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韩国_KFPA_火灾统计年报_화재조사보고서

分类:08_火灾统计与专题分析 / 2007 年份:2007 大小:56.4 KB 知识库创建:2026-08-05 09:06:16 抓取时间:2026-10-22 09:01:09

8

2007

KOREAN FIRE DATA

This is provided under the Agreement of Cooperation between the Korean Fire Protection Association and the National Fire Protection Association

  1. 3

〔图〕FOREWORD\n We are pleased to issue the revised edition of an English booklet entitled "Korean Fire Data" which offers an outline of Korean fire statistics during the year 2006.

The first edition was published in 1997 in accordance with the "The agreement of Cooperation between the NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) and the KFPA (Korean Fire Protection Association)." It was probably the first Korean fire related statistics in English which paved the way for disseminating of information throughout the world including USA. Since then, the revised editions have been issued annually.

Take a look at the Korean fire data in the year 2006.

Thirty one thousand and seven hundred and seventy eight (31,778) fires were attended by the public fire services, a decrease of 1.7% from the previous year. The death fell by 11.7% from 505 in 2005 to 446 in 2006 and injuries fell by 5.6% from 1,837 in 2005 to 1,734 in 2006. Property loss has accounted for 150.79 billion Won (approximately US $141 million) in 2006, 12.0% decreased from 171.37 billion Won (approximately US $160 million) in 2005.

With regard to the property loss in 2006, it still showed decrease rate of 12.0%, but average 3.8% increase per annum for the past ten year period. In addition, the rate of fire occurrence in Korea has increased by an average of 1.2% per annum for the past ten years.

National Emergency Management Agency of the Republic of Korea(NEMA) had gone through a profound renewal of 「Korea National Fire Incident Classification System」 which is a basis for the nationwide fire incident statistics in 2006. NEMA has put this renewal into effect from January 2007. Also, NEMA has launched a project to build 「National Fire Information System(NFIS)」 which will enable national fire statistics to be wide open to public application. Therefore forthcoming '2008 KOREAN FIRE DATA' will have many changes in its framework and contents following newly revised 「National Fire Incident Classification System」.

We hope this booklet serves not only to deliver the current Korean fire data but to reduce the worldwide fire disaster.

CONTENTS

$\blacksquare$ 2006 Fire Report $\ldots$ 1

  1. Summary of Fire Incidents in 2006 $\ldots$ 3

II. Fires for the 10-Year Period (1997-2006) $\ldots$ 7

☐Fire Investigation Reports $\ldots$ 27

O Fire at Yeosu Immigration Office $\ldots$ 29

O Explosion and Fire at the Cosmetics Case Manufacturing Plant $\ldots$ 39

O Explosion and Fire at the Car Scratch Removal Compound Factory $\ldots$ 49

2006 FIRE REPORT

SOURCE : 'Fire Statistics Yearbook 2006'

by the National Emergency Management Agency of the Republic of Korea

I. Summary of Fire Incidents in 2006

1. Fire Loss Summary

Category20062005Rise & FallIncrease Rate(%)
No. of Fires31,77832,340-562-1.7
Deaths446505-59-11.7
Injuries1,7341,837-103-5.6
Property Loss (¥ million)150,792171,374-20,582-12.0

※ Note : 1 KRW is worth 938.20 USD(as of Dec 31, 2007), the same shall apply herein after.

2. 2006 Fires by Causes

CategoryNo. of Fires(Percentage %)Fire Casualties(Deaths/Injuries)Property Loss(₩ million)
Total31,778446/1,734150,792
Electrical9,392 (29.6)43/31641,794
Smoking3,311 (10.4)17/724,707
Arson3,413 (10.7)139/31311,629
Emer2,416 (7.6)9/1149,111
Children Playing1,165 (3.7)0/301,323
Gas535 (1.7)7/1181,521
Fireplace645 (2.0)6/231,323
Stove301 (0.9)6/161,997
Oil291 (0.9)5/791,685
Matches · Candles295 (0.9)8/31708
Others10,014 (31.5)206/62274,811

3. 2006 Fires by Property Types

CategoryNo. of Fires(Percentage %)Fire Casualties(Deaths/Injuries)Property Loss(₹ million)
Total31,778446/1,734150,792
Residential8,234 (25.9)285/78125,530
Vehicle5,929 (18.7)46/12412,616
Factory3,261 (10.3)13/17948,272
Restaurant1,960 (6.2)15/1267,012
Shop1,685 (5.3)12/789,343
Warehouse801 (2.5)6/328,579
Workplace470 (1.5)2/302,830
Hotel · Motel278 (0.9)13/76713
School273 (0.9)0/11498
Ship74 (0.2)2/8530
Market34 (0.1)0/21,492
Others8,779 (27.6)52/28733,377

