and Second Witness Statements

During his oral evidence, Counsel for the Committee suggested that Mr.

Leung’s First and Second Statements were inconsistent [T(C)/D9/93/13-22].

In particular, it was suggested that, in the First Statement, Mr. Leung

considered it proper to assist PC&E because PC&E had already engaged

another RFSIC [WS2/1512-1513/§22], whereas in the Second Statement, he

explained that he proceeded on the basis that he believed PC&E was itself an

RFSIC [WS7/1882/§39].

It is submitted that this allegation arises from a misreading of the First

Statement and, in particular, the question to which Mr. Leung was responding.

In the First Statement, Mr. Leung was asked by the Committee’s solicitors,

Messrs. Lo & Lo, inter alia, why China Status had been engaged during the

Wang Fuk Court renovation when another RFSIC, namely Victory Fire

Engineering Limited (“Victory Fire”), had already been engaged:

“4. Please explain why it was necessary to engage China Status as a separate FSI Contractor during the Wang Fuk Court Renovation when another FSI contractor (which we understand to be Victory Fire Engineering Limited [“Victory Fire”]) had already been engaged to carry out annual inspection of fire installations and equipment in Wang Fuk Court.” (emphasis added)[WS2/1502/§4]

In response, Mr. Leung answered in his First Statement:

“Question 4

When I was initially approached by PC&E, I presumed PC&E would have already engaged another FSI contractor for the Wang Fuk Court Renovation, no explanation was provided by PC&E as to why China Status had to be engaged to make these FSD applications. However, I did not give much thought as to why services from a second FSI

contractor (such as China Status) would be required, nor did I speculate on this.” [WS2/1512-1513/§22]

Mr. Leung’s answer was directed solely to explaining why PC&E had engaged

China Status notwithstanding the involvement of another RFSIC. There could

have been numerous commercial explanations, for example, PC&E might

have wanted to engage different RFSICs for different aspects of the project.

The point, however, is that Mr. Leung simply did not know the reason and did

not purport to speculate. More importantly, his answer did not purport to

explain why he considered it proper for China Status to assist PC&E with

the SDN applications. That issue was addressed in the Second Statement

[WS7/1883/§44].

Properly understood, the two Statements address different questions and are

entirely consistent with one another.

H. Issue (d): The role of the fire alarm system in the present incident

Mr. Leung accepts that, had the fire alarm system been operational at the

material time, it is possible that the number of casualties might have been

reduced [T(C)/D9/97/21-22]. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the role of the

fire alarm system should be assessed together with the other factors specific

to this particular incident.

Both the IFITF and the IC Experts identified a number of critical factors

contributing to the high number of casualties. While the failure of the fire

alarm system was one such factor [ER1/203/§10.1.1; ER3/2247/§6.6.1], it is

submitted that the practical effectiveness of a fire alarm system might have

been diminished by the rapid loss of the available means of evacuation and

the residents’ impaired ability to appreciate the seriousness of the Fire.

H1. The rapidly compromised means of evacuation

It is submitted that the practical effectiveness of the fire alarm system in Wang

Cheong House might have been significantly constrained by the rapid and

swift deterioration of the means of evacuation. In reality, the evacuation

window might have been much shorter than the theoretical evacuation window

of no more than 10 minutes identified by the IFITF [ER1/215/§10.4.4].

A security guard attempted to activate the manual fire alarm at 1448 hours,

approximately three minutes before the Fire was officially reported to the FSD

at 1451 hours, but the attempt was unsuccessful [ER1/215/§10.4.3; ER2-

1/578/§2].

Mr. Yiu Men-yeung, leader of the IFITF, opined that since the fire engulfed

the entire east re-entrant at 1458 hours, the staircase of Wang Cheong House

also became untenable at that moment [WS6/1844/§20]. Echoing this opinion,

the IFITF concluded that, had the fire alarm system been operational, residents

might have received a warning during the key escape window of no more than

10 minutes between 1448 hours and 1458 hours:

“Had the FAS been operational, Ms. CHUNG’s activation attempt at 1448 hours could have provided residents with a critical evacuation alert during the key escape window between 1448 hours and 1458 hours, when escape routes were still tenable…” [ER1/215/§10.4.4]

The IC Experts reached a similar conclusion but considered that the staircase

had in fact become unsafe earlier. They referred to evidence that the staircase

on the 14th floor of Wang Cheong House was already filled with thick black

smoke between 1456 and 1457 hours [ER2-1/708/§4] and concluded that at

1456 hours, the staircase had ceased to function as a place of safety

[ER3/2234/§4.4.14].

It is submitted that, in reality, residents may have had considerably less time

to evacuate safely than the theoretical evacuation window of no more than

10 minutes identified by the IFITF, for the following reasons:

(a) Given that the fire originated on the flat roof outside Flats 104 and 105 and spread upwards [ER1/14/§1.3.1; ER3/2167/§3.2.2], it follows that the staircase below the 14th floor would likely have been affected by smoke before 1456 hours;

(b) This is further supported by Professor Yuen’s observation, accepted by the IC Experts, that fire and smoke could infiltrate the staircase through gaps and openings in the movable boards even before those boards were completely burned through [ER2-2/1191/§2.6.7; ER3/2247/§6.5.3]; and

(c) Once smoke had entered the staircase, residents would effectively have no safe means of evacuation, as they should not evacuate through a smoke-filled staircase and should not use lifts during a fire [T(C)/D26/44/3-17].