4. 2006 Fires by Months

MonthsNo. of FiresDeathsInjuriesProperty Loss (₹ million)
Total31,7784461,734150,792
Jan3,3577417717,627
Feb2,8265413114,387
Mar3,4383317015,139
Apr2,6584318712,072
May2,3943513911,256
Jun2,1763113010,373
Jul1,969331358,131
Aug2,323201149,836
Sep2,2412513410,090
Oct2,5372814711,518
Nov2,6382911814,418
Dec3,2214115215,945

5. 2006 Fires by Major Cities and Provinces

Cities & ProvincesNo. of FiresDeathsInjuriesProperty Loss (¥ million)
Total31,7784461,734150,792
Seoul4,907562759,023
Pusan1,757321213,965
Daegu97320772,626
Inchon1,61224835,703
Gwangju79210472,438
Daejun88020492,627
Ulsan9717632,349
Gyunggi-Do7,6819440254,407
Gangwon-Do1,534251047,800
Chungbuk-Do1,226179011,973
Chungnam-Do1,35723659,248
Jeonbuk-Do1,50818746,693
Jeonnam-Do1,39333606,844
Gyeongbuk-Do1,90936889,372
Gyeongnam-Do2,7072411213,461
Jeju-Do5717242,263

Thirty one thousand and seven hundred and seventy eight (31,778) fires were attended by public fire services, a decrease of 1.7% from the year before.

Death toll fell by 11.7% from 505 in 2005 to 446 in 2006 and injuries fell by 5.6% from 1,837 in 2005 to 1,734 in 2006.

Property loss accounts for ¥150.79 billion in 2006, 12.0 % decreased from ¥171.37 billion in 2005.

The leading causes of 2006 fires were electrical distribution involved, arson, smoking, ember and children playing etc. and they account for 62.0 % of the total fires in 2006. Electrical fires involved ranked first, occupied about 29.6 % of all fires in 2006.

Twenty-five point nine percent (25.9%, 8,234) of the total 31,778 fires occurred in homes, including houses and apartments ranked first, vehicles fires ranked second or 18.7 % (5,929), factory fires ranked third or 10.3 % (3,261).

6. Catastrophic Fires for the Last 5 Year Period (2002 - 2006)

YearNo. of FiresDeathsInjuriesProperty Loss (₹ million)
200254415115
20031023020215,163
20041506
2005567425,078
20062132492
increase rate(%)66.793.886,132.0

Catastrophic fires for the last 5 years marked an average 66.7% increase rate per year. But the 2 catastrophic fires in 2006 represented a 60.0% decrease from 2005.

The 13 fire deaths in 2006 showed an decrease of 70.5% from 2002, but a increase of 116.7% from 2005, with a 93.8% increase per year for the last 5 year.

The 24 fire injuries in 2006 showed a 60.0% increase from 2002

In 2006, property loss caused by fires amounted to ¥92 million, which marked a decrease of 20.0 % and 99.6 % respectively from 2002 and 2005, with a 86,132.8 % increase per year for the last 5 year.

II. Fires for the 10-Year Period (1997-2006)

1. Number of Fires for 1997-2006

〔图〕插图

Year1997199819992000200120022003200420052006IR (%)
TF29,47232,66433,85634,84436,16932,96631,37232,73732,34031,7781.2
S23,74327,16828,25328,84630,07827,10225,23526,62026,37025,7731.3
VH5,7295,4965,6035,9986,0915,8646,1376,1175,9706,0050.8

The number of fires for the last 10-year period has shown an average 1.2% increase rate per year since 1997. In 2006, total 31,778 fires occurred to be up by 7.8% from 1997. Fires in Structures marked an average 1.3% increase rate per year, and resulted in a 8.5% rise from 23,743 fires in 1997 to 25,773 fires in 2006. Vehicle (vehicles, ships, aircraft) fires have risen with an average 0.8% rate per year to mark a 4.8% increase rate in 2006 compared to 1997.

  1. Fire Casualties for 1997-2006

〔图〕插图

O Trend in fire deaths

O Trend in fire injuries

  1. Property Loss for 1997-2006

〔图〕插图

Year1997199819992000200120022003200420052006IR (%)
PL (Wmil.)121,712159,721166,426151,972169,750143,447151,590146,634171,374150,7923.8

○ Trend in property loss

○ Property loss order by places

○ Property loss order by causes

4. Fires by Cause for the 5-Year Period 2002-2006.

4-1. Electrical Fires

〔图〕插图

○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-2. Smoking materials

Category20022003200420052006Increase Rate(%)
Fires3,8473,3163,5853,2913,311-5.3
Deaths18271730173.1
Injuries1111501069272-6.4
Property Loss (W million)5,6704,7285,3424,3124,707-6.0

O Fire trend

O Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-3. Arson

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-4. Children Playing

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-5. Embers

14.012012PL(in thousands)PL(in thousands)PL(in thousands)PL(in thousands)PL(in thousands)PL(in thousands)
14.01201220032003200420052006Increase Rate(%)
Category2,2514InjuriesProperty Loss(W million)2,06126567,2612,4648968,7112,46071077,3892,41691149,1110.185.15.54.9

○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-6. Oils

〔图〕插图

Category20022003200420052006Increase Rate(%)
Fire355358354335291-5.9
Deaths30395
Injuries707081118791.1
Property Loss (¥ million)1,3781,3169081,2391,68513.5

○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

4-7. Gases

〔图〕14.0◆Fires12.0Fire Casualties(FC...一-★--Property Loss(PL)10.0Fires(in hundreds8.06.04.0PL(in thousands)2.0FC(in hundreds ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5. Fires by Property Type for the 5-Year Period 2002-2006

5-1. Residential (Houses & Apartments)

〔图〕插图 O Fire trend

O Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-2. Factories

6.0PL(in tenthousands)
4.014.014.014.014.014.014.01
3.3FC(in hundreds)3.3FC(in hundreds)3.3FC(in hundreds)3.3FC(in hundreds)3.3FC(in hundreds)3.3FC(in hundreds)3.3FC(in hundreds)
2.02.02.02.02.02.02.0
1.01.01.01.01.01.01.0
0.00.00.00.00.00.00.0
Category20022003200420052006IncreaseRate(%)
Fires3,5393,4163,4503,3583,261-3.5
Deaths24251826132.4
Injuries195223236195179-2.6
Property Loss(¥ million)41,36655,50743,80449,00648,2720.8

○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-3. Vehicles

20.020.020.020.020.020.020.0
18.018.018.018.018.018.018.0
16.016.016.0PL(in thousands)PL(in thousands)PL(in thousands)• Fire Casualties(FC)• Property Loss(PL)
14.014.014.014.014.014.0
12.012.012.012.012.012.0
10.010.010.0
8.08.08.0Fires(in thousands)Fires(in thousands)Fires(in thousands)
6.06.06.06.06.06.0
4.04.04.0FC(in hundreds)FC(in hundreds)FC(in hundreds)
2.02.02.02.02.02.0
0.00.00.0
20022003200420052006Increase Rate(%)
Category2002200320042005Increase Rate(%)
Fires5,7946,0496,0125,8845,929-0.1
Deaths6027474744657.7
Injuries9932413010012435.9
Property Loss (¥ million)12,90117,21213,74512,09212,6160.7

○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-4. Restaurants

〔图〕插图

○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-5. Shops

〔图〕插图

○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-6. Workplace

〔图〕插图 ○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-7. Warehouses

12.012.012.012.012.012.012.0
10.010.010.010.010.010.010.0
8.08.08.08.08.08.08.0
6.06.06.06.06.06.06.0
4.04.04.04.04.04.04.0
2.02.02.02.02.02.02.0
0.00.00.00.00.00.00.0
200220032003200420052006Increase Rate(%)
Injuries Property Loss (¥ million)InjuriesInjuriesInjuriesInjuriesInjuriesInjuries
7,8705,2678,77110,0048,57920.8

○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-8. Hotels & Motels

〔图〕插图

○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

5-9. Schools

9.09.09.09.09.09.09.0
7.07.07.07.07.07.07.0
6.06.06.06.06.06.06.0
5.05.05.05.05.05.05.0
4.04.04.04.04.04.04.0
3.03.03.03.03.03.03.0
2.02.02.02.02.02.02.0
1.01.01.01.01.01.01.0
0.00.00.00.00.00.00.0
Category20022003200420052006Increase Rate(%)
Fires2462432682182732.1
Deaths08200
Injuries1524921191.4
Property Loss (¥ million)7117127824154984.0

○ Fire trend

○ Fire casualties

○ Property loss

FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Fire at Yeosu Immigration Office

Fire at Yeosu Immigration Office

1. Generals

$\blacksquare$ Location : Hwajang-dong, Yeosu-si, Jeollanam-do, Korea

$\blacksquare$ Date & Time : Feb. 11th (Sun), 2007 at 03:55

$\blacksquare$ Ignition Area : Detention room 304 on the 3rd floor

$\blacksquare$ Cause of accident : Incendiary

$\blacksquare$ Casualties : Deaths - 10 persons, Injuries - 17 persons

$\blacksquare$ Loss of Properties : 148 m $^{2}$ of the interior on the 3rd floor burned & a part of the 4th floor smoked

2. Facility Status

2.1 Facility Overview

The Yeosu Immigration Office buildings that are located at 12,982 m $^{2}$ of site area consist of an administrative office building, an emergency standby station and a main entrance guardhouse. The construction completed on December, 2004. The Office is in charge of administration about 1,500 registered foreigners who

〔图〕插图

[Pic. 1] Front view of Yeosu Immigration Office

reside in the eastern regions of Jeollanam-do, control immigration defenses in mainly southern regions inspection on the entry and exit of natives, foreigners and ships,

and investigation, protection and eviction illegal of immigrants.