H2. The effect of the polystyrene window coverings

The effectiveness of a fire alarm system also depends upon residents being

able to assess the situation after hearing the alarm and decide whether

evacuation is appropriate. It is submitted that, in the present case, that ability

was materially impaired by the polystyrene window coverings.

It is neither realistic to assume nor advisable that residents should immediately

evacuate solely upon hearing a fire alarm. As Mr. Yiu explained in his oral

evidence, evacuation is not invariably the safest course of action. Depending

upon the circumstances, remaining inside one’s own unit may be the safer

option [T(C)/D26/44/11-12].

A resident hearing a fire alarm would naturally seek to assess the situation by

reference to visible smoke or flames, the smell of burning, shouting, or other

indications of fire. However, the polystyrene window coverings substantially

obstructed residents’ ability to observe the Fire. The IFITF’s survey findings

likewise indicate that only an extremely small proportion of residents became

aware of the fire through actually seeing the Fire:

“Among the 291 witness statements, only 43 individuals (14.7%) reported seeing fire or smoke. Similarly, among the 579 questionnaires, only 48 respondents (8.3%) indicated that they had witnessed the fire…” [ER1/218/10.5.3]

In those circumstances, even if the fire alarm system had functioned, residents

might still have been unable to make a timely and informed decision as to

whether evacuation was necessary or whether the available evacuation route

remained safe.

Accordingly, whilst the failure of the fire alarm system undoubtedly formed

part of the overall circumstances leading to this tragedy, its practical

effectiveness might have been significantly curtailed by the rapidly

deteriorating conditions within the staircases and the inability of many

residents to appreciate the seriousness of the Fire. It follows that the failure of

the fire alarm system should be considered together with those other critical

factors, rather than in isolation.

H3. The integrity of the fire alarm system

Finally, it is submitted, when considering the role of the fire alarm system in

the Fire, one should not too readily assume that the fire alarm system would

have been operational during the Fire if the main switch (“刀掣”) had

remained on.

Regarding Wang Chi House, which was only minimally affected by the Fire

and in respect of which Mr. Keung opined that the fire alarm system should

have remained intact and undamaged, the fire alarm system nevertheless could

not be actuated during the post-fire investigation and was only restored to

operation after replacement of the fuses [WS1/140-141/§10.11; ER2-4/1811].

Mr. Keung accepted that he could not exclude the possibility that, even if the

main switch of Wang Chi House had remained on during the Fire, the fire

alarm system might still not have operated [T(C)/D10/80/27-30].

A similar observation could be made in respect of Wang Tao House, which

was likewise “not affected or significantly affected” by the Fire

[WS4/1800/§4.3]. There was evidence suggesting that the main switch had

been restored during the Fire, yet the fire alarm system still could not be

activated [ER2-4/1769/§7].

As regards Wang Kin House and Wang Shing House, which were more

seriously affected by the Fire and whose fire alarm systems likewise could not

be actuated during the post-fire investigation, similar observations may

nevertheless be made. Although it is accepted that the Fire may have damaged

the relevant circuitry, the post-fire investigation does not eliminate the

possibility that the fire alarm systems were already not fully functional before

the Fire.

It is further noted that, according to the post-fire investigation, the control

fuses of the fire alarm systems in all buildings, with the exception of Wang

Cheong House, were found to have blown [ER2-4/1816]. Mr. Keung testified

that where the fuse is blown, a fire alarm cannot be activated whether the main

switch is in the “ON” or “OFF” position [T(C)/D10/80/17-20].

It is accepted that the Fire may have caused those control fuses to blow.

However, that is not the only possible explanation. Significantly, Wang

Cheong House, despite sustaining the most severe fire damage, was the only

building whose control fuse remained intact after the Fire. In those

circumstances, the post-fire investigation does not permit a firm conclusion

that the blown fuses in the other buildings were necessarily caused by the Fire.

The above is not intended to suggest that the fire alarm system would

necessarily have failed, regardless of the position of the main switch. It simply

demonstrates that one should not too readily assume that, had the main switch remained on during the Fire, the fire alarm system would necessarily have operated. Caution should therefore be exercised before concluding that the position of the main switch was the sole factor determining whether the fire alarm system would have been functional during the Fire.

I. Conclusion

Finally, Mr. Leung reiterates his sincere sympathy to all those affected by the

Fire. He respectfully hopes that the above observations will assist the

Committee in its fact-finding exercise and in reaching a full, balanced and

informed understanding of the matters relating to him.

Dated this 6th day of July 2026.

Jonathan Kwan

Aaron Chan

Counsel for Leung Ping Kay

源文件：06_境外及港澳台调查报告/2025/港澳台/2025_港澳台_香港大埔宏福苑-特别重大火灾事故调查报告(梁炳基结案陈词).md