The administrative office building where the fire took place is of reinforced concrete structure with slab roof, consisting of the official offices on the 1st and 2nd floors and protective facilities for foreigners on the 3rd and 4th floors. At the time of fire, a total of 55 illegal immigrants (51 men on the 3rd floor and 4 women on the 4th floor) were accommodated.

On the 3rd floor where the fire took place, there are 6 group rooms that each can accommodate 10 persons, and 6 single rooms. The group rooms are placed by 3 rooms on each side of a central monitoring room and the single rooms are located at the backside of the center.

In each detention room, steel-barred door was built in the direction toward the monitoring room in order to control the entrance and exit, and there were lavatory in the rear and a wooden cabinet which clothes were put in and a TV was placed on.

Corridors are on three sides around the central monitoring room and two direct stairways are located on both sides of the building.

Table. 1. Overview of Administrative Office Building

PurposeFloor$ \text{Area (m}^2\text{)} $Remark
Mach.&Elec. room1st basement floor651
Office1st floor1,984administration, inspection and safeguard divisions
"2nd floor1,820monitoring room
Detention room for man3rd floor1,201
Detention room for woman4th floor945
Water tank roomRooftop66
Total6,667

2.2 Fire Protection Facility and Administration System

On each floor, ABC dry powder fire extinguishers were properly placed on corridors and lobbies, but in the detention rooms, the fire extinguisher was not placed due to safety concerns.

A total of 18 indoor hydrant systems were installed in the administrative office building, including three hydrant outlets on the 3rd floor, every floor was covered within 25m of horizontal distance. Also, the result of fire safety inspection shows that the water source and the system maintenance status were good.

For the alarm system, automatic fire detection systems and emergency alarm systems were implemented on every floor, and 4 fire alarm pull stations, fire detectors and speakers were mounted on the 3rd floor. The status of all devices was reported as good.

A total of 8 CCTV surveillance cameras were installed, one in each group room and two in the corridor on the 3rd floor, so that administrators could conduct surveillance via monitors in the control room on the 2nd floor. Additionally, the surveillance system was implemented in order for the security guards to watch with their eyes in the central monitoring room.

At the time of fire, a total of 5 persons were on duty, one woman security guard in the detention facility on the 4th floor, two security guards in the corridor of detention facility and the central monitoring room on the 3rd floor, and two officials in the control room on the 2nd floor.

3. Circumstantial Analysis

Judging from the facts that the place of a cabinet shows the most evident trace of a fire (Pic. 2), that a ceiling part of the place had been affected by heat (Pic. 3), and that trace of a fire is more evident in the direction toward Room 304 from Room 306 (Pic. 4), it seems that the Room 304 is the origin of the fire. After occurring in Room 304, the fire burned the wooden cabinet and polyurethane mat on the floor

and toxic gases and smoke penetrated into all floors through adjacent group rooms.

Two security guards who recognized the fire tried to fight the fire with portable fire extinguishers outside of the room without opening the steel-barred door. However they failed to extinguish the fire, then called fire department. The fire began to be extinguished about 30 minutes after occurrence and was completely extinguished about 30 minutes after that by 120 or more fire-fighters and 27 fire fighting trucks.

The security guard who had failed to extinguish the fire in the first place, got the key from the office on the 2nd floor and went up to the 3rd floor. But because the air was too hot and

〔图〕插图

[Pic. 2] Floor of origin of the fire (Room 304)

(place that a cabinet was present)

〔图〕插图

[Pic. 3] Burned ceiling part of cabinet (Room 304)

toxic gases were present in the air, he could only open the steel-barred door of Room 301, the nearest room, and not the other 5 rooms.

4. Causes of Fire

According to the announcement of Jeonnam Provincial Police Agency, there is no substantial evidence that a lighter was involved in the fire. However judging from

that Mr. Kim (male, 39 years old), who died from the fire, tried to hide himself from the CCTV camera just before the fire and was carrying 130,000 won on his body, it is acknowledged that he is the incendiary.

Also, the police announced that the following facts were confirmed by testimony of the security guard who had been on duty at that time and/or analysis of the CCTV tapes : Mr. Kim, who had been under detention in Room 304, had behaved violently on the day before the accident and had covered the CCTV camera with wet paper tissues 3 times and with toothpaste once ; Mr. Kim had been alone in

〔图〕插图

[Pic. 4] Room 304 (rear) is more fire-damaged than Room 306 (front)

the residential area of Room 304 (the origin of the fire) immediately before the fire.

The police said that they obtained two foreign survivors' testimony, who had been in custody together with Mr. Kim in Room 304 at the time of the fire, "We did not see the behavior of setting a fire but clearly watched Mr. Kim had tried to propagate the fire by lifting the polyurethane mat to accelerate the fire."

Additionally the police found two lighters in Room 304, which could be used as the ignition sources, and the National Institute of Scientific Investigation gave an opinion that the fire might be originated in front of where a TV was placed. In this spot, it is unlikely that the fire can be caused by the external factor such as an leakage of electricity,

〔图〕插图

[Pic. 5] Trace of burned CCTV camera of Room 304

because there was no means of heating and ignition. Instead, it is assumed that the fire was caused by human ignition. Therefore, the police concluded that even though there is no substantial evidence that Mr. Kim set a fire using a lighter, but, judging from the fact that he had been alone the place of origin of the fire, it is acknowledged that he is the incendiary.

As a motive of the crime, considering that unlike other foreigners, he was wearing a sportswear and was carrying 130,000 won, it is assumed that he wanted to escape the immigration office by taking advantage of the confusion due to the fire.

5. Fire loss

While 148 m$^{2}$ of the interior of the 3rd floor was burned and parts of the 3rd and 4th floors ware smoked, loss of properties was insignificant, but 10 foreigners including illegal immigrants are died and 17 persons are injured.

Major combustibles were a wooden cabinet (see Pic. 2 & 6), clothes and books put in it, and

〔图〕.\n

[Pic. 6] Place of cabinet (before the fire)

a polyurethane mat used as a floor covering.

The reasons why, casualties were so high on the 3rd floor though the fire load was not high relatively to the volume, are as follows. First, a large quantity of lethal toxic gases, such as carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide, were formed from the polyurethane mat used as a floor covering and the fluorescent light cover (polyvinyl). Second, because, early in the fire, being concerned about the escape of people under care, the administrator did not immediately unlock the steel-barred doors, they got to be exposed to the fire and became to be victims.

6. Problems and Measures

Praying that the souls may rest in peace, we will examine the problems and propose the measures so that these tragic accidents may not to recur.

6.1 Administrative Measures

Like in many other countries, most of the fires in the care and detention facilities are the incendiary fires by people under care. Therefore, if adequate precaution had been taken so that they might not have any fire source such as a lighter, and the security guard in the 3rd floor's monitoring room had kept a close watch over the incendiary and had taken prompt action when he saw the behavior of covering the CCTV with wet paper tissues over several times, the fire would not happen.

Other two men on duty were reading a book and surfing on the internet, not watching the CCTV monitor in the 2nd floor's control room at the time of the fire, so they recognized the fire late and delayed opening doors except for Room 301 as a result of placing priority only on the escape of foreigners in custody. This resulted in increase in casualties. The control room manager's slow response also made the situation worse. Those 4 men on duty at the time of the fire arrested for professional negligence.

This tragic accident was a human disaster that could be prevented in advance if employees in charge of security and administration had been periodically trained for the security and fire prevention in a usual time and for the evacuation guidance and fire suppression in an emergency time.

6.2 Facility Measures

① Since most of fires in the detention and correctional facilities are the incendiary fires, use flame-proofing products instead of combustible bedding that is easy to be ignited, replace combustibles such as a wooden cabinet with noncombustibles, and especially, do not use materials that discharge lethal toxic gases during burning, such as a polyurethane mat.

② Install the smoke detection system in the detention room and corridor in order to

detect the fire at early stage.

③ In the residential area of the detention and correctional facility such as prison cells and foreigners' detention facilities, where people in custody can not evacuate rapidly due to the restraint, install the automatic sprinkler system to suppress and extinguish the fire.

④ The door locking system shall be capable of operating with both manual and remote controllers, considering the extremely rapid fire growth, and the unlocking device, such as a key, shall be kept in the place with limited access that is safe from the fire and adjacent to the detention room.

FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Explosion and Fire at the Cosmetics Case Manufacturing Plant

Explosion and Fire at the Cosmetics Case Manufacturing Plant

1. Generals

$\blacksquare$ Location : Gocheon-dong, Uiwang-si, Gyeonggi-do, Korea

$\blacksquare$ Date & Time : Aug. 9th (Thu), 2007 at 20:41

$\blacksquare$ Ignition Area : Coating booth in 3rd floor workplace

$\blacksquare$ Cause of accident : Electric ignition sources (assumption)

$\blacksquare$ Casualties : Deaths - 6 persons, Injuries - 2 persons

$\blacksquare$ Loss of Properties : 245 m $^{2}$ of the interior on the 3rd floor and process facilities burned-out

2. Overview of Facility and Process

2.1 Facility Status

The building where the explosion&fire accident took place is an apartment-type factory occupied by a number of small manufacturers which is of reinforced concrete structure, three storied, with slab roof. ○ ○ Industry was the small business and occupied on the 3rd floor and generates nearly 800 millions won in sales yearly. In this company, 11 employees perform the cosmetics case coating operation in the workplace of 245 m $^{2}$.

2.2 Process Overview

When workers put materials on the conveyor, dust removal, coating and drying works are performed in order along with the chain conveyor movement, and then the finished goods are produced, as shown in [Fig. 1].

Material InputDust RemovalCoatingDryingFinished Goods

[Fig. 1] Work Process Diagram

In coating work process, the coating liquid supplied by an air pump are sprayed to the surface of cosmetics case via a fixed spray nozzle in coating booth. There were air supply and exhaust equipment, general motors (non-explosion proof type) and fluorescent lights in the booth. In drying work process, the coating liquid remaining on the product is dried and removed by a infrared heater. Unlike the coating booth, only air supply equipment was installed in the drying system.

[Table. 1] shows the physical and chemical characteristics of thinner used in the process, involved with this fire and explosion accident. [Table. 2] shows the specification of coating booth apparatus which could be related to ignition.

[Table. 1] Physical and Chemical Characteristics of Thinner

Material NameFlash Point (°C)Ignition Point (°C)Explosion Limit (%)Vapor Density (Air = 1)
Thinner0 or below3801.2~103
Toluene44801.2~7.13.14
Xylene25464~5291.0~7.03.7

[Table. 2] Specification of Coating Booth

Dimension3 m×3.8 m×1.9 m (Width×Length×Height)
StructureClosed Type (Only the space required for conveyor movement to the drying system is open)
Effective Inside Volume12.7 m²
Coating Liquid SprayerTotal of 8 fixed sprayers (only 6 sprayers are found in the field investigation)
Supply Method of Coating LiquidThrough the air pump in stirring vessel outside of coating booth
Capacity of Air Supply and Exhaust EquipmentSupply : 40Hp, Exhaust : 20 Hp (air supply is shared with the drying system)
AccessoriesTwo electric motors and a number of fluorescent lights (non-explosion proof type)

3. Circumstantial Analysis

In the process immediately before explosion and fire occur, in preparation for coating of metal parts, the conveyor was running without materials put on it, and thinner was being sprayed using an air pump from the thinner vessel outside of coating booth in order to clean coating liquid left on the coating liquid feeding pipe and spray nozzle. (10 kg of thinner was sprayed for about 3 minutes.)

In the drying system, the exhaust ventilation equipment has been started up along with air supply and exhaust equipment of coating booth, and the temperature of infrared heater was adjusted to 100 °C.

At 20:41, August 9th, 2007, the sound of explosion was suddenly heard from the coating booth, and then fire took place at the entrance side and window glasses started to break. There were 8 workers around the material-feeding area and a plant manager in the workplace.

The manager tried to extinguish fire using two of three portable fire extinguishers

〔图〕2007\n

[Pic. 1] Exterior view of the factory

kept in the workplace but the fire rapidly spreaded to flammable substances, such as thinner, paints and plastic cosmetics cases. Therefore he ran out of the workplace and called a fire station.

The witnesses, including persons concerned with the adjacent businesses, testified that the sound of explosion continued to be heard 30 times or more after the first sound. It seems that these sounds caused by explosions of flammable substances (i.e., thinner and coating liquid vessels) scattered in the workplace.

The fire was completely brought under control by 120 or more fire-fighters and 29 fire fighting trucks at 22:10, about an hour and half after occurrence.

4. Causes of Explosion & Fire (Assumption)

4.1 Direct Causes

○ Potentially explosive atmosphere

Based on the sprayed amount of thinner (10 Kg), the volume of evaporated flammable substances was lower than the explosion limit (1.2 %) in coating booth but it is determined that local density might exceed the lower explosion limit in coating booth because the vapor density of thinner (3 or more) was heavier than air.

〔图〕2007,613\n

[Pic. 2] Burned-out coating booth

And there was a point of time when the density of flammable substances at the lower part of the booth locally exceeded the explosion limit due to the bad operation of air supply and exhaust equipment or large amount of liquid droplet from the nozzle.

○ Use of non-explosion proof type electrical equipment in the explosion hazard area

In the place where large quantities of flammable substances are used, such as a coating booth, electric machines and appliances shall be of appropriate explosion-proof type in order not to act as ignition sources, but non-explosion proof motors were used.

○ No preparation for explosion and fire prevention caused by static electricity

For the flammable substances handling equipment that may create a possible fire and explosion hazard caused by static electricity, it should be taken measures to restrain or prevent the generation of static electricity, but no measures were taken.

〔图〕20078 13\n

who could not egress were sacrificed when the evacuation route was blocked.

5. Fire loss

4 workers died due to toxic gases produced by the fire, 2 workers died and 2 workers were injured who broke the window and leaped from the 3rd floor after the entrance was blocked.

In terms of property losses, 245 m $^{2}$ of ○ ○ Industry's workplace at the 3rd floor was totally burned out, and process equipments, raw and subsidiary materials and finished goods were burned.

6. Preventive Measures

6.1 Technical Measures

○ Use explosion-proof electrical equipments

In the place where large quantities of flammable substances are used, such as a coating booth, the electric machines and appliances shall be of appropriate explosion-proof type in order not to act as ignition sources. (including an infrared heater in drying system)

○ Take Preventive measures for explosion and fire caused by static electricity

For the thinner supply system that may create a possible fire and explosion hazard caused by static electricity, measures such as grounding, using conductive materials or antistatic devices should be taken to restrain or prevent the generation of static electricity.

○ Improve drying system

The drying system for hazardous substances should be improved to have an exhaust ventilation equipment that can discharge vapors in drying process to a safe area, to be capable of contacting directly with vapors of flammable substances, and to be of a structure that supplies heat sources indirectly, such as a hot air drying

method, rather than drying by an infrared heater containing a potential hazard that temperature can increase over the auto-ignition temperature.

※ Local exhaust ventilation equipment shall be installed using an enclosing hood and shall be capable of keeping the speed over 0.4 m/sec.

○ Install gas detector

For the coating booth, since a potentially explosive atmosphere can be caused by the vapors of flammable substances, a combustible gas detector shall be installed.

6.2 Administrative Measures

○ Keep hazardous substances in the workplace only as much as required.

The flammable substances Such as Thinner and paints shall be kept in the workplace only as much as required for one day's work in order to prevent spread of the fire.

○ Install exit

In the flammable substances handling workplace, there shall be an exit in a direction other than the entrance.

※ Installation standard of exit

FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Explosion and Fire at the Car Scratch Removal

Compound Factory

Explosion and Fire at the Car Scratch

Removal Compound Factory

1. Generals

$\blacksquare$ Location : Daegot-myeon, Gimpo-si, Gyeonggi-do, Korea

$\blacksquare$ Date & Time : Aug. 17th (Fri), 2007 at 11:56

$\blacksquare$ Ignition Area : Inside of organic solvent mixer

$\blacksquare$ Cause of accident : Electrical causes, such as static electricity (assumption)

$\blacksquare$ Casualties : Deaths - 2 persons, Injuries - 5 persons

$\blacksquare$ Loss of Properties : 150 millions won (estimated by fire Department) due to two factory facilities (918.71 m $^{2}$) totally burned & finished goods and process facility burned-out

2. Process Overview

○ ○ Chemical's plant consisted of two single-story factory facilities, which are of steel structures and covered with sandwich panel roofs. In the plant, car scratch removal compounds were manufactured through the process as shown in [Fig. 1], and fire & explosion occurred when "oil-soluble materials" were being mixed in the first step of manufacturing process.

〔图〕插图 〔图〕插图

[Fig. 1] Work Process Diagram

Organic solvent (aromatic hydrocarbons, such as BTX) and abrasive powder were used as the oil-soluble materials, and it seems that a mixer is the Vertical Type with 2 m height and 1m diameter. Moreover, the stirring motor was of non-explosion proof type.

The process of mixing oil-soluble materials is as follows.

○ Step 1 : Inject the compound into a mixer for blending oil-soluble materials.

○ Step 2 : Increase temperature up to 90~100 ℃. (direct heating with the burner below the mixer)

○ Step 3 : Inject abrasive powder and wax, then heat and stir them.

○ Step 4 : Cool the compound after mixing.

○ Step 5 : Mix the water-soluble materials (water + emulsifying agent) when the mixing oil-soluble materials is finished.

3. Circumstantial Analysis

At 09:00 on the day when the fire accident occurred, 7 workers started works for manufacturing the car scratch removal compound. 2 workers were responsible in major parts of the process, including injecting materials and charging, and the remaining 5 workers were in charge of the simple work of labelling containers

charged with the organic solvent.

At 11:56, when 2 workers were injecting the organic solvent into the mixer for manufacturing oil-soluble materials and injecting the abrasive powder in the burlap bag via manhole, the vapor of organic solvent staying at the upper part of the mixer was ignited and then there was an explosion.

After the first explosion, a chain of explosions occurred as the flames caught containers and drums containing other flammable substances, which were scattered in the place the process.

The fire was completely extinguished by 60 or more fire-fighters and 34 fire fighting trucks at 12:50, about 50 minutes after occurrence.

〔图〕插图

[Pic. 1] Burned-out facility

〔图〕插图

[Pic. 2] Burned-out mixer

4. Causes of Explosion & Fire (Assumption)

○ Development of potentially explosive atmosphere

It seems that a potentially explosive atmosphere existed because of two reasons: first, the workers injected the organic solvent into the mixer, and then increased the inner temperature (up to about 90~100 °C) of the mixer directly using a burner below the mixer; second, the flammable vapors stayed at the upper parts of the

organic solvent in the mixer caused by the stirring work during injection through a manhole for preventing the abrasive powder from being deposited at the bottom.

O Ignition Sources

Static electricity might occur due to the friction between particles while injecting the abrasive powder, or electric charges of workers' bodies and clothes.

Also, a general motor and wires were placed at the upper parts of the mixer, typically the flammable vapors build up due to direct heating (90~100 °C) and stirring. When examining the accident site, a motor with core part heavily damaged was found.

〔图〕插图

[Pic. 3] Burner for direct heating of mixer

〔图〕插图

[Pic. 4] Burned-out impeller and Motor

In light of this, there is a possibility that the motor and wires were also the ignition sources.

5. Fire loss

Due to the fire resulted from the explosion, 2 workers died from burns all over their bodies and the remaining 5 workers suffered second-degree burns. Property losses are estimated (by fire department) to be around 150 millions won of the values of two factory facilities (918.71 m$^{2}$) burned out and finished goods &

process facility, including a mixer, burned.

6. Preventive Measures

6.1 Technical Measures

○ Avoid potentially explosive atmosphere

If the powder is injected while flammable vapors built up from the organic solvent, then static electricity occurs and may act as an ignition source. Therefore, to avoid the ignition of a potentially explosive atmosphere, a equipment for injection of inert gas, such as nitrogen, shall be placed. Also, the flammable substances handling equipment shall be grounded to prevent static electricity and properly maintained.

○ Improve temperature-increase method

If open flame is used to increase temperature after organic solvent is injected into a mixer for manufacturing oil-soluble materials for vehicles, then a potentially explosive atmosphere may occur because high temperature part is generated on the metal material and the inner temperature of organic solvent increases locally. Therefore, the temperature-increase method should be changed to the indirect thermal exchange method using steam, hot-water, and so on.

○ Install local exhaust ventilation system

To avoid a potentially explosive atmosphere arising from the expansion of flammable high-density vapors through a manhole of the mixer, a local exhaust ventilation system shall be implemented to minimize the generation of flammable vapors in workplace.

○ Use explosion-proof type electric machines and appliances

In the area where a potentially explosive atmosphere may be caused by flammable vapors such as the upper part of the mixer, electric machines and appliances shall be of explosion-proof type and a grounding system shall be installed.

O Install combustible gas detector

A combustible gas detector shall be installed in the combustible liquids handling place to avoid a potentially explosive atmosphere arising from the vapor of organic solvent.

6.2 Administrative Measures

○ Provide fire extinguishers and enhance the MSDS training

In the place to store and/or handle the flammable substances, fire extinguishers shall be placed, and the education and training should be provided periodically to workers as appropriate. Also, the training should be provided to workers regarding characteristics, work methods and material safety data sheets (MSDS) for the materials to be handled, because it was determined that all employees of $\bigcirc \bigcirc$ Chemical had no experience in handling organic solvents, and therefore they worked without awareness of the harmfulness and hazard of those materials.

○ Minimize flammable material usage

The flammable materials necessary to the process shall be brought and used in the workplace only as much as required for one day's work.

This is provided under the Agreement of Cooperation between the KFPA and the NFPA. Please feel free to contact Risk Research & Development Department of KFPA if you have any inquires. (E-Mail kfpa@kfpa.or.kr, Tel 82-2-3780-0200, Fax 82-2-3780-0329)

2007 KOREAN FIRE DATA

Published in March 2008

Edited by Research & Investigation Team

Published by Korean Fire Protection Association

35-4 Yoido-Dong, Yongdungpo-Ku

Seoul 150-885, KOREA

TEL 82-2-3780-0200

FAX 82-2-3780-0329

E-Mail kfpa@kfpa.or.kr// http://www.kfpa.or.kr

Registered No. 13-794 (1997.8.14)

Printed by LeeWhan (Tel 82-2-764-1116)

ISBN 978-89-88874-74-5 93530

源文件:08_火灾统计与专题分析/2007/2007_韩国_KFPA_火灾统计年报_화재조사보고서.md
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